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ABSTRACT 
CEO Traits and Loan Contract 
by 
MA Yiu Chung 
Doctor of Philosophy 
The first part of the thesis investigates the relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and loan covenant usage. Empirical findings show that creditors use 
significantly more covenants, increase covenant intensity, and rely on different types 
of covenants, such as debt-to-cash flow and coverage ratio to lower the default risk 
emanating from managerial overconfidence. Besides, creditors tighten individual 
covenants, such as debt-to-cash flow covenants and current ratio covenants in order 
to alleviate their risk exposure. Covenant usage is reported to be quantitatively larger 
in the loan contracts of firms with higher market-to-book ratios, reflecting that 
high-growth firms provide opportunities for overconfident CEOs to invest more 
excessively. To address endogeneity and self-selection, the thesis employs natural 
experiment with Sarbanes Oxley Acts (SOX) implemented in 2002, propensity score 
matching, and change-in-change equation. The results are robust in these tests. 
Besides, empirical evidence shows that CEO overconfidence is positively associated 
which loan maturity and loan amount, suggesting that the impacts of CEO 
overconfidence on loan contract terms are not one-sidedly negative.  
The second part of the research investigates the interaction between firms' CEO 
compensation and overconfidence, which is crucial for banks to assess credit risk. 
The empirical results suggest that covenant restrictions imposed by creditors increase 
with CEO’s holding of option compensation but decreases with CEO’s holding of 
stock compensation. Option compensation and CEO overconfidence interact to 
accentuate the usage of financial covenants. The results also suggest that option 
compensation and CEO overconfidence significantly increase credit risk, mainly in 
young, high-growth, or high-risk firms. However, these different contract terms 
could not replace covenant usage, pointing to the crucial importance of using 
financial covenants to curb overconfidence/incentive risks.
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Chapter I: CEO Overconfidence and Loan Contract 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 Previous studies have suggested that CEO overconfidence can have both 
positive and negative impact on corporate governance. On the one hand, driven by 
their self-attribution bias (Billet & Qian, 2008), overconfident Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) are more likely to pursue optimistic behavior that reduces their 
firm’s value. On the other hand, overconfident CEOs are willing to take risks, which 
helps alleviate the under-invest problem seen in risk-averse CEOs.  
While previous studies have focused on the impact of CEO overconfidence on a 
firm’s investment decision, few have paid attention on the cost of borrowing. This 
research aims to study the relationship between CEO overconfidence and loan 
contracting by hypothesizing that an overconfident CEO has both positive and 
negative impacts on the loan contract. Specifically, overconfident CEOs consistently 
overestimate their ability when making investment decisions. They are driven by 
self-attribution bias and have a higher tendency to engage in fraud activities, which 
significantly reduce the firm’s value and increase the default risk. Banks are 
well-informed and aware of the potential credit risk driven by overconfident CEOs. 
In order to alleviate the risk, banks can impose more restrictions or even higher loan 
spread. By using the option-based measure of CEO overconfidence (Malmendier & 
Tate, 2005) and with the evidence of a large sample of private loan agreements, this 
research concludes that banks rely on covenants instead of a higher loan spread as an 
instrument to cope with overconfident CEOs. This is because using a higher loan 
spread against overconfident CEOs may induce the problem of adverse selection, as 
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overconfident CEOs overestimate the return on investment and are more likely to 
accept a higher loan spread, while the use of more or even tighter covenants can 
restrict the CEOs’ opportunistic behavior in investment decisions. The research 
further studies the types of covenants chosen by banks to alleviate the credit risk 
stemming from overconfident CEOs. Apart from the traditional classification of 
financial covenants and general covenants, I have also employed the classification of 
covenant intensity (Bradley & Roberts, 2015), P-covenant and C-covenant 
(Christensen & Nikolaev, 2012), the six groups of covenant (Nini, Smith, & Sufi, 
2009), and covenant tightness measures (Demiroglu & James, 2010). The results 
suggest that banks impose more financial covenants (especially performance-related 
covenants) and tighter covenants measures when facing overconfident CEOs, 
suggesting that banks are aware of the threat of CEO overconfidence on credit risk.  
Despite the possibility of overconfident CEOs increasing the credit risk, these 
managers are more innovative and are more willing to invest in research and 
development. While these investments can be beneficial to the firm in the long run, 
they involve a larger amount of investment costs and take a longer time to yield 
return. Supported by the empirical evidence, this research reveals that banks 
acknowledge that actions that bring positive impacts on firms could bring a larger 
return to banks, and, as a result, banks are willing to give a longer loan period 
(maturity) and a larger loan amount to firms with overconfident CEO.  
Three methods have been used to tackle potential endogeneity issues in this 
study. The first approach is propensity score matching. As overconfident CEOs may 
select firms with higher growth opportunity and young firms to work in in order to 
exploit their power, the potential for self-selection bias exists. The use of propensity 
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score matching aims to pair up firms with similar characters but with different CEO 
trait (overconfident CEO) in order to rule out the possibility that the use of covenants 
can be attributed to factors other than CEO overconfidence (firm characters). The 
results show that the impact of overconfident CEOs on the use of covenant is also 
significant in the matched sample, suggesting that the effect of CEO overconfidence 
is unlikely to be driven by other firm characters. The second approach employed is 
change-in-change equation. Specifically, data on changes in CEO and CEO 
overconfidence are regressed with the change in covenant usage. The change in CEO 
(and the overconfidence level) works as an exogenous shock to alleviate potential 
endogenous concerns arising from firm characters. It was found that an increase in 
overconfidence level resulting from a change in CEO significantly increases the 
number of covenants, suggesting that the impact of overconfidence is robust with the 
help of exogenous shock. The last approach is the use of Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) 
implementation as a natural experiment. The implementation of SOX significantly 
increases the transparency of the management board and restrains CEO 
overconfidence. The results show that, in the post-SOX period, the effect of CEO 
overconfidence significantly decreases. As the implementation of SOX is an 
exogenous shock to weaken CEO overconfidence, the interaction between SOX and 
CEO overconfidence on covenant usage can serve as a natural experiment to tackle 
the potential endogeneity issue. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
current literature on loan contracting and CEO behavior, while Section 3 describes 
the hypothesis setting and regression model for the current study. Section 4 
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introduces the data sources and variable constructions, and Section 5 discusses the 
empirical results. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the findings from this chapter.  
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Section 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Studies on CEO Overconfidence 
 The study of CEO overconfidence can be traced back to Heaton (2002), who 
discovered that the existence of managerial optimistic estimation can be a distortion 
to the corporate investment. Since then, there has been an increasing number of 
studies on the impacts of CEO overconfidence on corporate governance. These 
studies suggested that CEO overconfidence has both positive and negative impacts 
on corporate governance. On the one hand, overconfident CEOs are optimistic and 
tend to overestimate their abilities, resulting in an excessive investment in risky 
projects. Malmendier and Tate (2005) revealed that overconfident CEOs 
overestimate the return of investment, and, in the absence of capital market 
restrictions, they tend to overinvest when they have abundant internal funds. 
Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) concluded that overconfident CEOs tend to 
believe that the firm value is underestimated in the market, and they rely on debt 
financing more than equity financing, which leads to a high leverage. Billet and Qian 
(2008) proposed that CEO overconfidence is developed from self-attribution bias, 
and such managers are more likely to make value-destroying merging and acquisition 
decisions. Ferris, Jayaraman, & Sabherwal (2013) found that overconfident CEOs are 
more likely to make non-diversified merger decision, and they are more likely to 
finance their project with cash.  
Apart from aggressive investments that decrease the firm value, overconfident 
CEOs are also found to be more likely to engage in fraud activities. Schrand and 
Zechman (2011) suggested that overconfident CEOs exhibit optimistic bias, which 
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increases the tendency of intentional misstatement in financial report. Ahmed and 
Duellman (2012) concurred, adding that overconfident CEOs tend to use 
less-conservative accounting standard and delay loss recognition.  
On the flip side, overconfident CEOs are less risk-averse, which can bring 
positive impacts to a firm. For example, Goel and Thakor (2008) discovered that 
overconfident CEOs can increase firm value. This is because, for risk-averse CEOs, 
if they receive a significant portion of their compensation in form of equity 
compensation, they are likely to under-invest to avoid possible decrease in share 
price. Such behavior reduces a firm’s value, as the investment level would be lower 
than optimum. Overconfident CEOs can mitigate the problem, as in nature, they are 
more aggressive in investment decisions, which can alleviate the under-investment 
problem due to risk-aversion (Note that overconfidence and risk-averse are not 
mutually exclusive). Hirshleifer, Low, and Teo (2012) pointed out that overconfident 
CEOs are more willing to invest in research and development, as demonstrated by 
their returns on innovative industries being higher relative to normal CEOs.  
Thus it can be concluded that overconfident CEOs are in fact a double-edged 
sword for firms, as they bring both positive and negative effects to a firm’s value. 
Although their overestimation of their ability can lead to excessive investment and 
possible fraud activities that harm a firm’s value, their risk-taking behavior can 
improve a firm’s investment portfolio and lead to an increase in firm value.  
 Despite the large amount of research that has been carried out on the impact of 
CEO overconfidence on corporate governance, studies on how the creditors perceive 
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overconfident CEO are very limited. The next section is a summary of studies on 
debt contracting in the literature. 
  
2.2 Studies on Debt Contracting 
 In the context of loan contracting, previous research mostly focused on its 
impact on firms’ characters, external relationship and managerial compensation 
structure, and character to loan contracting. Regarding firm characters, Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2010) concluded that financial reporting quality affects debt 
contracting. Creditors substitute loan covenant with other security and price 
protection measures when firms are revealed to have a material internal control 
weakness. Nikolaev (2010) studied the relationship between accounting conservatism 
and the use of covenants, and suggested that the use of covenants in public debt and 
timely loss recognition are positively related. He also found that the impact of 
covenants on the demand for timely loss recognition is weakened when firms rely 
more on private debts, suggesting that private loan's lender has a higher degree of 
monitoring than public debt holders. Christensen, Nikolaev, and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2016) pointed out that accounting information is important in 
the determination of debt contract. The use of accounting ratio-related covenants can 
both provide incentive to the firms and allocate part of the control right to the lenders, 
suggesting that the use of accounting information can improve the debt contract 
efficiency. Using the book-tax difference and cash effective tax rate as measures of 
tax avoidance, Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2014) revealed that firms that exhibit tax 
avoidance are likely to incur a higher loan spread.  
 8 
The determinants of loan contract are also subject to environment factor. For 
example, Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma (2014) found that if a firm’s broad members 
have a political tie, it would significantly decrease the borrowing cost for the firm. 
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011) discovered that the loan spread 
charged to a firm decrease significantly if the firm repeatedly borrows from the same 
lender, suggesting that the lending relationship can help mitigate asymmetric 
information and credit risk.  
On managerial compensation structure characters, Brockman, Martin, and 
Unlu’s (2010) study on the relationship between executive compensation and firms' 
debt portfolio maturity revealed that there is a negative relation between executive’s 
delta (Sensitivity to stock price. Delta is defined as the sensitivity of a derivative 
relative to the changes in the stock price. For example, if the delta of a stock option is 
0.7, it implies that an increase in stock price by $1 would cause the value of option to 
increase by $0.7) and a firm’s debt maturity, and a negative relation between 
executive’s vega (Sensitivity to stock price volatility. It is measures the impact of a 
1% increase in standard deviation of the stock price on manager's option portfolio 
value). Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2014) concluded that CEO inside debts are 
negatively related to loan spread and covenants, suggesting that a higher CEO inside 
debts align the incentive of managers with that of debt holders to alleviate agency 
risk.  
Among existing literature, only a few studies focused on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and a firm’s financing cost. Huang, Tan, and Faff 
(2016) studied the relationship between a firm’s debt maturity profile and CEO 
overconfidence, and found that overconfident CEOs tend to prefer short-term debt 
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financing, as they believe that such debt can alleviate the mispricing problem 
stemming from insider information being not known to public. While Sunder, Sunder, 
and Tan (2010) investigated the relationship between bond contract and 
overconfident CEOs, their work focused on public debt contract (bond) but not 
private debt contract (bank loan). As such, how the banks perceive the possible credit 
risk and opportunities arising from CEO overconfidence was not adequately 
explained.  
The importance of studying loan contract can be explained as follows. As 
revealed by Denis and Mihov (2003), the choice of whether to finance through 
private debt or public debt is highly dependent on the credit quality of a firm. Firms 
with the highest credit quality rely on public debt financing, while those with lower 
credit quality have to rely on private debt financing. Focusing only on bond 
contracting without paying attention to private loan contracts would mean omitting 
the group of firms with lower credit quality. Since this group of firms is more likely 
to have higher credit risk, it is important to study how creditors react accordingly to 
mitigate the potential default risk. Also, banks have access to more financial and 
accounting information of the firms than bond holders due to concentration of debt, 
which implies that private loan contracts are more sensitive to a firm’s condition, and 
hence, reveal more information about a firm’s credit quality.  
In this research, the primary focus is the use of covenant in relation to CEO 
overconfidence. Due to separation of ownership and misalignment of information, 
agency problem between stockholders and managers, or between managers and 
debtholders, are very common (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Covenant is one of the 
most common tools used in alleviating agency problems, as it restricts a firm’s 
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financial ratio or prohibits the firm from engaging in certain actions, which restrains 
the CEO’s behavior and protect the creditor’s interests. Once the covenant is 
breached, part of the control right of the firm is transferred to the creditors. As a 
result, the covenant can be regarded as a monitoring tool that reduces the amount of 
risk creditors are exposed to. Chava & Roberts (2008) discovered that investment 
activities of the borrowing firms decline significantly after the firm has violated 
certain covenants. Using CEO tenure as a proxy of entrenchment, Chava, Kumar, 
and Warga (2010) revealed that managerial entrenchment is associated with the use 
of investment restriction-related covenant by the creditors. All of these suggest that 
covenants play an important role in a firm’s investment decision and managerial trait.   
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Section 3: Hypothesis 
 
 This thesis aims at studying the relationship between CEO overconfidence and 
loan contracting. The key variable used to proxy for a change in loan term is 
covenant. Loan covenant is a common instrument used by banks to protect 
themselves against potential credit risk. Different types of covenant can affect firms 
in different aspects, including capital structure, profit management, investment 
decision, and even dividend policy. Generally, covenants can be categorized into two 
major groups: Financial covenants and general covenants. Financial covenants are 
covenants that aim to restrain a firm’s financial ratio. For example, if a debt-to-cash 
flow covenant is included in the loan agreement, the firm’s debt-to-cash flow ratio 
cannot exceed the threshold set by the covenant. Such covenant can restrict the 
firm’s financing ability and cash flow management simultaneously. General 
covenants, on the other hand, restrict a varity of firm behavior, including debt issue 
sweep, collateral release, and dividend restriction. If a covenant set in the loan 
agreement is breached, the borrowing firm would be regarded to be in a status of 
technical default, and part of its control right would be transferred to the banks, 
which can then take actions including shortening the debt maturity or increasing the 
loan spread. Unlike loan spread, which only increases the cost of borrowing without 
a direct intervention on a firm’s management, the use of covenant can restrict CEOs 
from abusing their power in investing and making financing decision, hence 
protecting both shareholders and creditors (Nikolaev, 2010). Moreover, covenants 
can be used as a signal to reflect a firm’s healthiness. Banks can amend the loan 
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terms in advance, so that when the covenant is breached, they can still protect their 
interest.  
For the current study, I hypothesize that, in a bank’s perception, an 
overconfident CEO’s opportunistic behavior increases the credit risk face by the 
bank. To alleviate the potential risk, the bank would impose more covenants to 
restrain the CEO’s opportunistic behavior. The determinants of the number of 
covenant are expressed as the following equation: 
Covenant Number = f (CEO Overconfidence, Loan Characteristics, Firm 
Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, Industry fixed effects, year fixed 
effects). 
I also employ the measure of covenant intensity (Bradley and Roberts, 2015) as 
a proxy of the intensiveness of covenant, and hypothesize that CEO overconfidence 
has a positive effect on the covenant intensity. The determinants of covenant 
intensity are expressed as the following equation: 
Covenant Intensity = f (Managerial Overconfidence, Loan Characteristics, Firm 
Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, Industry fixed effects, year fixed 
effects). 
(As the covenant intensity includes collateral measure as part of the index, “Secured 
Dummy” is omitted in the loan characteristics control for the covenant intensity 
equation.) 
As mentioned previously, I have employed three methods to tackle potential 
endogeneity issues in the study. The first approach is propensity score matching. 
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This aims to reduce the potential for self-selection bias, which stems from 
overconfident CEOs opting to work in firms with higher growth opportunity and 
young firm in order to exploit their power. The use of propensity score matching 
aims to pair up firms with similar characters but with different CEO trait 
(overconfident CEO) in order to rule out the possibility that the use of covenant can 
be attributed to factors other than CEO overconfidence (firm characters). Following 
the method used by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), the propensity score matching is 
conduced according to the following steps. First, I estimate the propensity score of 
each observations based on characters (firm characters) other than the treatment 
(overconfident CEOs). I first hypothesize that CEO overconfidence is determined by 
the following Probit regression: 
CEO overconfidence = f (CEO characters, firm characteristics, industry and year 
fixed effects) 
Overconfidence 67 is used as the dependent variable in the equation, as it is the 
only dummy variable measure for overconfidence, which is essential for conducting 
propensity score matching analysis (to separate the “treatment group” and “non- 
treatment group”). CEO character includes CEO tenure and CEO age. The firm 
characteristics variable is the same as the one in the equation of number of covenant 
and covenant intensity. Using the regression result from the CEO overconfidence 
equation, I determine the propensity score by estimating the similarity of the 
observations in terms of firm characteristics and CEO characters. Then, I pair up 
observations of overconfident CEO and non-overconfident CEO with similar 
propensity score, or, in other words, observations with similar firm characteristics 
and CEO characters, but with different nature of overconfidence. The matching is 
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restricted to be 1-to-1, and the caliper distance is set to 0.1 based on the propensity 
score derived from the Probit regression. Next, the number of covenant and covenant 
intensity regressions are run against this matched sample. If the coefficient of CEO 
overconfidence remains significant in the matched sample, it implies that the effect 
of overconfident CEO is not driven by endogenous factors, as banks choose to 
impose more covenants on firms with overconfident CEO, even if those firms are 
similar to others in nature.  
The second approach employed is change-in-change equation. Data on CEO 
turnover is collected and the change in covenant usage is regressed with the change 
in CEO overconfidence. The CEO turnover works as an exogenous shock to the 
overconfidence level, which alleviates the potential endogenous concern arising from 
firm characters. The change-in-change regression is expressed as follows: 
∆(Covenant Number) = f (∆(Overconfidence), ∆(Loan Characteristics), ∆(Firm 
Characteristics), ∆(Macroeconomic Characteristics), Industry and year fixed effects) 
∆(Covenant Intensity) = f (∆(Overconfidence), ∆(Loan Characteristics), ∆(Firm 
Characteristics), ∆(Macroeconomic Characteristics), Industry and year fixed 
effects). 
The “changes in” variables are constructed by subtracting the variable value in 
the year with the old CEO from that in the year with the new CEO. I hypothesize that 
the change in CEO overconfidence has a positive impact on the change in covenant 
usage.  
The third test conducted is the SOX natural experiment. Guo, Lach, and Mobbs 
(2015) argued that the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 provided an 
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exogenous shock to corporate governance. With the passage of SOX, firms are 
required to have a majority of independent directors on their board and a 
fully-independent audit committee to oversee their accounting quality and 
management. Such requirements significantly strengthened a firm’s internal 
monitoring. The board and audit committee are more independent, and hence, have 
the right to restrain over-aggressive decisions made by overconfident CEOs. 
Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda (2015) noted that the passage of SOX has 
improved the investment decision-making of overconfident CEOs, as they found that 
the interaction of SOX and CEO overconfidence has a negative effect on a firm’s 
overinvestment. I hypothesize that similar relationship can also be found in loan 
contracting. With a more independent board and audit committee to monitor the firm, 
the adverse effect of CEO overconfidence can be mitigated. Banks can then impose 
fewer covenants as they perceive a decrease in credit risk. To capture the impacts of 
SOX regulation on the effects of CEO overconfidence, three interactions term: 
Overconfidence 67 * SOX, Overconfidence Index * SOX, and Avg Option Price * 
SOX are constructed to determine the interaction between the three CEO 
overconfidence measures and the SOX dummy, which is set to 1 if the loan deal is 
made on or after 2002, zero otherwise. The determinants of covenants are expressed 
in the following equations: 
Covenant Number = f (Managerial Overconfidence, Overconfidence*SOX, SOX, 
Loan Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, 
Industry fixed effects, year fixed effects). 
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Covenant Intensity = f (Managerial Overconfidence, Overconfidence*SOX, SOX, 
Loan Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, 
Industry fixed effects, year fixed effects). 
I hypothesize that the coefficient of the interaction terms are negative, 
suggesting that the passage of SOX alleviates the impact of overconfidence on 
covenant usage. As SOX is an exogenous effect mainly and significantly affecting 
the power of CEO overconfidence in exploiting the creditor’s wealth, it can serve as 
a natural experiment that alleviates the potential endogeneity concern. 
I also hypothesize that the problem of CEO overconfidence is higher in 
high-growth firms. Previous studies have suggested that a firm’s growth 
opportunities are associated with risk-shifting behavior (Eisdorfer, 2008). As the 
downside risk is limited, CEOs would take excessive risk and engage in asset 
substitution activities at the cost of creditors, especially when there are amble 
investment opportunities. To study the impact on growth opportunities, I conduct a 
sub-sample analysis by separating the firms into high and low market-to-book ratio 
groups and compare the coefficient of CEO overconfidence between the two groups. 
Apart from investigating whether CEO overconfidence increases loan risk and 
whether banks would react by imposing more covenants, this research also aims to 
study which types of covenant are more effective for banks to alleviate the credit risk 
arising from overconfident CEOs. For this study, covenants are classified into 
financial covenants and general covenants. Financial covenants are mainly used to 
constrain a firm’s financial ratio, including debt-to-cash flow ratio and coverage ratio, 
both of which are closely related to a firm’s profitability and cash flow management. 
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General covenants, on the other hand, mostly restrict firms in aspects other than 
profitability. For example, dividend restriction, debt sweep, or equity sweep. As the 
major problem of overconfident CEOs is their over-optimistic behavior in making 
investment decision, which would lead to overestimation of profit or excessive 
investment, I hypothesize that the use of financial covenants are more effective in 
constraining these behaviors than general covenants. Imposing financial covenants 
may give banks an early signal on whether overconfident CEOs can properly manage 
their firm’s investments. If a firm breaches any covenant, it would be considered to 
be in a status of technical default, and part of its control right would be transferred to 
the banks. Banks can hence constrain overconfident CEOs by charging a higher 
interest rate, shortening the loan maturity, or increasing the collateral. The 
relationship between CEO overconfidence and the use of financial and general 
covenants can be expressed as the following equations: 
Number of Financial Covenants = f (Managerial Overconfidence, Loan 
Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, Industry 
fixed effects, year fixed effects). 
Number of General Covenants = f (Managerial Overconfidence, Loan 
Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, Industry 
fixed effects, year fixed effects). 
I hypothesize that the coefficient of overconfidence is positive and significant 
only in the financial covenant equation, suggesting that financial covenants are more 
effective in alleviating credit risk stemming from overconfident CEOs. 
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In this study, financial covenants are further classified into P-covenants and 
C-covenants, per Christensen and Nikolaev’s (2012) definition. P-covenants are 
covenants with thresholds set according to a firm’s current performance and 
efficiency ratio, including debt-to-cash flow and coverage ratios. In contrast, 
C-covenants are covenants with thresholds based on a firm’s capital structure and 
balance sheet items, including debt-to-equity and current ratios. Christensen and 
Nikolaev (2012) argued that P-covenants are more forward-looking, and as such, can 
act as a timely indicator of poor performance, while C-covenants can align the 
interest of firms and banks, as these covenants require a firm to reserve enough 
capital to satisfy the threshold requirement. Both of these covenants can alleviate a 
certain degree of agency problem. In the case of P-covenants, since overconfident 
CEOs tend to overestimate the expected payoff from the investment and are more 
likely to breach performance-related covenants, if any P-covenant is violated, banks 
can regard it as an early warning of increased credit risk due to the overconfident 
CEO’s misbehavior, such as an over-optimistic projection of profit. Similarly, since 
C-covenants restrict a firm’s capital structure by requiring firms to keep sufficient 
capital against liabilities, the CEO’s investment ability is restricted and the interest 
between banks and shareholders of the firm can be aligned. The determinants of 
P-covenants and C-covenants are expressed in the following equations: 
Number of P-Covenants = f (CEO Overconfidence, Loan Characteristics, Firm 
Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, Industry fixed effects, year fixed 
effects). 
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Number of C-Covenants = f (CEO Overconfidence, Loan Characteristics, Firm 
Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, Industry fixed effects, year fixed 
effects). 
I hypothesize that P-covenants are more effective in monitoring and alleviating 
CEO overconfidence, as they constrain the performance-based financial ratio, which 
exactly targets the problem of overconfident CEOs, namely, overestimating the profit 
from investment. As a result, the coefficient of CEO overconfidence in the 
P-covenant equation should be larger than that in the C-covenant equation. 
Apart from P-covenants and C-covenants, financial covenants can also be 
categorized into the following mutually-exclusive groups based on Nini, Smith, and 
Sufi’s (2009) specification: Debt-to-cash flow, coverage ratio, net worth, 
debt-to-balance sheet, liquidity, and minimum cash flow.   
Pr(Type of Covenant) = f (CEO Overconfidence, Loan Characteristics, Firm 
Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, Industry fixed effects, year fixed 
effects). 
I hypothesize that coverage ratio covenants and liquidity covenants are more 
sensitive to CEO overconfidence. Coverage ratio covenants include interest coverage, 
fixed charge coverage, and debt service coverage ratios, and mainly target the 
borrower’s profitability. As overconfident CEOs are likely to overestimate their 
investment return, banks choose to use coverage ratio to protect themselves in case a 
firm’s profit falls. In contrast, liquidity ratio covenants restrain the liquidity of the 
borrower. As overconfident CEOs tend to invest excessively due to self-attribution 
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bias, restraining liquidity can serve to restrain their behavior by requiring them to 
maintain enough quick assets against liabilities. 
Apart from imposing more covenants, banks can also impose tighter covenants 
to restrain the misbehavior by overconfident CEOs. This study makes use of 
Demiroglu and James’ (2010) covenant slack as a measurement of covenant tightness. 
The determinants of the covenant slack are expressed with the following equation: 
Covenant Slack = f (CEO Overconfidence, Loan Characteristics, Firm 
Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, Industry and year fixed effects). 
 I hypothesize that banks would impose tighter covenants by reducing the 
covenant slack when dealing with firms with overconfident CEOs to cope with the 
associated credit risk. 
 Apart from covenants, loan spread is another instrument used by banks to cope 
with potential credit risk. As loan spread and covenants are both used to cope with 
credit risk, to alleviate the endogeneity problem between the two instruments, I 
employ the generalized method of moment (GMM) simultaneous equations to jointly 
determine the covenant intensity and all-in-spread (loan spread). The model is 
expressed as follows: 
Covenant Intensity = f (CEO Overconfidence, All-in-spread, Loan Characteristics, 
Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, Industry and year fixed 
effects). 
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All-in-spread = f (CEO Overconfidence, Covenant Intensity, Loan Characteristics, 
Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, Industry and year fixed 
effects). 
 The instrumental variable for covenant intensity is the average covenant index 
imposed by the same lead arranger (Lead bank of the syndicate loan) in the year, 
while the instrumental variable for all-in-spread is the average all-in-spread imposed 
by the same lead arranger in the year. 
 I further explore the role of CEO overconfidence in determining other loan 
contract terms, which include loan maturity and loan amount. The determinants of 
loan maturity and loan amount are expressed with the following equations: 
Maturity = f (Overconfidence, Loan Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, 
Macroeconomic Characteristics, Industry and year fixed effects). 
Loan amount = f (Overconfidence, Loan Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, 
Macroeconomic Characteristics, Industry and year fixed effects). 
 As overconfident CEOs tend to invest in more innovative industries and are 
more likely to succeed in increasing the firm value (Goel & Thakor, 2008; 
Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012), I hypothesize that banks are willing to increase 
loan maturity and loan amount to overconfident CEOs so as to increase their return.  
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Section 4: Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.1 Data Sources 
The primary data source in relation to bank loan arrangements is DealScan. Data 
collected includes the loan tranche amount, loan spread, covenant information, 
maturity in terms of months, loan purpose, loan types, collateral provisions, and 
performance pricing information. Firm control variables are extracted from 
Compustat. The data includes a firm’s asset size, leverage, profitability, 
market-to-book ratio, tangibility, Z-score, firm age, S&P rating, cash flow volatility, 
current ratio, debt-to-cash flow ratio, and industry controls. Data related to CEOs are 
extracted from ExecuComp, and includes unexercised option number, unexercised 
option value estimation, and option portfolio. Such data is used to construct the 
option-based measurement of CEO overconfidence using the methods proposed by 
Malmendier and Tate (2005), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), and 
Humphery-Jenner and Nanda (2015). Macro control data is extracted from the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The data period used in this thesis is from 1996 
to 2011. Loan agreements included in the sample have to have at least one covenant 
as a guard against missing data in covenant information. The final sample contains 
3841 loan agreements. Appendix A describes the definition of all variables used in 
the regression and Appendix B describes the details and procedures of how the 
variables are processed and constructed.  
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4.2 Managerial Overconfidence Measures 
 In order to measure CEO overconfidence, three option-based measures are 
employed as proxies: Overconfidence 67, Overconfidence Index, and Average 
Option Price. 
 Overconfidence 67 (or holder67): The first measure is the most 
commonly-used method in existing literature (Malmendier & Tate, 2005; 
Billet & Qian, 2008; Malmendier, Tate, & Yan, 2011; Hirshleifer, Low, & 
Teoh, 2012; Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, & Nanda, 2015). A CEO is 
considered to be overconfident if his/her average moneyness of option 
portfolio is larger than 67%, which means more than 67% of his/her vested 
option is in-the-money. The rationale of this measure is that overconfident 
CEOs believe they have positive insider information about the firm not known 
to the public. As a result, the firm value in the market is underestimated, and 
hence, the stock price of the firm is undervalued. To capture the gain after the 
insider information they have perceived is realized, these CEOs are more likely 
to hold more in-the-money option and postpone exercising these vested 
options. Since details of the a CEO’s option portfolio is not disclosed, I follow 
the method used by Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) to estimate the average 
option value, namely, by dividing the CEO’s unexercised option value by 
number of CEO’s unexercised option number. The average option value is then 
subtracted from the firm’s year-end closing stock price to estimate the option 
strike price. Lastly, the stock price at year end is divided by the estimated strike 
price minus 1 to estimate the average moneyness of the option portfolio. 
According to the definition of Overconfidence 67, a CEO is regarded as 
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overconfident if the average moneyness is larger than 0.67. With reference to 
Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda (2015), the overconfidence is allowed 
to vary over time. 
 Overconfidence Index: This second measure is similar to Overconfidence 67. I 
construct an index with 4 different levels to reflect the varying degrees of 
overconfidence. If the average moneyness is below 0.3, the index is equal to 0. 
If the moneyness is between 0.3 and 0.67, the index is equal to 1. If the average 
moneyness is between 0.67 and 1, the index is equal to 2. If the average 
moneyness is larger than 1, then the index is equal to 3. The choice of scale is 
based on that of Humphery-Jenner, Lisic, Nanda, and Silveri (2016), who 
defined CEO overconfidence based on the degree of average moneyness of 
option portfolio. A higher index implies a higher level of overconfidence. The 
advantage of such index over the Overconfidence 67 is that the level of 
overconfidence can be measured on a scale instead of simply being represented 
by a single dummy variable. 
 Average Option Price: The third measure is another option-based measure of 
CEO overconfidence derived from Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda 
(2015). I estimate the average option value using a similar method as in 
Overconfidence 67, then I scale the average option value by the stock price at 
the end of the fiscal year to calculate the Average Option Price as the proxy for 
overconfidence measure. This is the only CEO overconfidence measure that is 
a continuous variable.  
 
There are also other measures of CEO overconfidence, including survey data 
and press-based data, but they are not employed in this research for several reasons. 
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First, the data on loan agreements are collected from listed companies in the United 
States, and it is difficult to conduct survey with the management board. Even if a 
survey can be conducted, the managers might not want to reveal their overconfidence 
nature. This is because, as shown in previous studies, overconfident CEOs reduce a 
firm’s value in different aspects, which may affect the stock price of these listed 
companies. In view of this, these CEOs may intentionally report invalid answers in 
the surveys, which could distort the results of this research. Second, this research 
requires data on firm characteristics and loan agreements to be available 
simultaneously, which already reduces the sample size significantly compared to 
other studies on bank governance and corporate governance. Using press-based data, 
which involves collecting information on speeches made by CEOs from Media 
database, would lead to a further reduction in the number of observations. Although 
the option-based measures used in this research may be subject to endogeneity 
problem, they are still the most commonly-used variables as proxies of CEO 
overconfidence, and they strike a good balance between data objectiveness and 
sample size. As a result, this research employs these option-based measures. I have 
also conducted several experiments and tests to tackle the endogeneity issue. Details 
on how the three overconfidence measures are constructed are presented in 
Appendices A and B. 
 
4.3 Measures of Covenants and Loan Characteristics 
 I employ the following measures of as the proxy for covenant usage: Covenant 
intensity, number of covenants, financial covenants, general covenants, P-covenants, 
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C-covenants, individual types of covenant, and covenant tightness measure (in terms 
of slack).  
 Covenant intensity: Based on the study by Bradley and Roberts (2015), the 
covenant intensity is an index ranging from 0 to 6. One index point would be 
assigned if the loan agreement contains one of the following 
covenants/restrictions: Secured debt, dividend restriction, more than two 
financial covenants, asset sweep, equity sweep, and debt sweep. 
 Number of covenants: Defined as the total number of covenants contained in 
a loan agreement.  
 Financial covenants and general covenants: Defined as the total number of 
financial covenants and general covenants respectively. The definition of 
financial covenants and general covenants are specified in Appendix A. 
 P-covenants and C-covenants: Following the categorization by Christensen 
and Nikolaev (2012), financial covenants are further divided into these two 
mutually-exclusive groups. The definitions of P-covenants and C-covenants 
are specified in Appendix A.  
 Individual types of covenant: With reference to Nini, Smith, and Sufi’s 
(2009), financial covenants are further categorized into six 
mutually-exclusive groups: Debt-to-cash flow, coverage ratio, net worth, 
debt-to-balance sheet, liquidity, and minimum cash flow covenants.  
 Covenant tightness: Based on Demiroglu and James’ (2010) method, two of 
the covenants, namely, debt-to-cash flow covenants and current ratio 
covenants, are employed, as the financial ratios of these two covenants are 
more objective (The Dealscan database does not provide precise definition 
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of the financial ratios use in covenants). I use covenant slack as a proxy to 
measure covenant tightness, where the slack is defined as the distance 
between covenant threshold ratio, that is, the ratio limit required by the bank 
and the firm’s actual financial ratio. The lower the covenant slack, the 
tighter the financial covenant measure. To illustrate this, using the 
debt-to-cash flow covenant as an example, banks may impose a maximum 
limit on the debt-to-cash flow ratio as the covenant requirement. By setting 
this ratio to a value close to the firm’s actual financial ratio, banks can limit 
the firm’s ability to increase its debt level, meaning it is a tight covenant.  
 Other loan characteristics control variables include performance pricing (which 
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan agreement contains performance 
pricing mechanism), loan amount, loan maturity in months, secured dummy (equals 
to 1 if the loan agreement is backed by collateral), loan purpose controls, and loan 
types controls.   
 
4.4 Firm Characteristics and Macro Control 
  Firm control variables include asset size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, 
profitability, tangibility, Z-score, S&P rating dummy, firm age, and cash flow 
volatility, as proposed by Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) and Huang, Tan, and 
Faff (2016). Firm asset size: This serves as a control for a firm’s reputation, 
which allows a firm to negotiate better loan terms.  
 Leverage: This is a control for the financial status of a firm, as high leverage is 
associated with higher credit risk.  
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 Market-to-book ratio: This is the ratio between market value of asset to its 
book value, which is a control for a firm’s growth opportunity.  
 Profitability: This is defined as the ratio of earnings before tax, depreciation, 
and amortization to total asset, which controls for default risk. The higher the 
profitability, the better the firm’s performance, and hence the lower the credit 
risk.  
 Tangibility: This is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total 
assets, which provides a proxy to measure the quality of collateral.  
 Z-score: This is defined as [3.3* Pretax operating income/total assets + 
sales/total assets + 1.4*retained earnings/total assets +1.2*(current assets - 
current liabilities)/total assets + 0.6*(market value of equity/total liabilities)], 
and is a proxy to measure the distance to default. A higher Z-score implies a 
lower probability of default.  
 S&P rating: This is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has a credit 
rating by Standard and Poor’s, zero otherwise, and is a control for the credit 
risk. Firms with an S&P rating are associated with lower credit risk.  
 Firm age: This is used as control for growth opportunity and credit risk.  
 Cash flow volatility: This is defined as the standard deviation of the cash flow 
in the past 36 quarters, and serves as a control variable for credit risk.  
 To control for the macroeconomic condition, I have employed the credit spread, 
which is defined as the difference between AAA spread and BAA corporate bond 
yield. The regressions are all controlled for industry effects (based on two-digit SIC) 
and year fixed effects. 
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4.5 Summary Statistics 
 Table 1 presents a summary of the statistics of the sample used in this research. 
All loan tranches included in the sample contain at least one covenant, and 
observations without loan tranche are considered to have missing covenant data, and 
are thus excluded. The final sample contains 3,841 observations.  
 The average loan size in the sample is US$584,000,000, with a median of 
US$294,000,000. The average loan spread of the sample is 143 basis points, with a 
median of 125 basis points. The average maturity is 46.122 months, with a median of 
58 months. 40.8% of the loans are backed by collateral, and 77.7% of the loans 
contain performance pricing mechanism (Loan spread adjusted to firms’ 
performance). The average number of covenant is 5.605, with a median of 5. 
 For CEO characters, 33.3% of the observations are considered as overconfident 
under the Overconfidence67 measure (that is, more than 67% of the options in their 
CEO option portfolio are in-the-money). The mean value of Overconfidence Index is 
1.072 and the median value is 1, which implies that, when the criterion is set to the 
CEO option portfolio with more than 30% of the options being in-the-money, more 
than 50% of the observations in the sample are considered overconfident. 
 Table 2 presents a summary of the statistics of the non-overconfident CEOs and 
overconfident CEOs in the sample. Overconfidence67 is used as the measure for 
overconfident CEO in this table, as it is the only dummy variable among the three 
measures. On average, loan deals for firms with overconfident CEO contain a higher 
number of covenants, financial covenants, general covenants, P-covenants, and 
C-covenants. From the firm characters, the mean value of profitability and 
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market-to-book ratio for firms with overconfident CEOs are higher, while the mean 
value of firm age and Z-score are lower, suggesting that firms with overconfident 
CEOs have a higher growth rate on average but also a higher credit risk. 
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Section 5: Regression Analysis 
 
5.1 The Effects of CEO Overconfidence on Covenants 
 Table 3a presents the OLS regression results of the relationships between 
covenant intensity and different measures of CEO overconfidence. The dependent 
variable in Equations (1) to (3) is natural log of (1 + covenant intensity). Table 3b 
presents the OLS regression results of the relationships between number of covenant 
and CEO overconfidence. The dependent variable in Equations (4) to (6) is natural 
log of (1 + number of covenants). The results in both tables show that the coefficient 
of CEO overconfidence in the three measures: Overconfidence 67, Overconfidence 
Index, and Average Option Price are all positive and statistically significant in the 
determinants of covenant intensity and covenant number respectively. In addition, 
loan contracts for firms with overconfident CEO contain more covenants, which 
suggest that when banks evaluate the credit risk of firms, they take the character of 
CEO into consideration. Firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to invest in 
risky project at the cost of creditors. From the bank’s point of view, overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to overestimate their ability, and hence, make wrong decisions, 
such as overestimating the return of investments, underestimating the risk in new 
projects, and excessively investing in R&A activities. Even though overconfident 
CEOs are more innovative and can possibly increase the profitability of a firm, it 
cannot compensate for the negative effects as mentioned, which significantly 
increase the credit risk and default risk. In order to alleviate the risks, banks impose 
more covenants to firms with overconfident CEOs. This allows banks to gain part of 
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the control rights of the firm if the firm has violated the covenants. The coefficient of 
Overconfidence 67 is 0.0668 in Table 3a, which implies that the covenant intensity is 
6.9% higher for firms with overconfident CEO than for firms without. The 
coefficient of Overconfidence 67 is 0.0487 in Table 3c, which implies the loan deals 
for firms with overconfident CEO contain 5% more covenant than those for firms 
without overconfident CEO. The above results suggest that overconfident CEOs have 
both statistically and economically significant impact on loan covenants imposed. As 
a robustness check, I have run similar regressions with Ordered-Probit model and the 
results are presented in Table 3c and Table 3d. The dependent variables are covenant 
intensity in Equations (7) to (9) and number of covenants in Equations (10) to (12) 
respectively. The results are similar to the previous findings, namely, the three CEO 
overconfidence measures are positive and statistically significant in the 
determination of covenant intensity and number of covenant respectively.    
 
5.2 Propensity Score Matching 
 I have conducted three robustness tests in order to rule out the possibility that 
covenant usage can be attributed to factors other than CEO overconfidence. This 
section presents results from the first test: Propensity Score Matching. To exercise 
their power for their self-optimistic investment desire, overconfident CEOs may 
choose to work in firms with shorter firm age and higher growth opportunity. 
According to Chava and Purnanandam (2011), the use of propensity score matching 
technique can mitigate the potential bias that the probability for a firm to have 
overconfident CEO is systematically correlated with the firm’s characters.  
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Equation (1) in Table 4a presents the determinants of overconfident CEO in the 
full sample. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the 
firm’s CEO is overconfident, and zero otherwise. The independent variables include 
CEO age, CEO tenure, firm size, leverage, market-to-book, profitability, tangibility, 
Z-score, S&P rating dummy, firm age, and cash flow volatility. Among the variables, 
market-to-book ratio and profitability are positively related to the dependent variable 
(overconfident CEO), which suggests that overconfident CEOs are more likely to 
work in firms with higher growth rate and profit. In contrast, the coefficient of firm 
age is negative, which suggests that overconfident CEOs are more likely to work in 
young firm, where they can have a greater influence in making investment decisions. 
When performing the propensity score matching, I employ 1-to-1 matching, meaning 
that a firm with overconfident CEO is matched with another firm with similar 
character (propensity score) but with a non-overconfident CEO. In the sample, 1088 
out of 1280 overconfident CEOs can be paired up with a firm with non-overconfident 
CEO. The propensity score matching method reduced the sample size to 2176 
observations (2 times 1088).  
Equation (2) in Table 4a presents the determinants of overconfident CEO with 
the matched sample. Most coefficients that are significant in Equation (1) are no 
longer significant in the matched sample, which suggests the matched sample has 
successfully mitigated the possibility that overconfident CEO can be attributed to 
other firm factors.  
I have also plotted the density distribution diagrams for firm age and 
market-to-book ratio for the full sample and matched sample respectively. Figure 1 
presents the Kernel density function of firm age for the full sample. The distribution 
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of firm age for overconfident CEO group is slightly less left-skewed than the full 
sample, suggesting that overconfident CEO are more likely to work in young firms. 
Figure 2 presents the Kernel density function of firm age for the matched sample. 
The distribution between the matched sample and matched overconfident CEO 
sample is more aligned compared to Figure 1. Similar patterns can be observed in 
market-to-book ratio. Figure 3 presents the Kernel density function of 
market-to-book for the full sample. The distribution of the overconfident CEO 
sample is less right-skewed than for the full sample, suggesting that overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to choose to work in firms with higher growth opportunity. 
Figure 4 presents the Kernel density function of market-to-book for the matched 
sample. The distribution between the matched sample and matched overconfident 
CEO sample is more aligned compared to Figure 3. These suggest that the use of 
propensity score matching technique alleviates part of the endogeneity issue 
concerning self-selection bias.  
As it has been established, overconfident CEOs tend to work in young and 
high-growth firms, and it is possible that the increase in covenant usage is due to the 
firm’s characteristics instead of CEO trait. Running a similar regression as in Tables 
3a and 3c with the matched sample and determinants of covenants to investigate 
whether an increase in covenant usage can more likely be attributed to factors other 
than firm's characteristics, it was found that the coefficient of Overconfidence 67 
remains positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of 
overconfident CEO cannot be attributed to other firm factors or selection bias (Table 
4b).  
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5.3 CEO Turnover and Covenant Usage 
 The second robustness test employed in this thesis is CEO changes. For this, all 
changes in CEO employment in the sample are recorded to identify changes in CEO 
overconfidence, changes in covenant, changes in firm factors, and other loan factors. 
A regression is run with changes in covenant number as dependent variable, and 
changes in CEO overconfidence, changes in firm factors, and changes in loan factors 
as independent variables. As a change in CEO employment is an exogenous shock, 
any change in CEO confidence arising from a change in CEO employment would not 
be attributed to the firm’s factors, and hence the problem of endogeneity and 
self-selection bias is alleviated. Table 5a and Table 5b present the results of the 
change-in-change regression. As changes in CEO employment are not frequently 
observed in the sample, the number of observations drops significantly in this 
regression analysis. The coefficient of change in CEO overconfidence is positive and 
significant in the determination of changes in covenant intensity and changes in 
number of covenant respectively, which suggests that firms receive more covenants 
from banks if the firm CEO is changed from non-overconfident to overconfident. 
This analysis provides strong evidence that the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and covenants are unlikely to be driven by other firm factors.  
 
5.4 Natural Experiment: Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) 
The last approach is the use of Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) implementation as a 
natural experiment. The implementation of SOX significantly increases the 
transparency of management board and restrains CEO overconfidence. As the 
 36 
implementation of SOX is an exogenous shock that weakens CEO overconfidence, 
the effect of the interaction between SOX and CEO overconfidence on covenants can 
serve as a natural experiment to tackle the potential endogeneity issue. Table 6a 
presents the results of the exogenous impact of SOX on the determinants of covenant 
intensity. The coefficient of the interaction terms with the overconfidence measure 
are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the SOX has weakened the 
effect of CEO overconfidence, which lead to reductions in the usage of covenants. 
The coefficient of Overconfidence 67 in Equation (1) is 0.126, while the coefficient 
for Overconfidence 67*SOX is -0.0867, which implies the SOX has weakened the 
effect of overconfidence CEO on covenant intensity by 69.0%. Table 6b presents the 
results of the exogenous impact of SOX on the determinants of number of covenants. 
Similar to the covenant intensity, the interactions terms among all overconfidence are 
negative and statistically significant. The coefficient of Overconfidence 67 is 0.0938 
and the coefficient of Overconfidence 67*SOX is -0.0656, which implies the SOX 
has weakened the effect of overconfidence CEO to number of covenants by 69.9%. 
Such findings are coherent with the literature, and reaffirms that the highly 
significant relationship between CEO overconfidence and covenant usage is not 
driven by endogeneity or self-selection.  
With the concern that the interaction effect of SOX on CEO overconfidence are 
driven by other factors, I have conducted a placebo test by using year 2000 and 
creating an interaction term with CEO overconfidence measure similar to the 
previous setting. If the coefficient of the interaction terms is no longer significant, it 
will serve as strong evidence to show that the interaction effect between SOX and 
CEO overconfidence is significant. Table 6c and Table 6d present the results of the 
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placebo test. The coefficient of the interaction for all CEO overconfidence measures 
(Overconfidence 67*PB2000, Overconfidence Index*PB2000, and Avg Option 
Price*PB2000) are statistically insignificant among all regressions on number of 
covenants and covenant intensity, suggesting that the interaction effects are not 
caused by other factors. 
 
5.5 The Effects of CEO Overconfidence and Market Growth Opportunity  
 Previous studies have pointed out that firms with more growth opportunities are 
more likely to exhibit risk-shifting behavior (Eisdorfer, 2008). To investigate the 
impact of growth opportunity on CEO overconfidence, I use the market-to-book ratio 
as a proxy for growth opportunity. By comparing the firm’s market-to-book ratio 
with the median of the industry market-to-book ratio, the sample is split into two 
groups, namely, the High M/B group (firms with market-to-book ratio higher than 
the industry median) and the low M/B group (firms with market-to-book ratio lower 
than the industry median). A regression with same specification as in Table 3 is run 
for the two groups respectively, and Table 7a and Table 7b present the results of 
covenant intensity and number of covenant respectively. The coefficient of 
overconfidence measures in the high M/B group are significantly larger than those in 
the low M/B group, which suggests that CEO overconfidence imposes a larger effect 
in firms with relatively high M/B ratio (that is, higher growth opportunity). To 
alleviate the overinvest problem, banks tend to use more covenants on high growth 
firm with overconfident CEO. 
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5.6 The Effects of CEO Overconfidence on General and Financial Covenants 
 After establishing a solid relationship between covenant usage and CEO 
overconfidence, the current research further explores the effect of CEO 
overconfidence on different types of covenant. As mentioned previously, loan 
convents can be classified into financial covenants and general covenants. Table 8a 
presents the OLS regression results of the relationship between financial covenants 
and CEO overconfidence. The dependent variable in Equations (1) to (3) is the 
natural log of (1 + Number of financial covenants). The results show that the 
coefficient of the three CEO overconfidence measures is positive and statistically 
significant in the determinants of financial covenant. The coefficient of 
Overconfidence 67 is 0.0756, which implies that banks impose 7.85% more financial 
covenants on firms with overconfident CEO than those without. In contrast, Table 8b 
presents the OLS regression results of the relationship between general covenants 
and CEO overconfidence. The dependent variable in Equation (4) to (6) is the natural 
log of (1 + Number of general covenants). The results show that only one of the CEO 
overconfidence measures: Avg Option Price, is statistically significant in relation to 
the number of general covenant, and the coefficient (0.0358) is much smaller than 
the coefficient in the financial covenant regression (0.128). This finding suggests that 
it is more common for banks to use financial covenants instead of general covenants 
to cope with potential credit risk stemming from overconfident.  
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5.7  The Effects of CEO Overconfidence on P- covenants and C-covenants 
 After confirming the significant impact of CEO overconfidence on financial 
covenants, I further investigate which types of financial covenant are more likely to 
be used by banks to restrain the behavior of overconfident CEOs. Christensen and 
Nikolaev (2012) suggested that financial covenants can be further categorized into 
two types: Performance-based covenants (P-covenants) and capital-based covenants 
(C-covenants). Tables 9a and 9b present the impact of CEO overconfidence on the 
number of P-covenants and C-covenants respectively. The coefficient of all CEO 
overconfidence measures is significant and positive in all equations, which implies 
that banks perceive a higher credit risk from overconfident CEOs and impose more 
P-covenants and C-covenants on firms with such CEO. The coefficient of CEO 
overconfidence is larger for P-covenants than for C-covenants for all overconfidence 
measures, which suggests that P-covenants are more likely to be employed than 
C-covenants to cope with overconfident CEOs. This can be explained by the nature 
of overconfident CEOs, namely, they are likely to overestimate the return on 
investments, and P-covenants are effective in dealing with the profitability and 
performance of firms. 
 
5.8 The Effects of CEO Overconfidence on Different Types of Financial Covenants 
 In this section, I examine the impact of CEO overconfidence on individual types 
of covenant. Using Nini, Smith, and Sufi’s (2009) categorization, financial covenants 
are separated into six mutually-exclusive groups: Debt-to-cash flow, coverage ratio, 
net worth, debt-to-balance sheet, liquidity, and minimum cash flow. Tables 10a to 
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10e present the regression result of the different types of covenant (debt-to-cash flow, 
coverage ratio, net worth, debt-to-balance sheet, and liquidity). As the dependent 
variables are dummy variables, the Logit model is used to run the regressions. The 
coefficients are reported in odds ratio, which is defined as the ratio between having a 
certain type of covenant imposed and not having the covenant of the treatment group 
(with overconfident CEO) and non-treatment group (with non-overconfident CEO). 
The coefficient of CEO overconfidence is positive and statistically significant in the 
determinants of all types of covenant, except for the minimum cash flow covenant. 
The coefficient of Overconfidence 67 in the liquidity ratio regression is the largest 
among all others, which implies that it is more likely for banks to impose liquidity 
covenant on firms to cope with the credit risk stemming from overconfident CEOs. It 
can be explained by the fact that overconfident CEOs are more optimistic and 
aggressive in making investment decision, such that they may use too much cash for 
investment, leaving insufficient capital for the firm to pay for short term liabilities. In 
order to mitigate the risk, it is effective for banks to impose liquidity covenant on a 
firm to restrict its CEO from using too much of the firm’s current asset (cash) for 
investment. 
 
5.9 The Effects of CEO Overconfidence on Covenant Tightness 
After establishing the strong relationship between overconfident CEOs and 
extensive use of total number of covenants, covenant intensity, financial covenants, 
P-covenants, and C-covenants, I further investigate the impact on the tightness of 
covenants. Covenant tightness is defined as the distance between a covenant’s 
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permitted ratio threshold and a firm’s actual financial ratio (Demiroglu & James, 
2012). Table 11a presents the relationship between debt-to-cash flow covenant slack 
and CEO overconfidence. The coefficient of two of the overconfidence: 
Overconfidence 67 and Overconfidence Index, is negative and statistically 
significant, which implies that an increase in CEO overconfidence would result in a 
tighter debt-to-cash flow covenant measure. Similar results can be found in the 
current ratio covenant tightness. In Table 11b, the coefficient of Overconfidence 67 
and Overconfidence Index is negative and statistically significant, which implies that 
banks would set a tighter current ratio on firms with an increase in CEO 
overconfidence. These results suggest that banks impose tighter covenants on 
overconfident CEOs to protect their interest, and show that covenant tightness can be 
used as a complement to covenant numbers and covenant types in alleviating 
potential credit risk due to overconfident CEOs. 
 
5.10 Simultaneous Equations: Loan Spread and Covenants 
 Apart from covenants, previous studies have shown that loan spread can help 
creditors cope with potential credit risks. As both covenants and loan spread can be 
used together for a similar purpose, there is an endogenous relationship between the 
two instruments. In this section, I employ the generalized method of moment (GMM) 
simultaneous equations to jointly determine the covenant intensity and all-in-spread 
(loan spread). Table 12 presents the regression results. The dependent variable in 
Equation (1) and Equation (2) is the natural log of covenant intensity and natural log 
of all-in-spread respectively. I employ the Overconfidence 67 as the measure of CEO 
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overconfidence in the system of equations. The results show that the coefficient of 
Overconfidence 67 is positive and statistically significant only in Equation (1), the 
covenant intensity equation, but not in the all-in-spread equation. This suggests that 
banks are more likely to use covenant on overconfidence CEO than using loan spread. 
This can be explained by the fact that the use of loan spread may result in adverse 
selection problem. As overconfident CEOs systematically overestimate the return on 
investment, they are more likely to accept a higher interest rate as they believe the 
cost can be covered by the return – which they overestimated. In this sense, loan 
spread is not an effective instrument to alleviate the problem of CEO overconfidence. 
On the other hand, the use of covenant constrains the CEO’s optimistic behavior by 
restricting the financial ratio of the firms. If the covenant is breached, the control 
right is transferred to banks, which significantly reduces the credit risk faced by the 
banks. Another finding from the regression results is that the coefficient of covenant 
intensity is positive and statistically significant in the all-in-spread equation, while 
the coefficient of all-in-spread is also positive and statistically significant in the 
covenant intensity equation. This finding suggests that the two instruments are not 
substitutes for each other. Specifically, loan spread cannot be used in place of 
covenant, and vice versa. The positive relationship between them shows that they 
complement each other. As such, they are most likely used together to alleviate 
potential credit risks of the borrowers. 
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5.11 The Effects of CEO Overconfidence on Loan Maturity and Loan Amount 
The study by Huang, Tan, and Faff (2016) provided an explanation for 
overconfident CEOs’ preference for debt maturity by suggesting that overconfident 
CEOs believe they have insider information not known to the market, leading to 
them believing that all firm securities are mispriced. To minimize the mispricing 
problem, overconfident CEOs tend to use short-term debt financing rather than 
taking on long-term debt. In this part, I provide another perspective to study the 
relationship between CEO overconfidence and debt maturity. My objective is to find 
out how banks react to CEO overconfidence with debt maturity. Table 13 presents 
the regression results. The dependent variable is natural of maturity in terms of 
month. The coefficient of all three CEO overconfidence measures is positive and 
statistically significant in the regression, which suggests that banks would increase 
the maturity when a firm’s CEO is overconfident. The results are consistent with 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), who stated that overconfident CEOs are more 
willing to invest and succeed in research and development. These innovative 
investments take a longer time to yield return, and hence, banks are willing to 
increase the maturity for the firm. This finding suggests that CEO overconfidence is 
not a one-sided factor that only brings negative effect on a firm's financing cost as 
previously perceived. Firms can actually benefit from the longer debt maturity.  
The last regression analyzes the relationship between loan size and CEO 
overconfidence. Table 14 presents the regression results. The coefficient of all the 
CEO overconfidence measures is positive and statistically significant, implying that 
banks are willing to increase the loan amount to firms with overconfident CEO. This 
is consistent with Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh’s (2012) conclusion that overconfident 
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CEOs are more willing to invest in innovative industry, which requires a large set-up 
cost. Banks know that overconfident CEOs are better innovator, and hence, are 
willing to approve a larger loan amount.  
  
 45 
Section 6: Conclusion 
 Supported by strong empirical evidence, this thesis examines the importance of 
CEO overconfidence in the determination of loan contract. The self-attribution bias 
makes overconfident CEOs more ready to adopt weaker lending standards (Ho, 
Huang, Lin, & Yen, 2016), overinvest in risky projects (Malmendier, Tate, & Yan, 
2011), engage in value-destroying M&A activities (Ferris, Jayaraman, & Sabherwal, 
2013), overpay for target companies (Billet & Qian, 2008), or even engage in 
accounting fraud activities (Schrand & Zechman, 2010) - all of which significantly 
increase the credit risk faced by lenders. Using a large sample of loan agreement, this 
thesis studies how the increase in credit risk stemming from overconfident CEOs 
affect loan contracting from the lender’s (bank’s) perspective. By using covenant 
intensity, number of covenants, and covenant slack as proxies for loan contract 
restrictiveness and three option-based CEO overconfidence measures, this thesis 
reveals that banks impose more and tighter covenants on firms with overconfident 
CEOs to restrain their behavior in order to reduce the credit risk.  
Apart from the overall measures for covenant, this thesis also studies which 
types of covenant are more likely to be employed by banks in response to an increase 
in CEO overconfidence. By using the classification of financial and general 
covenants, P-covenant and C-covenant, and six individual types of covenant, this 
study suggests that there is a positive relationship between CEO overconfidence and 
the use of covenants related to a firm’s performance and profitability. Banks 
acknowledge that overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate a project’s profitability, 
and thus, impose performance-related covenants to closely monitor the firm’s 
performance. .     
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To resolve potential endogeneity bias, this thesis employ propensity score 
matching, turnover of CEO, and implementation of SOX as an exogenous shock to 
CEO trait. The interaction term between SOX and CEO overconfidence shows that 
the implementation of SOX has weakened the effect of overconfident CEO. The 
impact on CEO overconfidence remains robust in the propensity score matched 
sample and CEO turnover sample, which reaffirms that the character trait of the CEO 
is the sole factor.  
The thesis also investigates how growth opportunities affect CEO 
overconfidence. By using the industry median of market-to-book ratio as an indicator 
of growth opportunities, the results from this study show that the impact of 
overconfident CEOs on covenant usage is more significant in firms with higher 
growth opportunity, which suggest that firms with higher growth opportunities 
provide ample investment opportunities for overconfident CEOs to overinvest, even 
in non-profitable projects, and hence, increasing the credit risk faced by banks 
Apart from covenant usage, the impact of CEO overconfidence on other loan 
contract terms, such as loan spread, maturity, and loan amount, is also studied. The 
results show that overconfident CEOs are not associated with higher loan spread. 
This can be explained by the possible concern of adverse selection and moral hazard 
problem. Overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate the return of investment, and are 
hence more likely to accept a higher loan spread, putting banks at an even riskier 
position.  
Despite the potential credit risk concern, overconfident CEOs may somehow 
increase firm value as they are more willing to invest in research and development 
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and succeed in innovative industries (Hirshleifer, Low, & Teo, 2012). Goel and 
Thakor (2008) suggested that overconfident CEOs can alleviate the underinvest 
problem related to risk aversion. The results in this thesis show that the maturity and 
loan amount are positively associated with CEO overconfidence, suggesting that 
banks acknowledge that overconfident CEO can increase firm value and are hence 
willing to provide a larger loan size and also longer maturity, so that they can enjoy a 
higher return from these loans. 
The inclusion of covenants, on the one hand, protects the interest of creditors, 
and, on the other hand, benefits the shareholders (and hence increases firm value). 
Specifically, overconfident CEOs are restricted from engaging in excessively risky 
business. This conclusion is subject to the tightness of the covenants. If the covenants 
are too restrictive, for example, forbidding firms from investing in projects with 
positive net present value, they can be value-destroying. Thus, creditors have no 
incentive to impose covenants that are too restrictive, as it is harmful to their interest 
as well. Taking the potential benefits from the covenant into consideration, the actual 
cost of hiring an overconfident CEO would be lower than one perceives.  
To conclude, current findings suggest that the CEO overconfidence affects 
loan attracting from multiple aspects. Banks, on the one hand, impose more 
restrictive covenants to alleviate the potential credit risk. On the other hand, they 
allow a longer maturity and larger loan size to firms with overconfident CEOs in 
hope to capture the potential benefits. These findings provide important implications 
to the management board when appointing CEOs, who is proven to affect the firm’s 
borrowing cost, and contribute the literature by providing a new perspective to study 
the relationship between CEO traits and corporate governance.
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Appendix A: Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
Overconfidence Variables 
Overconfidence 67 Option-based measure of CEO overconfidence. A dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the average moneyness of a 
CEO’s option portfolio is larger than 67%, zero otherwise. 
Average moneyness is calculated as the value of vested 
option divided by the average strike price of the option 
(Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012; Humphery-Jenner, Lisic, 
Nanda, & Silveri, 2015) 
Overconfidence 
Index 
Option-based measure of CEO overconfidence. The index is 
equal to 1 if the average moneyness of CEO's option 
portfolio is larger than 0.3 but lower than 0.67; equal to 2 if 
the average moneyness of CEO’s option portfolio is larger 
than 0.67 but less than 1; equal to 3 if the average 
moneyness of CEO’s option portfolio is larger 1; zero 
otherwise. 
Avg Option Price Option-based measure of CEO overconfidence that is equal 
to the value per option of the in-the-money option, which is 
calculated by dividing the unexercised exercisable option by 
the number of option. The value per option is scaled by the 
stock price in the fiscal year end. (Banerjee, 
Humphery-Jenner, & Nanda, 2015)  
Covenant Measures 
Covenant Intensity Covenant intensity is an index that ranges from 0 to 6. One 
point would be assigned for each of the following covenants: 
Secured debt, dividend restriction, more than two financial 
covenants, asset sweep, equity sweep, and debt sweep. 
Ln(1 + Covenant 
Intensity) 
Natural log of (1+Covenant Intensity) 
Number of Covenants Total number of covenants (including both financial 
covenants and general covenants imposed on a loan 
agreement). 
Ln(1+Number of 
Covenants) 
Natural log of (1 +Number of Covenants) 
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Number of Financial 
Covenants 
Financial covenants include fixed charge coverage covenant, 
debt service coverage, interst coverage, cash interet 
coverage, leverage coverage, debt-to-cash flow, senior 
debt-to-cash flow, debt-to-tangible net worth, debt-to-equity, 
current ratio, minimum tangible net worth, minimum net 
worth, and maximum loan-to-value. 
Ln(1+Number of 
Financial Covenants) 
Natural log of (1+Number of Financial Covenants).  
Number of General 
Covenants 
General covenants include excess cash flow sweep, asset 
sales sweep, debt issue sweep, equity issue sweep, 
percentage of excess cash flow, percentage of net income, 
material restriction, required lenders, term changes, 
collateral release, and investment basket. 
Ln(1+Number of 
General Covenants) 
Natural log of (1+Number of General Covenants).  
Number of 
P-covenants 
Number of performance-based covenants, including cash 
interest coverage, debt service coverage ratio, minimum 
EBITDA, fixed charge coverage, interest coverage, ratio of 
debt to EBITDA, and ratio of senior debt to EBITDA. 
(Christensen & Nikolaev, 2012) 
Ln(1+Number of 
P-covenants) 
Natural log of (1+Number of P-covenants). 
Number of 
C-covenants 
Number of capital-based covenants, including quick ratio, 
current ratio, debt-to-equity, loan-to-value, ratio of debt to 
tangible net worth, leverage ratio, senior leverage ratio, and 
net worth requirement. (Christensen & Nikolaev, 2012)  
Ln(1+Number of 
C-covenants) 
Natural log of (1+Number of C-covenants) 
Individual Types of Covenant 
Debt-to-cash flow 
Covenant 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
debt-to cash flow or senior debt-to-cash flow covenant, zero 
otherwise. (Nini, Smith, & Sufi, 2009) 
Coverage Covenant Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
interest coverage, cash interest coverage, debt service 
coverage, debt service coverage and fixed charge coverage 
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covenant zero otherwise. (Nini, Smith, & Sufi, 2009) 
Net Worth Covenant Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
minimum net worth and tangible net worth covenant, zero 
otherwise. (Nini, Smith, & Sufi, 2009) 
Debt-to-balance sheet 
Covenant 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
debt-to-equity and debt-to-tangible net worth covenant, zero 
otherwise. (Nini, Smith, & Sufi, 2009) 
Liquidity Covenant Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
current ratio covenant, zero otherwise. (Nini, Smith, & Sufi, 
2009) 
Tightness Measures 
Debt-to-cash flow 
Covenant’s Slack 
Covenant tightness measure. Defined as the difference 
between Firm's debt to cash flow ratio and covenant 
threshold. 
Current Ratio 
Covenant’s Slack 
Covenant tightness measure. Defined as the difference 
between Firm's current ratio and covenant threshold. 
Loan Control Variables 
Ln(Loan Amount) Natural log of loan amount. 
Ln(Maturity) Natural log of loan maturity in terms of month 
Performance Pricing Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
performance pricing, zero otherwise.  
Secured Dummy Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan is secured, zero 
otherwise 
Loan Purpose Dummy variable for loan purpose, including acquisition 
corporate purpose, debt repay, takeover, etc. 
Loan Types Dummy variables for loan types, including term loan, 
revolver, bridge loan, etc. 
Firm Control Variables 
Ln(Asset) Natural log of the firm’s total asset.  
Leverage The firm's leverage, defined as (Long-term debts + 
Short-term debts)/Total asset.  
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Market-to-book The firm’s market-to-book ratio, defined as (Common share 
outstanding * Stock price at year close + Total asset - 
Common equity)/Total asset 
Profitability The firm’s profitability measures, defined as operating 
income before depreciation / Total asset.  
Tangibility The firm’s tangibility, defined as net property, plant and 
equipment / Total asset. 
Z-score The firm’s Z-score, a ratio proxy for its distance to default, 
defined as 3.3*Pretax income/total asset + Sale/total asset + 
1.4*Retained earning/Total asset + 1.2*(Current asset - 
Current liabilities)/Total asset + 0.6*( Common share 
outstanding * Stock price at year close)/Total liabilities) 
(Murfin, 2012) 
S&P Rating Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has an S&P 
rating, zero otherwise. 
Ln(Firm Age) Natural log of the firm’s age. 
Cash Flow Vol Cash flow volatility, defined as the standard deviation of 
quarterly operating cash flow over 36 quarters. 
Current Ratio Defined as the current asset divided by current liabilities. 
Debt-to-EBITDA Defined as the total debts divided by the earnings.  
Industry Dummy Industry classification is based on 2 digi-SIC. 
Macro Control Variables 
Ln(Credit Spread) Defined as the natural log of the difference between BAA 
corporate bond yield and AAA corporate bond yield plus 1. 
SOX Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan was made in 
2002 or later, zero otherwise. 
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Appendix B: Data description 
 
The final dataset used in this research is comprised of the following databases: 
 Compustat - for firm control variables and CEO overconfidence measures 
 Execucomp - for CEO overconfidence measures 
 Dealscan - for covenants measures and loan control variables 
 Federal Reserve Board of Governors - for macro environment control 
 
The Dealscan loan data was first downloaded in February 2013 in Excel format, and 
was later converted into STATA format. The data was downloaded at facility level 
and the variables in the raw dataset includes information on loan granted date, loan 
mature date, loan amount (tranche), financial covenants, general covenants, secured, 
performance pricing, loan purpose, and loan types, etc. The variables used in the 
final dataset are constructed as follows: 
Number of Covenants A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if covenant 
information is contained in the dataset for each type of 
covenant, zero otherwise. To calculate the number of 
covenants, I sum the dummy variables for each type of 
covenant.  
Number of Financial 
Covenants 
Similar to number covenants, but I only sum up the dummy 
variables for the following covenant types: Fixed charge 
coverage covenant, debt service coverage, interst coverage, 
cash interest coverage, leverage coverage, debt-to-cash 
flow, senior debt-to-cash flow, debt-to-tangible net worth, 
debt-to-equity, current ratio, minimum tangible net worth, 
minimum net worth, and maximum loan to value. 
Number of General 
Covenants 
Similar to number of covenants, but I only sum up the 
dummy variables of the following covenant types: Excess 
cash flow sweep, asset sales sweep, debt issue sweep, 
equity issue sweep, percentage of excess cash flow, 
percentage of net income, material restriction, required 
lenders, term changes, collateral release, and investment 
basket. 
Number of 
P-covenants 
Similar to number of covenants, but I only sum up the 
dummy variables of the following covenant types: Cash 
interest coverage, debt service coverage ratio, minimum 
EBITDA, fixed charge coverage, interest coverage, 
debt-to-EBITDA ratio, and senior debt-to-EBITDA ratio. 
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Number of 
C-covenants 
Similar to number of covenants, but I only sum up the 
dummy variables of the following covenant types: Quick 
ratio, current ratio, debt-to-equity, loan-to-value, 
debt-to-tangible net worth ratio, leverage ratio, senior 
leverage ratio, and net worth requirement. 
Secured Dummy Data directly extracted from DealScan 
Covenant Intensity A dummy variable, Fincov2, which is equal to 1 if financial 
covenant >=2, zero otherwise, is first constructed. The 
Covenant Index is constructed by calculating the sum of the 
following dummy variables: Fincov2, secured, dividend 
restriction, asset sweep, equity sweep, and debt sweep.  
Loan Amount Loan tranche amount, extracted directly from DealScan 
Ln(Maturity) Constructed by using the loan granted date and maturity 
date to calculate the loan maturity in months. 
Performance Pricing Data directly extracted from DealScan 
Loan Purpose Data directly extracted from DealScan 
Loan Types Data directly extracted from DealScan 
The firm control variables are extracted from the Compustat (annual) database. The 
data was downloaded in STATA format in February 2013. The information includes 
total asset, long term debts, sales, cash flow, etc. The firm control variables are 
constructed as follows: 
Ln(Asset) Compustat: AT 
Leverage Compustat: (DLTT+DLC)/AT 
Industry Dummy SIC data extracted from Compustat, then the industry is 
classified based on 2 digi-SIC. 
Market-to-book Compustat: (CSHO*PRCC_F + AT - CEQ)/AT) 
Market-to-book 
(Industry median) 
Calculated for each year from the market-to-book and 
industry dummy. 
Profitability Compustat: (OIBDP/AT) 
Tangibility Compustat: (PPENT/AT) 
Z-score Compustat: (3.3*PI/AT + SALE/AT + 1.4*RE/AT + 
 58 
1.2*(ACT - LCT)/ATQ + 0.6*(CSHO*PRCC_F)/LT)  
S&P Rating Data directly extracted from Compustat 
Ln(Firm Age) Firm age is constructed based on the difference between 
firm year and the first year the firm appeared in the 
Compustat database. 
For firm quarterly data, I use Compustat (quarterly) and constructed as follow: 
Cash Flow Vol Compustat: (OIBDPQ – TXTQ – XINTQ) 
Current Ratio Compustat: (ACT/LCT) 
Debt-to-EBITDA Compustat: ((DLCQ+DLTTQ)/ OIBDPQ + OIBDPQ(T-1) 
+ OIBDPQ(T-2) + OIBDPQ(T-3))  
All the firm control variables are winsorized at 1% level. 
The data for CEO overconfidence measures was extracted in STATA format from 
the Execucomp database in February 2013. The variables include data date, 
executive ID number, CEO indicator, executive option portfolio (unexercised option 
number, estimated value of in-the-money option), etc. Stock price information is 
from Compustat and the data is merged with the Execucomp data set by gvkey and 
firm year. The overconfidence measures are constructed as follows: 
Overconfidence 67 I first construct a variable average moneyness equals: 
(Compustat and Execucomp:  [PRCC_F/(PRCC_F - 
OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL / 
OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM) -1] ) 
Overconfidence 67 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
average moneyness>=0.67, zero otherwise. 
Overconfidence Index Overconfidence Index. Equals to 1 if average moneyness 
is >=0.3 and <0.67; equals to 2 if average moneyness 
is >=0.67 and <1; equals to 3 if average moneyness is >=1; 
zero otherwise. 
Avg Option Price Avg Option Price is equal to: 
(Compustat and Execucomp: 
[(OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL / 
OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM) / PRCC_F] 
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Macro environment control data is constructed based on the spread data downloaded 
from Federal Reserve Board of Governors in February 2013 (in excel format, later 
converted into STATA format): 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) Natural logarithm of (BAA corporate bond yield - AAA 
corporate bond yield + 1) 
With the processed data, I merge the Execucomp data and Compustat with Dealscan 
dataset based on gvkey and firm year with the reference of the Dealscan-Compustat 
Linking Table (Chava & Roberts, 2008). All the annually-reported data from 
Compustat and Execucomp is lagged by one year when it is merged with Dealscan. 
For quarterly firm control data, the lag is one quarter. With this combined dataset, I 
construct the tightness measure as follows: 
Debt-to-cash flow 
Covenant’s Slack 
The difference between debt-to-EBITDA and debt-to-cash 
flow covenant threshold in Dealscan. 
Current Ratio 
Covenant’s Slack 
The difference between current ratio and current ratio 
covenant threshold in Dealscan. 
For firm with more than one facility in any given year, our final sample only includes 
the facility with largest loan amount. Financial firms and utilities are also excluded 
from our final sample. For the change-in-change dataset in Table 3, I sort the data 
(with gvkey, co_per_rol, and year) and manually identify the CEO changes. I subject 
our sample to the restriction that the new CEO has been working in the firm for one 
year, so that overconfidence would have taken effect. I put these samples with CEO 
changes in a “new dataset” and merged with the original dataset. I then construct the 
changes variables by subtracting the “new dataset” variables from the original dataset 
variables. I also restrict our change-in-change sample to the same loan type in both 
the “new dataset” and original dataset. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
VARIABLE N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
 
Overconfidence Measures       
Overconfidence 67 3841 0.333  0.471  0.000  0.000  1.000  
Overconfidence Index 3841 1.072  1.234  0.000  1.000  2.000  
Average Option Price 3841 0.288  0.296  0.012  0.237  0.484  
       
Covenant Measures       
Covenant Intensity 3841 2.425  1.723  1.000  2.000  3.000  
Total Covenants 3841 5.605  2.375  4.000  5.000  7.000  
Financial Covenants 3841 1.999  1.013  1.000  2.000  3.000  
General Covenants 3841 3.606  1.920  2.000  3.000  4.000  
P-Covenants 3841 1.352  0.951  1.000  1.000  2.000  
C-Covenants 3841 0.647  0.719  0.000  1.000  1.000  
       
Individual Types of Covenant Measures 
Coverage Covenants 3841 0.693 0.461 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Debt-to-cash flow Covenants 3841 0.557 0.497 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Net Worth Covenants 3841 0.301 0.459 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Debt-to-balance sheet Covenants 3841 0.053 0.224 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Liquidity Covenants 3841 0.045 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Tightness Measures       
Debt-to-cash flow Slack 2068 1.314  3.499  0.764  1.611  2.451  
Current Ratio Slack 172 0.813 1.049 0.127 0.454 1.181 
       
Firms Characteristics       
Ln(Asset) 3841 7.492  1.452  6.444  7.404  8.419  
Leverage 3841 0.260  0.171  0.137  0.253  0.363  
Market-to-book 3841 1.870  1.102  1.179  1.518  2.138  
Profitability 3841 0.147  0.080  0.098  0.136  0.187  
Tangibility 3841 0.328  0.235  0.140  0.267  0.486  
Z-score 3841 2.671 2.698 1.163 1.948 3.220 
S&P Rating 3841 0.610  0.488  0.000  1.000  1.000  
Ln(Firm Age) 3841 3.083  0.762  2.485  3.178  3.784  
Cash Flow Vol 3841 47.359  223.034  4.819  12.074  35.019  
Debt-to-cash Flow  2068 2.291  3.550  0.766  1.726  3.054  
Current Ratio 172 2.084 1.323 1.252 1.730 2.624 
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Loan Characteristics       
Performance pricing 3841 0.777  0.416  1.000  1.000  1.000  
Ln(Loan Amount) 3841 19.440  1.231  18.644  19.500  20.212  
Ln(Maturity) 3841 3.704  0.621  3.611  4.078  4.111  
Secured 3841 0.408  0.491  0.000  0.000  1.000  
Ln(All-in-Spread) 3708 4.836 0.804 4.151 4.836 5.303 
       
Macro Control       
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 3841  0.676  0.185  0.525  0.668  0.747  
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Table 2: 
Summary Statistic between Overconfident CEO and Non-overconfident CEO 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
Non-Overconfident  
(67 measure) 
(N=2561) 
Overconfident 
(67 measure) 
(N=1280) 
 
 
Differences 
 
Covenant Measures 
   
Covenant Intensity 2.335 2.605 0.269*** 
Number of Covenants 5.436 5.944 0.508*** 
Financial Covenants 1.897 2.203 0.306*** 
General Covenants 3.539 3.741 0.202*** 
P-Covenants 1.273 1.510 0.237*** 
C-Covenants 0.624 0.693 0.069*** 
 
Firms Characteristics 
   
Ln(Asset) 7.620 7.234 -0.386*** 
Leverage 0.270 0.240 -0.030*** 
Market-to-book 1.629 2.353 0.724*** 
Profitability 0.135 0.171 0.035*** 
Tangibility 0.338 0.308 -0.029*** 
Z-score 3.465 2.310 1.155*** 
S&P Rating 0.636 0.559 -0.109*** 
Ln(Firm Age) 3.182 2.884 -0.298*** 
Cash Flow Vol 56.032 30.006 -26.026*** 
Cash Holding 0.083 0.096 0.012*** 
ROA 0.135 0.170 0.035*** 
 
Loan Characteristics 
   
Ln(Loan amount) 19.451 19.416 -0.036 
Ln(Maturity) 3.651 3.811 0.160*** 
Secured 0.396 0.432 0.036** 
Ln(All-in-spread) 4.722^ 4.609^ -0.113*** 
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Table 3a  
Covenant Intensity and Overconfidence (OLS) 
This table contains the results of OLS regression between CEO overconfident of 
different measures and covenant intensity. The dependent variable in columns (1) to 
(3) is natural log of covenant index, an index that ranges from 0 to 6, in which one 
point would be assigned for each of the following covenants: Secured debt, dividend 
restriction, more than two financial covenants, asset sweep, equity sweep, and debt 
sweep. The regression has controlled for industry and year effect. Brackets under 
coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to coefficients denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(1 + Covenant Intensity) 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.0668***   
 (0.0136)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0294***  
  (0.00494)  
Avg Option Price   0.105*** 
   (0.0288) 
Ln(Asset) -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.206*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
Leverage 0.415*** 0.412*** 0.414*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0376) (0.0377) 
Market-to-book -0.0714*** -0.0734*** -0.0718*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0103) 
Profitability -0.465** -0.471** -0.464** 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.151) 
Tangibility -0.0531 -0.0523 -0.0521 
 (0.0672) (0.0680) (0.0670) 
Z-score -0.0285*** -0.0290*** -0.0293*** 
 (0.00602) (0.00621) (0.00624) 
S&P Rating 0.0389 0.0380 0.0372 
 (0.0270) (0.0267) (0.0269) 
Ln(Firm age) -0.0584** -0.0580** -0.0586** 
 (0.0184) (0.0180) (0.0181) 
Cash Flow Vol 8.50e-05*** 8.63e-05*** 8.61e-05*** 
 (1.40e-05) (1.38e-05) (1.35e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit spread) 0.117** 0.118** 0.114** 
 (0.0402) (0.0400) (0.0396) 
Ln(Loan amount) 0.0684*** 0.0680*** 0.0684*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0111) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.00953 0.00778 0.00926 
 64 
 (0.0237) (0.0235) (0.0239) 
Performance Dummy 0.00994 0.00924 0.00902 
 (0.0388) (0.0389) (0.0385) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
R-squared 0.438 0.438 0.438 
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Table 3b  
Number of Covenant and Overconfidence (OLS) 
This table contains the results of OLS regression between CEO overconfident of 
different measures and number of covenants. The dependent variable in columns (4) 
to (6) is natural log of number of covenant. The regression has controlled for industry 
and year effect. Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next 
to coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Ln (1+Number of Covenants) 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.0487***   
 (0.00718)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0213***  
  (0.00313)  
Avg Option Price   0.0839*** 
   (0.00861) 
Ln(Asset) -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.103*** 
 (0.00944) (0.00942) (0.00937) 
Leverage 0.269*** 0.268*** 0.269*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0305) (0.0307) 
Market-to-book -0.0484*** -0.0498*** -0.0492*** 
 (0.00254) (0.00253) (0.00243) 
Profitability 0.105 0.101 0.105 
 (0.0686) (0.0698) (0.0723) 
Tangibility -0.0442 -0.0436 -0.0432 
 (0.0339) (0.0350) (0.0348) 
Z-score 0.0245** 0.0241** 0.0239** 
 (0.00935) (0.00921) (0.00929) 
S&P Rating 0.00161 0.000998 0.000101 
 (0.00658) (0.00666) (0.00665) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0192 -0.0190 -0.0191 
 (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0107) 
Cash Flow Vol -6.47e-06 -5.52e-06 -5.55e-06 
 (1.06e-05) (1.02e-05) (1.02e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.0513 0.0520 0.0497 
 (0.0432) (0.0440) (0.0432) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.0756*** 0.0753*** 0.0755*** 
 (0.00812) (0.00810) (0.00794) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0575** 0.0563** 0.0570** 
 (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0209) 
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Performance Dummy 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0189) 
Secured Dummy 0.241*** 0.240*** 0.242*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0222) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
R-squared 0.419 0.420 0.420 
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Table 3c 
Covenant Intensity and Overconfidence (Ordered-Probit) 
This table contains the results of Ordered-Probit regression between CEO 
overconfident of different measures and covenant intensity. The dependent variable 
in columns (7) to (9) is covenant intensity. The regression has controlled for industry 
and year effect. Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next 
to coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Covenant Intensity 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.170***   
 (0.0371)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0759***  
  (0.0112)  
Avg Option Price   0.261*** 
   (0.0748) 
Ln(Asset) -0.525*** -0.525*** -0.525*** 
 (0.0542) (0.0544) (0.0542) 
Leverage 1.056*** 1.052*** 1.055*** 
 (0.0687) (0.0712) (0.0720) 
Market-to-book -0.182*** -0.187*** -0.182*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0285) (0.0264) 
Profitability -1.181*** -1.200*** -1.176*** 
 (0.370) (0.371) (0.373) 
Tangibility -0.149 -0.147 -0.148 
 (0.144) (0.146) (0.144) 
Z-score -0.0710*** -0.0724*** -0.0728*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0126) 
S&P Rating 0.145** 0.143** 0.141** 
 (0.0712) (0.0707) (0.0710) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.143*** -0.142*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0388) (0.0388) 
Cash Flow Vol 0.000225*** 0.000228*** 0.000227*** 
 (4.69e-05) (4.76e-05) (4.62e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.324*** 0.326*** 0.315*** 
 (0.0910) (0.0900) (0.0896) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.179*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0289) (0.0282) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0629 0.0583 0.0625 
 (0.0568) (0.0563) (0.0582) 
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Performance Dummy 0.0101 0.00843 0.00759 
 (0.0900) (0.0901) (0.0890) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
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Table 3d  
Number of Covenants and Overconfidence (Ordered-Probit) 
This table contains the results of Ordered-Probit regression between CEO 
overconfident of different measures and number of covenants. The dependent 
variable in columns (10) to (12) is the number of covenant. The regression has 
controlled for industry and year effect. Brackets under coefficients contain standard 
error. *, **, & *** next to coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% 
respectively. 
 (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Number of Covenants 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.176***   
 (0.0253)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0794***  
  (0.00990)  
Avg Option Price   0.325*** 
   (0.0264) 
Ln(Asset) -0.391*** -0.391*** -0.391*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0316) 
Leverage 1.033*** 1.028*** 1.032*** 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.123) 
Market-to-book -0.176*** -0.182*** -0.180*** 
 (0.00649) (0.00617) (0.00717) 
Profitability 0.318 0.299 0.313 
 (0.223) (0.227) (0.239) 
Tangibility -0.211* -0.209* -0.207* 
 (0.116) (0.120) (0.119) 
Z-score 0.0678** 0.0664** 0.0656** 
 (0.0268) (0.0263) (0.0266) 
S&P Rating 0.0145 0.0122 0.00856 
 (0.0308) (0.0304) (0.0296) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0659* -0.0648* -0.0648* 
 (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0362) 
Cash Flow Vol -1.82e-05 -1.45e-05 -1.41e-05 
 (3.07e-05) (3.00e-05) (2.96e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.163 0.166 0.158 
 (0.130) (0.132) (0.129) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.273*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0280) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.224*** 0.219*** 0.222*** 
 70 
 (0.0723) (0.0718) (0.0744) 
Performance Dummy 0.353*** 0.351*** 0.350*** 
 (0.0712) (0.0711) (0.0696) 
Secured Dummy 0.949*** 0.950*** 0.954*** 
 (0.0888) (0.0881) (0.0883) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
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Table 4a:  
Propensity Score Matching: Estimation 
This table contains the result of Probit regression between CEO overconfident and its 
determinants.  The matched sample contains 1088 observations with overconfident 
CEO and 1088 observations with non-overconfident CEO. The regression has 
controlled for industry and year effect. Brackets under coefficients contain standard 
error. *, **, & *** next to coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
 Pre-match sample Matched sample 
VARIABLES Overconfidence 67 
   
Ln(1 + CEO Age) -0.0445 -0.0109 
 (0.196) (0.231) 
Ln(1 + CEO Tenure) 0.0844*** -0.0277 
 (0.0241) (0.0288) 
Ln(Asset) 0.00895 -0.0193 
 (0.0249) (0.0306) 
Leverage -0.0887 0.0725 
 (0.154) (0.181) 
Market-to-book 0.315*** -0.0204 
 (0.0258) (0.0335) 
Profitability 1.195*** -0.495 
 (0.351) (0.426) 
Tangibility -0.0682 0.0898 
 (0.101) (0.122) 
Z-score -0.00586 -0.00207 
 (0.0299) (0.0377) 
S&P Rating 0.109* 0.0339 
 (0.0621) (0.0735) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.222*** 0.0729* 
 (0.0337) (0.0400) 
Cash Flow Vol -0.00100*** -7.92e-05 
 (0.000309) (0.000417) 
   
Observations 3,625 2,176 
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Table 4b:  
Propensity Score Matching: Result 
This table contains the results of OLS regression between CEO overconfident and 
different covenant measures. The matched sample is matched based on the 
propensity score matching technique. Each observation with an overconfident CEO 
was matched with another observation with non-overconfident CEO. The matching is 
restricted to be 1-to-1 matching and the caliper distance is set to 0.1. Results are 
robust with caliper distance of 0.2 and 0.05. The regression has controlled for 
industry and year effect. Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & 
*** next to coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Ln(1 + Covenant Index) Ln(1 + Number of Covenant) 
   
Overconfidence 67 0.0688*** 0.0464*** 
 (0.0179) (0.00761) 
Ln(Asset) -0.218*** -0.110*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0121) 
Leverage 0.398*** 0.290*** 
 (0.0532) (0.0312) 
Market-to-book -0.0832*** -0.0453*** 
 (0.0149) (0.00421) 
Profitability -0.375** -0.0667 
 (0.152) (0.131) 
Tangibility -0.0818 -0.0564 
 (0.0891) (0.0446) 
Z-score -0.0330** 0.0307** 
 (0.0108) (0.0124) 
S&P Rating 0.0329 -0.00211 
 (0.0288) (0.00940) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0738*** -0.0295** 
 (0.0131) (0.00881) 
Cash Flow Vol -8.97e-05 -0.000116 
 (0.000130) (7.98e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.146 0.0145 
 (0.0973) (0.0796) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.0789*** 0.0723*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0117) 
Ln(Maturity) -0.00677 0.0415 
 (0.0354) (0.0365) 
Performance Dummy 0.0155 0.114*** 
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 (0.0331) (0.0273) 
Secured Dummy - 0.241*** 
 - (0.0171) 
Industry Control Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes 
   
Observations 2,176 2,176 
R-squared 0.466 0.465 
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Table 5a 
Change-in-Change equation: Changes in Covenant Intensity 
This table contains the ordered Probit regression for the relation between a change in 
CEO overconfidence (due to a change in CEO) and a change in covenant intensity (total 
covenant). Dependent variable in Equations (1) to (3) is the changes in covenant intensity. 
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Figures in parenthesis are standard 
errors. *, **, & *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ∆Covenant Intensity 
    
∆Overconfidence index 0.213***   
 (0.0446)   
∆Overconfidence 67  0.513***  
  (0.0856)  
∆Avg Option Price   1.256*** 
   (0.214) 
∆Ln(Asset) -0.281 -0.336 -0.344 
 (0.613) (0.637) (0.642) 
∆Leverage 2.833*** 2.956*** 2.786*** 
 (0.653) (0.702) (0.630) 
∆Market-to-book 0.0139 0.0231 -0.0643 
 (0.168) (0.181) (0.145) 
∆Profitability -1.995 -1.399 -2.011 
 (3.374) (3.194) (3.315) 
∆Tangibility -0.638 -0.621 -0.0289 
 (1.379) (1.370) (1.506) 
∆Z-score 0.988* 1.014* 0.968* 
 (0.497) (0.517) (0.513) 
∆S&P Rating 1.232 1.244 1.185 
 (1.143) (1.198) (1.185) 
∆Cash Flow Vol 0.00104 0.00116 0.00110 
 (0.000863) (0.000949) (0.000819) 
∆Credit Spread -0.216 -0.115 -0.206 
 (0.591) (0.580) (0.518) 
∆Ln(Loan Amount) -0.000390 -0.0189 0.00449 
 (0.132) (0.153) (0.119) 
∆Ln(Maturity) 0.331 0.422 0.353 
 (0.389) (0.431) (0.396) 
∆Performance Dummy 0.705*** 0.703*** 0.747*** 
 (0.132) (0.136) (0.130) 
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∆Secured Dummy 1.317*** 1.320*** 1.321*** 
 (0.111) (0.109) (0.107) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 120 120 120 
 
  
 76 
Table 5b 
Change-in-change equation: Changes in Number of Covenants 
This table contains the ordered Probit regression for the relation between a change in 
CEO overconfidence (due to a change in CEO) and a change in covenant intensity (total 
covenant). Dependent variable in Equations (4) to (6) is the changes in number of 
covenants. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Figures in parenthesis are 
standard errors. *, **, & *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10%, respectively. 
 (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ∆Number of Covenants 
    
∆Overconfidence Index 0.350**   
 (0.138)   
∆Overconfidence 67  0.815**  
  (0.293)  
∆Avg Option Price   2.093*** 
   (0.569) 
∆Ln(Asset) 0.0285 -0.0670 -0.0739 
 (0.630) (0.692) (0.690) 
∆Leverage 2.225 2.393 2.156 
 (1.578) (1.687) (1.541) 
∆Market-to-book 0.0585 0.0902 -0.0778 
 (0.487) (0.491) (0.463) 
∆Profitability -8.140* -7.179 -8.171* 
 (4.356) (4.369) (4.312) 
∆Tangibility -5.802* -5.788* -4.782 
 (2.602) (2.546) (2.915) 
∆Z-score 1.670 1.709 1.638 
 (1.182) (1.227) (1.196) 
∆S&P Rating 3.527** 3.567** 3.441** 
 (1.134) (1.218) (1.191) 
∆Cash Flow Vol 0.000544 0.000737 0.000660 
 (0.00177) (0.00187) (0.00172) 
∆Credit Spread -0.800 -0.637 -0.785 
 (0.999) (1.019) (0.963) 
∆Ln(Loan Amount) -0.0685 -0.0986 -0.0601 
 (0.0813) (0.105) (0.0967) 
∆Ln(Maturity) 0.435 0.587 0.469 
 (0.666) (0.695) (0.670) 
∆Performance Dummy 2.967*** 2.965*** 3.037*** 
 (0.299) (0.312) (0.300) 
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∆Secured Dummy 1.373*** 1.374*** 1.381*** 
 (0.231) (0.224) (0.213) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 120 120 120 
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Table 6a:  
Interaction of SOX and Overconfidence to Covenant Intensity 
This table contains the results of OLS regression between the interaction of SOX and 
overconfidence to the two covenant measures. The interaction terms Overconfidence 
67*SOX, Overconfidence Index*SOX, and Avg Option Price*SOX are constructed by 
multiplying the CEO overconfidence measures and the SOX dummy (equals to 1 if the 
loan deal is made in or after 2002, zero otherwise). The dependent variable in columns 
(1) to (3) is natural log of the covenant intensity. Brackets under coefficients contain 
standard error. *, **, & *** next to coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(1+Covenant Intensity) 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.126***   
 (0.0277)   
Overconfidence 67*SOX -0.0869***   
 (0.0218)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0501***  
  (0.00985)  
Overconfidence Index*SOX  -0.0305***  
  (0.00864)  
Avg Option Price   0.144** 
   (0.0584) 
Avg Option Price*SOX   -0.0726 
   (0.0499) 
SOX 0.205*** 0.208*** 0.198*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0502) (0.0504) 
Ln(Asset) -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.206*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0165) 
Leverage 0.417*** 0.416*** 0.416*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0374) (0.0380) 
Market-to-book -0.0732*** -0.0750*** -0.0720*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.00964) 
Profitability -0.463** -0.468** -0.459** 
 (0.152) (0.151) (0.148) 
Tangibility -0.0515 -0.0512 -0.0526 
 (0.0687) (0.0694) (0.0673) 
Z-score -0.0284*** -0.0287*** -0.0291*** 
 (0.00589) (0.00601) (0.00603) 
S&P Rating 0.0384 0.0377 0.0370 
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 (0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0268) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0592*** -0.0587*** -0.0591*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0180) 
Cash Flow Vol 8.41e-05*** 8.53e-05*** 8.52e-05*** 
 (1.42e-05) (1.40e-05) (1.36e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.116** 0.116** 0.114** 
 (0.0387) (0.0383) (0.0389) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.0689*** 0.0683*** 0.0686*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0111) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.00796 0.00618 0.00884 
 (0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0239) 
Performance Dummy 0.0104 0.0101 0.00947 
 (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0383) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
R-squared 0.439 0.439 0.438 
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Table 6b  
Interaction of SOX and Overconfidence to Number of Covenants 
This table contains the results of OLS regression between the interaction of SOX and 
overconfidence to the two covenant measures. The interaction terms Overconfidence 
67*SOX, Overconfidence Index*SOX, and Avg Option Price*SOX are constructed by 
multiplying the CEO overconfidence measures and the SOX dummy (equals to 1 if the 
loan deal is made in or after 2002, zero otherwise). The dependent variable in columns 
(4) to (6) is natural log of the number of all covenants. Brackets under coefficients 
contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
& 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(1+Number of Covenants) 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.0938***   
 (0.0138)   
Overconfidence 67*SOX -0.0656***   
 (0.0160)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0369***  
  (0.00594)  
Overconfidence Index*SOX  -0.0231**  
  (0.00714)  
Avg Option Price   0.126*** 
   (0.0193) 
Avg Option Price*SOX   -0.0792** 
   (0.0271) 
SOX 0.0563** 0.0585** 0.0572** 
 (0.0205) (0.0224) (0.0229) 
Ln(Asset) -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.103*** 
 (0.00951) (0.00946) (0.00933) 
Leverage 0.271*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0307) (0.0315) 
Market-to-book -0.0497*** -0.0510*** -0.0493*** 
 (0.00269) (0.00271) (0.00184) 
Profitability 0.107 0.103 0.112 
 (0.0717) (0.0723) (0.0741) 
Tangibility -0.0430 -0.0428 -0.0437 
 (0.0341) (0.0354) (0.0351) 
Z-score 0.0246** 0.0244** 0.0242** 
 (0.00953) (0.00938) (0.00946) 
S&P Rating 0.00125 0.000709 -0.000217 
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 (0.00695) (0.00706) (0.00685) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0198* -0.0195* -0.0196* 
 (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0107) 
Cash Flow Vol -7.16e-06 -6.31e-06 -6.60e-06 
 (1.11e-05) (1.06e-05) (1.06e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.0505 0.0509 0.0493 
 (0.0427) (0.0433) (0.0429) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.0759*** 0.0756*** 0.0756*** 
 (0.00803) (0.00807) (0.00786) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0563** 0.0551** 0.0566** 
 (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0212) 
Performance Dummy 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.118*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0188) 
Secured Dummy 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.243*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0217) (0.0218) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
R-squared 0.421 0.421 0.421 
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Table 6c: Interaction of SOX and Overconfidence to Covenant Intensity 
(Placebo Test):  
This table contains the results of OLS regression for the Placebo effect test between the 
interaction of SOX and CEO overconfidence. The Placebo interaction terms 
Overconfidence 67*PB2000, Overconfidence Index*PB2000, and Avg Option 
Price*PB2000 are constructed by multiplying the CEO overconfidence measures and 
the PB2000 dummy (equals to 1 if the loan deal is made in or after 2000, zero 
otherwise). The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is natural log of the covenant 
intensity. Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to 
coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(1+Covenant Intensity) 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.0878*   
 (0.0441)   
Overconfidence 67*PB2000 -0.0264   
 (0.0402)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0381*  
  (0.0171)  
Overconfidence Index*PB2000  -0.0110  
  (0.0168)  
Avg Option Price   0.170* 
   (0.0838) 
Avg Option Price*PB2000   -0.0776 
   (0.0801) 
PB2000 0.0787*** 0.0806*** 0.0873*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0203) 
Ln(Asset) -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.206*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0168) 
Leverage 0.415*** 0.413*** 0.415*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0373) (0.0380) 
Market-to-book -0.0717*** -0.0736*** -0.0725*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.00998) 
Profitability -0.466** -0.472** -0.465** 
 (0.152) (0.152) (0.151) 
Tangibility -0.0524 -0.0517 -0.0514 
 (0.0679) (0.0688) (0.0682) 
Z-score -0.0285*** -0.0289*** -0.0292*** 
 (0.00602) (0.00619) (0.00623) 
S&P Rating 0.0388 0.0380 0.0372 
 (0.0269) (0.0267) (0.0268) 
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Ln(Firm Age) -0.0586** -0.0583*** -0.0590*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0178) (0.0179) 
Cash Flow Vol 8.48e-05*** 8.61e-05*** 8.58e-05*** 
 (1.41e-05) (1.39e-05) (1.36e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.117** 0.118** 0.115** 
 (0.0399) (0.0396) (0.0388) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.0686*** 0.0682*** 0.0687*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0113) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.00917 0.00734 0.00837 
 (0.0235) (0.0233) (0.0237) 
Performance Dummy 0.00979 0.00919 0.00889 
 (0.0388) (0.0390) (0.0385) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
R-squared 0.438 0.438 0.438 
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Table 6d: Interaction of SOX and Overconfidence to Number of Covenants 
(Placebo Test) 
This table contains the results of OLS regression for the Placebo effect test between the 
interaction of SOX and CEO overconfidence. The Placebo interaction terms 
Overconfidence 67*PB2000, Overconfidence Index*PB2000, and Avg Option 
Price*PB2000 are constructed by multiplying the CEO overconfidence measures and 
the PB2000 dummy (equals to 1 if the loan deal is made in or after 2000, zero 
otherwise). The dependent variable in columns (4) to (6) is natural log of the number of 
all covenants. Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **b & *** next to 
coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%b & 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(1+Number of Covenants) 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.0723***   
 (0.0174)   
Overconfidence 67*PB2000 -0.0296   
 (0.0182)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0295***  
  (0.00629)  
Overconfidence Index*PB2000  -0.0104  
  (0.00702)  
Avg Option Price   0.141*** 
   (0.0309) 
Avg Option Price*PB2000   -0.0689* 
   (0.0369) 
PB2000 0.0315 0.0319 0.0367 
 (0.0240) (0.0268) (0.0313) 
Ln(Asset) -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.104*** 
 (0.00946) (0.00947) (0.00944) 
Leverage 0.270*** 0.268*** 0.269*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0313) 
Market-to-book -0.0487*** -0.0500*** -0.0497*** 
 (0.00256) (0.00251) (0.00235) 
Profitability 0.105 0.100 0.105 
 (0.0687) (0.0697) (0.0710) 
Tangibility -0.0434 -0.0431 -0.0426 
 (0.0341) (0.0353) (0.0353) 
Z-score 0.0246** 0.0242** 0.0241** 
 (0.00942) (0.00929) (0.00941) 
S&P Rating 0.00154 0.000929 7.52e-05 
 (0.00674) (0.00683) (0.00681) 
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Ln(Firm Age) -0.0194* -0.0192* -0.0194* 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0106) 
Cash Flow Vol -6.63e-06 -5.73e-06 -5.83e-06 
 (1.08e-05) (1.04e-05) (1.03e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.0514 0.0521 0.0499 
 (0.0435) (0.0440) (0.0436) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.0758*** 0.0755*** 0.0757*** 
 (0.00819) (0.00823) (0.00813) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0571** 0.0559** 0.0562** 
 (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0209) 
Performance Dummy 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0190) 
Secured Dummy 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.242*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0221) (0.0219) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
R-squared 0.419 0.420 0.420 
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Table 7a 
Effect of CEO Overconfidence under Different Market-to-book Ratio: Covenant 
Intensity 
This table contains the OLS regression results for the relations between CEO 
overconfidence and covenant intensity under relatively high and relatively low 
market-to-book (M/B) ratios. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (6) is in 
natural log of the total number of all the covenants in our loan samples. The sample 
is separated into high M/B and low M/B ratios using the industry median. I use SIC 
2-digit code to categorize each firm according to its respective industry mean. 
Columns (1), (3), and (5) contain the sample with firm’s M/B ratio higher than its 
respective industry median. Columns (2), (4), and (6) contain the sample with firm’s 
M/B ratio lower than its respective industry median. For example, a manufacturing 
firm is segregated according to the manufacturing industry’s median M/B ratio. 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard error. *, **, & *** denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The differences in the overconfidence 
coefficients between high and M/B ratios are found to be statistically significant 
using the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln(1+Covenant Intensity) 
VARIABLES High M/B Low 
M/B 
High M/B Low 
M/B 
High M/B Low 
M/B 
       
Overconfidence 67 0.0772*** 0.00864     
 (0.00977) (0.0128)     
Overconfidence Index   0.0342*** 0.00760   
   (0.00549) (0.00569)   
Avg Option Price     0.142*** 0.0503* 
     (0.0290) (0.0259) 
Ln(Asset) -0.143*** -0.139*** -0.143*** -0.139*** -0.144*** -0.139*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0140) (0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0130) (0.0138) 
Leverage 0.281** 0.367*** 0.278** 0.367*** 0.279** 0.367*** 
 (0.0837) (0.0385) (0.0847) (0.0381) (0.0857) (0.0382) 
Market-to-book -0.0384*** -0.0672** -0.0400*** -0.0729** -0.0404*** -0.0777** 
 (0.00601) (0.0289) (0.00596) (0.0278) (0.00569) (0.0261) 
Profitability -0.132* 0.190 -0.134* 0.184 -0.134* 0.182 
 (0.0639) (0.129) (0.0639) (0.127) (0.0623) (0.127) 
Tangibility -0.0745* -0.0863 -0.0739* -0.0863 -0.0712 -0.0866 
 (0.0372) (0.0624) (0.0394) (0.0630) (0.0407) (0.0634) 
Z-score -0.00622 0.0155 -0.00685 0.0154 -0.00688* 0.0148 
 (0.00380) (0.0189) (0.00370) (0.0188) (0.00368) (0.0187) 
S&P Rating -0.0458* 0.0283 -0.0474* 0.0283 -0.0484* 0.0273 
 (0.0232) (0.0163) (0.0225) (0.0162) (0.0239) (0.0167) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0343** -0.0132 -0.0338** -0.0130 -0.0342** -0.0125 
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 (0.0143) (0.0118) (0.0138) (0.0114) (0.0139) (0.0116) 
Cash Flow Vol -0.000147 2.97e-05 -0.000135 2.99e-05 -0.000138 3.05e-05 
 (0.000108) (1.65e-05) (0.000109) (1.66e-05) (0.000110) (1.68e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.116 0.0458 0.118 0.0472 0.113 0.0477 
 (0.0709) (0.0404) (0.0724) (0.0415) (0.0703) (0.0429) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.0664*** 0.0693*** 0.0655*** 0.0693*** 0.0663*** 0.0691*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0123) (0.0193) (0.0122) (0.0190) (0.0122) 
Ln(Maturity) -0.0275 0.0124 -0.0279 0.0114 -0.0287 0.0114 
 (0.0293) (0.0358) (0.0287) (0.0364) (0.0305) (0.0365) 
Performance Dummy 0.0538 0.0582** 0.0538 0.0578** 0.0533 0.0574** 
 (0.0459) (0.0227) (0.0456) (0.0231) (0.0453) (0.0230) 
Secured Dummy 0.453*** 0.529*** 0.453*** 0.529*** 0.454*** 0.529*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0362) (0.0169) (0.0357) (0.0171) (0.0354) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1,905 1,936 1,905 1,936 1,905 1,936 
R-squared 0.591 0.567 0.592 0.567 0.591 0.568 
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Table 7b 
Effect of CEO Overconfidence under Different Market-to-book Ratio: Number of 
Covenants 
This table contains the OLS regression results for the relations between CEO 
overconfidence and covenant number under relatively high and relatively low 
market-to-book (M/B) ratios. The dependent variable in columns (7) to (12) is in 
natural log of the total number of all the covenants in our loan samples. The sample 
is separated into high M/B and low M/B ratios using the industry median. I use SIC 
2-digit code to categorize each firm according to its respective industry mean. 
Columns (7), (9), and (11) contain the sample with firm’s M/B ratio higher than its 
respective industry median. Columns (8), (10), and (12) contain the sample with 
firm’s M/B ratio lower than its respective industry median. For example, a 
manufacturing firm is segregated according to the manufacturing industry’s median 
M/B ratio. Numbers in parenthesis are standard error. *, **, & *** denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The differences in the overconfidence 
coefficients between high and M/B ratios are found to be statistically significant 
using the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).   
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Ln(1+Number of Covenants) 
VARIABLES High M/B Low 
M/B 
High M/B Low 
M/B 
High M/B Low 
M/B 
       
Overconfidence 67 0.0709*** 0.0162     
 (0.00777) (0.0112)     
Overconfidence 
Index 
  0.0293*** 0.0101*   
   (0.00413) (0.00494)   
Avg Option Price     0.114*** 0.0587** 
     (0.0284) (0.0182) 
Ln(Asset) -0.105*** -0.101*** -0.105*** -0.101*** -0.106*** -0.101*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0119) (0.0128) (0.0120) 
Leverage 0.263*** 0.293*** 0.260*** 0.292*** 0.261*** 0.293*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0520) (0.0399) (0.0517) (0.0406) (0.0514) 
Market-to-book -0.0387*** -0.0149 -0.0397*** -0.0206 -0.0397*** -0.0247 
 (0.00560) (0.0476) (0.00549) (0.0469) (0.00505) (0.0443) 
Profitability -0.00248 0.316* -0.00394 0.311* -0.00400 0.311* 
 (0.0805) (0.155) (0.0814) (0.153) (0.0835) (0.158) 
Tangibility -0.0591 -0.0578 -0.0590 -0.0577 -0.0572 -0.0579 
 (0.0417) (0.0337) (0.0435) (0.0344) (0.0447) (0.0357) 
Z-score 0.0228** 0.0266* 0.0224* 0.0265* 0.0224** 0.0258* 
 (0.00989) (0.0130) (0.00976) (0.0126) (0.00970) (0.0125) 
S&P Rating -0.0355** 0.0302* -0.0368** 0.0302* -0.0375** 0.0291* 
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 (0.0139) (0.0152) (0.0141) (0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0157) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0222 -0.0147 -0.0221 -0.0145 -0.0228 -0.0140 
 (0.0132) (0.00999) (0.0130) (0.00997) (0.0129) (0.0106) 
Cash Flow Vol -7.01e-05 2.96e-06 -6.09e-05 3.15e-06 -6.41e-05 3.75e-06 
 (7.72e-05) (1.06e-05) (7.83e-05) (1.07e-05) (7.93e-05) (1.07e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.0439 0.0798 0.0450 0.0809 0.0403 0.0811 
 (0.0581) (0.0635) (0.0592) (0.0632) (0.0579) (0.0624) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.0821*** 0.0727*** 0.0814*** 0.0728*** 0.0822*** 0.0725*** 
 (0.0189) (0.00527) (0.0187) (0.00517) (0.0186) (0.00516) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0330 0.0734** 0.0328 0.0723** 0.0324 0.0725** 
 (0.0232) (0.0304) (0.0228) (0.0306) (0.0241) (0.0309) 
Performance Dummy 0.112*** 0.122*** 0.112*** 0.121*** 0.112*** 0.121*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0168) (0.0286) (0.0169) (0.0283) (0.0164) 
Secured Dummy 0.205*** 0.266*** 0.205*** 0.266*** 0.206*** 0.266*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0213) (0.0172) (0.0213) (0.0173) (0.0206) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1,905 1,936 1,905 1,936 1,905 1,936 
R-squared 0.443 0.409 0.444 0.410 0.441 0.411 
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Table 8a 
Number of Financial Covenants and CEO Overconfidence 
This table contains the results of OLS regression between CEO overconfidence and 
financial covenants. The dependent variable in columns (4) to (6) is the natural log of 
the number of financial covenants. The regression has controlled for industry and year 
effect. Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to 
coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(1+Financial Covenant) 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.0756***   
 (0.0109)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0333***  
  (0.00463)  
Avg Option Price   0.128*** 
   (0.0257) 
Ln(Asset) -0.0765*** -0.0766*** -0.0765*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0109) 
Leverage 0.205*** 0.202*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0517) (0.0524) (0.0529) 
Market-to-book -0.0533*** -0.0556*** -0.0544*** 
 (0.00654) (0.00663) (0.00657) 
Profitability 0.380** 0.372** 0.380** 
 (0.121) (0.120) (0.123) 
Tangibility -0.116** -0.115** -0.114** 
 (0.0476) (0.0483) (0.0471) 
Z-score 0.0310*** 0.0304*** 0.0301*** 
 (0.00430) (0.00418) (0.00416) 
S&P Rating -0.0152 -0.0162 -0.0175 
 (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0127) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0355** -0.0350** -0.0353** 
 (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0128) 
Cash Flow Vol -6.46e-05*** -6.30e-05*** -6.32e-05*** 
 (1.53e-05) (1.51e-05) (1.54e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.0628 0.0640 0.0603 
 (0.0543) (0.0545) (0.0525) 
Ln(Loan Amount) -0.000360 -0.000750 -0.000454 
 (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0122) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0116) 
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Performance Dummy 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0274) (0.0271) 
Secured Dummy -0.00200 -0.00224 -0.000368 
 (0.0280) (0.0277) (0.0282) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
R-squared 0.258 0.260 0.259 
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Table 8b 
Number of General Covenants and CEO Overconfidence 
This table contains the results of OLS regression between managerial overconfidence 
and general covenants. The dependent variable in columns (4) to (6) is in natural log of 
the number of general covenants. The regression has controlled for industry and year 
effect. Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to 
coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(1+Number of General Covenants) 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.0178   
 (0.0111)   
Overconfidence Index  0.00782*  
  (0.00407)  
Avg Option Price   0.0358** 
   (0.0146) 
Ln(Asset) -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.103*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0202) 
Leverage 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.244*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0374) (0.0373) 
Market-to-book -0.0367*** -0.0372*** -0.0374*** 
 (0.00433) (0.00429) (0.00407) 
Profitability -0.0548 -0.0565 -0.0560 
 (0.0956) (0.0958) (0.0950) 
Tangibility -0.00188 -0.00167 -0.00135 
 (0.0387) (0.0388) (0.0390) 
Z-score 0.0142 0.0141 0.0140 
 (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0110) 
S&P Rating 0.0195*** 0.0193*** 0.0188*** 
 (0.00395) (0.00391) (0.00389) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.00271 -0.00262 -0.00251 
 (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0117) 
Cash Flow Vol 8.13e-06 8.48e-06 8.66e-06 
 (2.03e-05) (2.01e-05) (2.00e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.0598 0.0601 0.0594 
 (0.0399) (0.0403) (0.0404) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0299 0.0295 0.0296 
 (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0246) 
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Performance Dummy 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0181) 
Secured Dummy 0.343*** 0.343*** 0.343*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0245) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
R-squared 0.383 0.383 0.383 
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Table 9a 
Number of P-Covenants and CEO Overconfidence 
This table contains the results of OLS regression between managerial overconfidence 
and performance-based covenants. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is 
natural log of number of performance-based covenants. The regression has controlled 
for industry and year effect. Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & 
*** next to coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(1+Number of P-covenants) 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.0611***   
 (0.00840)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0269***  
  (0.00463)  
Avg Option Price   0.0993*** 
   (0.0165) 
Ln(Asset) -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.110*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) 
Leverage 0.384*** 0.382*** 0.383*** 
 (0.0382) (0.0377) (0.0377) 
Market-to-book -0.0448*** -0.0467*** -0.0454*** 
 (0.00522) (0.00560) (0.00535) 
Profitability 0.460** 0.454** 0.461** 
 (0.154) (0.154) (0.153) 
Tangibility -0.262* -0.261* -0.261* 
 (0.125) (0.126) (0.124) 
Z-score 0.0146*** 0.0141*** 0.0140*** 
 (0.00296) (0.00304) (0.00296) 
S&P Rating -0.0358* -0.0366* -0.0376* 
 (0.0191) (0.0189) (0.0189) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0465 -0.0462 -0.0465 
 (0.0270) (0.0269) (0.0270) 
Cash Flow Vol -3.78e-05 -3.66e-05 -3.69e-05 
 (2.49e-05) (2.55e-05) (2.55e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.0939 0.0949 0.0918 
 (0.0688) (0.0690) (0.0675) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.0486** 0.0483** 0.0486** 
 (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.147*** 0.145*** 0.147*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0160) (0.0170) 
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Performance Dummy 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0343) (0.0342) (0.0338) 
Secured Dummy 0.0756** 0.0754** 0.0770** 
 (0.0298) (0.0294) (0.0294) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
R-squared 0.324 0.324 0.324 
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Table 9b 
Number of C-covenants and CEO overconfidence 
This table contains the results of OLS regression between managerial overconfidence 
and capital-based covenants. The dependent variable in columns (4) to (6) is natural log 
of number of capital-based covenants. The regression has controlled for industry and 
year effect. Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to 
coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Ln(1+ Number of C-covenants) 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.0185***   
 (0.00401)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0443***  
  (0.0114)  
Avg Option Price   0.0865*** 
   (0.0255) 
Ln(Asset) 0.00700 0.00705 0.00708 
 (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0207) 
Leverage -0.150* -0.149* -0.149* 
 (0.0719) (0.0716) (0.0721) 
Market-to-book -0.0307*** -0.0297** -0.0311*** 
 (0.00909) (0.00919) (0.00876) 
Profitability -0.0930 -0.0898 -0.0922 
 (0.137) (0.136) (0.141) 
Tangibility 0.149 0.149 0.150 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
Z-score 0.0323*** 0.0326*** 0.0320*** 
 (0.00629) (0.00634) (0.00624) 
S&P Rating -0.00571 -0.00520 -0.00684 
 (0.0249) (0.0246) (0.0248) 
Ln(Firm Age) 0.00526 0.00514 0.00558 
 (0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0155) 
Cash Flow Vol -1.51e-05 -1.58e-05 -1.46e-05 
 (1.90e-05) (1.94e-05) (1.89e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) -0.0599** -0.0603** -0.0614** 
 (0.0228) (0.0240) (0.0215) 
Ln(Loan Amount) -0.0493*** -0.0491*** -0.0493*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0143) 
Ln(Maturity) -0.0607** -0.0597** -0.0605** 
 (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0202) 
Performance Dummy 0.0217 0.0221 0.0213 
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 (0.0240) (0.0242) (0.0243) 
Secured Dummy -0.0879*** -0.0879*** -0.0871*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0240) (0.0248) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
R-squared 0.278 0.278 0.279 
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Table 10a 
Individual Type of Financial Covenant and CEO Overconfidence: Debt to Cash Flow 
Covenant 
This table contains the results of Logit regression between CEO overconfident and 
different types of financial covenants. The coefficients are presented in Odds Ratio. 
With reference to Nini, Smith, & Sufi (2009), I categorize the financial covenants 
into six mutually-exclusive groups. The dependent variable in Equations (1) to (3) is 
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contract contains debt to cash flow 
covenant, zero otherwise. The regression has controlled for industry and year effect. 
Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to coefficients 
denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Debt-to-cash flow Covenant 
    
Overconfidence 67 1.220**   
 (0.0958)   
Overconfidence Index  1.322**  
  (0.161)  
Avg Option Price   1.372** 
   (0.206) 
Ln(Asset) 0.635*** 0.635*** 0.635*** 
 (0.0638) (0.0640) (0.0638) 
Leverage 2.757** 2.734** 2.737** 
 (1.089) (1.074) (1.090) 
Market-to-book 0.828** 0.823** 0.826** 
 (0.0701) (0.0723) (0.0716) 
Profitability 42.03*** 41.71*** 41.98*** 
 (49.71) (49.42) (48.93) 
Tangibility 0.186** 0.185** 0.187** 
 (0.130) (0.128) (0.130) 
Z-score 1.003 1.003 1.001 
 (0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0324) 
S&P Rating 0.701*** 0.700*** 0.699*** 
 (0.0951) (0.0964) (0.0948) 
Ln(Firm Age) 0.718** 0.720** 0.717** 
 (0.0982) (0.0986) (0.0978) 
Cash Flow Vol 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.000290) (0.000286) (0.000289) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 1.937** 1.939** 1.913** 
 (0.551) (0.545) (0.521) 
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Ln(Loan Amount) 1.353*** 1.353*** 1.354*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
Ln(Maturity) 2.203*** 2.195*** 2.199*** 
 (0.247) (0.245) (0.250) 
Performance Dummy 1.887*** 1.893*** 1.885*** 
 (0.373) (0.377) (0.371) 
Secured Dummy 1.216 1.207 1.218 
 (0.270) (0.270) (0.269) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
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Table 10b 
Individual Type of Financial Covenant and CEO Overconfidence: Coverage Ratio 
Covenant 
This table contains the results of Logit regression between CEO overconfident and 
different types of financial covenants. The coefficients are presented in Odds Ratio. 
With reference to Nini, Smith, & Sufi (2009), I categorize the financial covenants 
into six mutually exclusive groups. The dependent variable in Equations (4) to (6) is 
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contract contains coverage ratio 
covenant, zero otherwise. The regression has controlled for industry and year effect. 
Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to coefficients 
denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Coverage Ratio Covenant 
    
Overconfidence 67 1.377***   
 (0.0954)   
Overconfidence Index  1.696***  
  (0.188)  
Avg Option Price   2.026*** 
   (0.349) 
Ln(Asset) 0.553*** 0.549*** 0.551*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0342) (0.0343) 
Leverage 8.461*** 8.316*** 8.410*** 
 (2.652) (2.602) (2.601) 
Market-to-book 0.789*** 0.773*** 0.775*** 
 (0.0437) (0.0444) (0.0454) 
Profitability 7.015** 6.715** 6.756** 
 (6.097) (5.858) (5.841) 
Tangibility 0.297** 0.297** 0.301** 
 (0.178) (0.180) (0.183) 
Z-score 1.104*** 1.097** 1.098*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0401) (0.0395) 
S&P Rating 0.830** 0.827** 0.823** 
 (0.0773) (0.0721) (0.0742) 
Ln(Firm Age) 0.936 0.938 0.939 
 (0.0886) (0.0887) (0.0890) 
Cash Flow Vol 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.000251) (0.000241) (0.000240) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 1.212 1.216 1.191 
 (0.586) (0.602) (0.580) 
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Ln(Loan Amount) 1.239*** 1.239*** 1.237*** 
 (0.0929) (0.0920) (0.0913) 
Ln(Maturity) 1.861*** 1.835*** 1.848*** 
 (0.294) (0.287) (0.296) 
Performance Dummy 1.802*** 1.795*** 1.795*** 
 (0.342) (0.340) (0.339) 
Secured Dummy 1.595*** 1.586*** 1.591*** 
 (0.207) (0.204) (0.204) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
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Table 10c 
Individual Type of Financial Covenant and CEO Overconfidence: Net Worth 
Covenant 
This table contains the results of Logit regression between CEO overconfident and 
different types of financial covenants. The coefficients are presented in Odds Ratio. 
With reference to Nini, Smith, & Sufi (2009), I categorize the financial covenants 
into six mutually-exclusive groups. The dependent variable in Equations (7) to (9) is 
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contract contains net worth covenant, 
zero otherwise. The regression has controlled for industry and year effect. Brackets 
under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to coefficients denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Net Worth Covenant 
    
Overconfidence 67 1.191**   
 (0.0973)   
Overconfidence Index  1.287**  
  (0.134)  
Avg Option Price   1.598*** 
   (0.131) 
Ln(Asset) 0.829 0.827 0.828 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) 
Leverage 0.832 0.822 0.832 
 (0.347) (0.344) (0.348) 
Market-to-book 0.845*** 0.838*** 0.831*** 
 (0.0519) (0.0520) (0.0479) 
Profitability 0.742 0.719 0.710 
 (0.255) (0.249) (0.266) 
Tangibility 1.113 1.125 1.133 
 (0.513) (0.536) (0.533) 
Z-score 1.237*** 1.235*** 1.235*** 
 (0.0749) (0.0745) (0.0748) 
S&P Rating 0.817* 0.815* 0.812* 
 (0.0985) (0.0989) (0.0971) 
Ln(Firm Age) 0.927 0.928 0.932 
 (0.0536) (0.0525) (0.0541) 
Cash Flow Vol 0.999 0.999 0.999 
 (0.00148) (0.00146) (0.00145) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.850 0.845 0.850 
 (0.190) (0.190) (0.193) 
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Ln(Loan Amount) 0.858 0.856 0.854 
 (0.0917) (0.0908) (0.0914) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.837 0.831 0.830 
 (0.0983) (0.0984) (0.0953) 
Performance Dummy 0.929 0.926 0.927 
 (0.108) (0.106) (0.107) 
Secured Dummy 0.871 0.874 0.871 
 (0.132) (0.133) (0.131) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
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Table 10d 
Individual Type of Financial Covenant and CEO Overconfidence: Debt-to-balance 
sheet Covenant 
This table contains the results of Logit regression between CEO overconfident and 
different types of financial covenants. The coefficients are presented in Odds Ratio. 
With reference to Nini, Smith, & Sufi (2009), I categorize the financial covenants 
into six mutually-exclusive groups. The dependent variable in Equations (10) to (12) 
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contract contains debt-to-balance 
sheet covenant, zero otherwise. The regression has controlled for industry and year 
effect. Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to 
coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Debt-to-balance sheet Covenant 
    
Overconfidence 67 1.275**   
 (0.144)   
Overconfidence Index  1.452***  
  (0.122)  
Avg Option Price   1.566*** 
   (0.171) 
Ln(Asset) 1.545** 1.538** 1.548** 
 (0.285) (0.288) (0.292) 
Leverage 0.571 0.564 0.572 
 (0.515) (0.507) (0.513) 
Market-to-book 0.957 0.946 0.951 
 (0.135) (0.127) (0.119) 
Profitability 13.70** 12.65** 13.74** 
 (14.33) (13.23) (15.41) 
Tangibility 0.689 0.695 0.687 
 (0.760) (0.762) (0.775) 
Z-score 1.084 1.084 1.082 
 (0.0688) (0.0689) (0.0685) 
S&P Rating 0.935 0.928 0.921 
 (0.345) (0.341) (0.338) 
Ln(Firm Age) 0.891 0.892 0.896 
 (0.0846) (0.0814) (0.0847) 
Cash Flow Vol 0.995** 0.996** 0.996** 
 (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00193) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.877 0.877 0.886 
 (1.058) (1.074) (1.086) 
 105 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.600*** 0.596*** 0.596*** 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.108) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.557*** 0.554*** 0.558*** 
 (0.0976) (0.0961) (0.0963) 
Performance Dummy 0.513*** 0.514*** 0.510*** 
 (0.0890) (0.0893) (0.0850) 
Secured Dummy 1.279 1.275 1.291* 
 (0.198) (0.199) (0.191) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
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Table 10e 
Individual Type of Financial Covenant and CEO Overconfidence: Liquidity 
Covenant 
This table contains the results of Logit regression between CEO overconfident and 
different types of financial covenants. The coefficients are presented in Odds Ratio. 
With reference to Nini, Smith, & Sufi (2009), I categorize the financial covenants 
into six mutually-exclusive groups. The dependent variable in Equations (13) to (15) 
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contract contains liquidity covenant, 
zero otherwise. The regression has controlled for industry and year effect. Brackets 
under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to coefficients denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES Liquidity Covenant 
    
Overconfidence 67 1.659**   
 (0.395)   
Overconfidence Index  1.781**  
  (0.523)  
Avg Option Price   1.836** 
   (0.437) 
Ln(Asset) 0.696* 0.696* 0.703* 
 (0.133) (0.134) (0.138) 
Leverage 2.203 2.175 2.155 
 (2.186) (2.174) (2.171) 
Market-to-book 0.920*** 0.915*** 0.932** 
 (0.0266) (0.0218) (0.0306) 
Profitability 1.363 1.316 1.500 
 (1.759) (1.650) (1.956) 
Tangibility 1.669 1.646 1.626 
 (2.409) (2.354) (2.369) 
Z-score 1.676** 1.678** 1.667** 
 (0.345) (0.341) (0.344) 
S&P Rating 0.934 0.936 0.907 
 (0.343) (0.351) (0.322) 
Ln(Firm Age) 0.807 0.808 0.814 
 (0.153) (0.153) (0.152) 
Cash Flow Vol 1.000*** 1.001*** 1.000*** 
 (0.000114) (0.000117) (0.000107) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 2.471*** 2.473*** 2.421*** 
 (0.827) (0.829) (0.783) 
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Ln(Loan Amount) 0.847 0.845 0.844 
 (0.242) (0.241) (0.243) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.574 0.573 0.582 
 (0.231) (0.229) (0.223) 
Performance Dummy 0.866 0.868 0.860 
 (0.219) (0.218) (0.216) 
Secured Dummy 2.757*** 2.747*** 2.850*** 
 (0.806) (0.784) (0.877) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
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Table 11a 
Covenant Tightness and CEO Overconfidence: Debt-to-cash flow 
This table contains the OLS regression results for the relation between CEO 
overconfidence and covenant tightness. Columns (1) to (3) present results corresponding 
to debt-to-cash flow slack. The dependent variable debt-to-cash flow slack is defined as 
the distance between covenant threshold and the firm’s debt-to-cash flow ratio. Figures 
in parenthesis are standard errors. *, **, & *** denote significance level at 1%, 5%, 
and10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Debt-to-cash flow Slack 
    
Overconfidence 67 -0.135***   
 (0.0412)   
Overconfidence Index  -0.0610***  
  (0.0181)  
Avg Option Price   -0.228 
   (0.129) 
Ln(Asset) -0.0267 -0.0276 -0.0280 
 (0.0264) (0.0271) (0.0275) 
Leverage 2.254*** 2.258*** 2.254*** 
 (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) 
Market-to-book 0.0315 0.0371 0.0331 
 (0.0623) (0.0609) (0.0579) 
Profitability -3.355** -3.355** -3.367** 
 (1.318) (1.319) (1.324) 
Tangibility 0.487 0.494 0.498 
 (0.325) (0.322) (0.325) 
Z-score 0.00856 0.00994 0.0111 
 (0.0395) (0.0390) (0.0388) 
S&P Rating 0.225*** 0.227*** 0.229*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0315) (0.0305) 
Ln(Firm Age) 0.0578 0.0566 0.0558 
 (0.0573) (0.0579) (0.0583) 
Debt-to-cash flow -1.001*** -1.001*** -1.000*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0218) 
Cash Flow Vol -0.000469* -0.000475* -0.000468* 
 (0.000227) (0.000227) (0.000224) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.0792 0.0684 0.0838 
 (0.127) (0.133) (0.127) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.141*** 0.144*** 0.143*** 
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 (0.0152) (0.0150) (0.0137) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.266** 0.270** 0.263** 
 (0.108) (0.109) (0.106) 
Performance Dummy -0.103** -0.100** -0.0966** 
 (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0316) 
Secured Dummy 0.302** 0.303** 0.296** 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.111) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 1,829 1,829 1,829 
R-squared 0.938 0.938 0.938 
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Table 11b 
Covenant Tightness and CEO Overconfidence: Current Ratio 
This table contains the OLS regression results for the relation between CEO 
overconfidence and covenant tightness. Equations (4) to (6) present results corresponding 
to current-ratio slack. The dependent variable is the distance between covenant threshold 
and the firm’s current ratio. Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. *, **, & *** 
denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Current Ratio Slack 
    
Overconfidence 67 -0.177**   
 (0.0532)   
Overconfidence Index  -0.0941***  
  (0.0200)  
Avg Option Price   -0.394** 
   (0.122) 
Ln(Asset) 0.159 0.178* 0.170 
 (0.0881) (0.0863) (0.0921) 
Leverage -0.0404 -0.0458 -0.00130 
 (0.311) (0.306) (0.311) 
Market-to-book 0.165 0.173 0.174 
 (0.170) (0.172) (0.178) 
Profitability -1.145** -1.049** -1.037** 
 (0.380) (0.403) (0.372) 
Tangibility 0.224 0.223 0.223 
 (0.424) (0.406) (0.402) 
Z-score 0.132 0.124 0.123 
 (0.168) (0.166) (0.167) 
S&P Rating -0.172 -0.198 -0.191 
 (0.141) (0.137) (0.132) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.000285 -0.00454 -0.00162 
 (0.0855) (0.0854) (0.0814) 
Current Ratio 0.533*** 0.532*** 0.533*** 
 (0.0485) (0.0466) (0.0463) 
Cash Flow Vol -7.10e-05 -8.43e-05 -3.81e-05 
 (0.000313) (0.000294) (0.000311) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) -0.252* -0.295* -0.282* 
 (0.128) (0.126) (0.122) 
Ln(Loan Amount) -0.190* -0.196* -0.191* 
 (0.0909) (0.0949) (0.0933) 
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Ln(Maturity) 0.103 0.108 0.102 
 (0.138) (0.148) (0.150) 
Performance Dummy 0.197 0.201* 0.210* 
 (0.108) (0.103) (0.101) 
Secured Dummy 0.0858 0.0950 0.0844 
 (0.204) (0.207) (0.203) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 172 172 172 
R-squared 0.639 0.644 0.643 
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Table 12 
GMM Joint Determinants of Loan Spread and Covenant Intensity 
The table contains the regression with generalize method of moment (GMM) for the 
relation between CEO overconfident, Ln(1 + Covenant Intensity) and 
Ln(All-in-Spread). The instrumental variable for Ln(1 + Covenant Intensity) and 
Ln(All-in-Spread) are the average of the Ln(1 + Covenant Intensity) and Ln(All in 
Spread) imposed by the same lead arranger in the year respectively. The regression 
has controlled for industry and year effect. Brackets under coefficients contain 
standard error. *, **, & *** next to coefficients denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Ln(1 + Covenant Intensity) Ln(All-in-Spread) 
   
Ln(All-in-Spread) 0.433***  
 (0.0545)  
Ln(1 + Covenant Index)  0.388*** 
  (0.0859) 
Overconfidence 67 0.0455*** 0.0165 
 (0.0141) (0.0166) 
Ln(Asset) -0.116*** -0.0901*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0180) 
Leverage 0.0917 0.635*** 
 (0.0625) (0.0621) 
Market-to-book -0.0331*** -0.0614*** 
 (0.00843) (0.0107) 
Profitability 0.282** 16.44 
 (0.133) (13.88) 
Tangibility -0.0173 -0.0151 
 (0.0362) (0.0437) 
Z-score 0.00259 -0.0446*** 
 (0.00822) (0.0159) 
S&P Rating 0.0312* -0.0351* 
 (0.0170) (0.0194) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0267**  
 (0.0108)  
Cash Flow Vol -4.42e-06  
 (2.26e-05)  
Cash Holding  0.450*** 
  (0.0899) 
ROA  -17.72 
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  (13.88) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) 0.0375 0.0639 
 (0.0785) (0.0874) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.0785*** -0.0474*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0150) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0739*** -0.131*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0274) 
Performance Dummy 0.0415** -0.0653*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0225) 
Secured Dummy  0.248*** 
  (0.0464) 
Industry Control Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes 
   
Observations 3,706 3,706 
R-squared 0.509 0.704 
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Table 13 
Loan Maturity and Overconfidence (OLS) 
This table contains the results of OLS regression between CEO overconfidence and 
loan amount. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is natural log of loan 
maturity in term of months. The regression has controlled for industry and year effect. 
Brackets under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to coefficients 
denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(Maturity) 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.0295**   
 (0.0110)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0155***  
  (0.00448)  
Avg Option Price   0.0522*** 
   (0.0141) 
Ln(Asset) -0.0715*** -0.0714*** -0.0715*** 
 (0.00546) (0.00559) (0.00560) 
Leverage 0.0769** 0.0758** 0.0766** 
 (0.0308) (0.0311) (0.0303) 
Market-to-book -0.0237** -0.0253** -0.0242** 
 (0.00908) (0.00924) (0.00900) 
Profitability 0.375*** 0.369*** 0.375*** 
 (0.0776) (0.0772) (0.0707) 
Tangibility 0.0393 0.0400 0.0400 
 (0.0487) (0.0488) (0.0481) 
Z-score 0.0115 0.0111 0.0111 
 (0.00706) (0.00695) (0.00700) 
S&P Rating 0.0309** 0.0303** 0.0299** 
 (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0122) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.00753 -0.00704 -0.00740 
 (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0114) 
Cash Flow Vol -1.31e-05 -1.21e-05 -1.25e-05 
 (3.68e-05) (3.63e-05) (3.66e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) -0.0280 -0.0268 -0.0289 
 (0.0793) (0.0792) (0.0782) 
Ln(Loan Amount) 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 
 (0.00695) (0.00697) (0.00720) 
Performance Dummy 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0167) 
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Secured Dummy 0.0169 0.0165 0.0175 
 (0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0206) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
R-squared 0.713 0.713 0.713 
 
  
 116 
Table 14 
Loan Amount and Overconfidence (OLS) 
This table contains the results of OLS regression between CEO overconfidence and 
loan amount. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is natural log of loan 
tranche amount. The regression has controlled for industry and year effect. Brackets 
under coefficients contain standard error. *, **, & *** next to coefficients denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, & 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(Tranche Amount) 
    
Overconfidence 67 0.0412**   
 (0.0155)   
Overconfidence Index  0.0179***  
  (0.00521)  
Avg Option Price   0.0657*** 
   (0.0173) 
Ln(Asset) 0.703*** 0.703*** 0.703*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0236) 
Leverage 0.620*** 0.619*** 0.620*** 
 (0.0811) (0.0810) (0.0817) 
Market-to-book -0.00684 -0.00797 -0.00714 
 (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0110) 
Profitability 1.341*** 1.337*** 1.342*** 
 (0.156) (0.155) (0.154) 
Tangibility -0.0483 -0.0478 -0.0477 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) 
Z-score 0.0631*** 0.0628*** 0.0627*** 
 (0.00914) (0.00905) (0.00908) 
S&P Rating -0.0114 -0.0119 -0.0125 
 (0.0433) (0.0432) (0.0434) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0820* -0.0818* -0.0821* 
 (0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0445) 
Cash Flow Vol 2.36e-06 3.14e-06 2.95e-06 
 (4.24e-05) (4.29e-05) (4.22e-05) 
Ln(1+Credit Spread) -0.109 -0.108 -0.110 
 (0.0695) (0.0686) (0.0680) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.462*** 0.461*** 0.461*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0295) 
Performance Dummy 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0304) 
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Secured Dummy 0.0337* 0.0336 0.0346 
 (0.0183) (0.0186) (0.0190) 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Types Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 3,841 3,841 3,841 
R-squared 0.742 0.742 0.742 
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Figure 1: Density Diagram for Firm Age (Full Sample) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Density Diagram for Firm Age (Matched Sample) 
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Figure 3: Density Diagram for Market-to-book (Full Sample) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Density Diagram for Market-to-book (Matched Sample) 
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Chapter II: Option Compensation, CEO Overconfidence and Covenant Protection 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 In the precious chapter, I have investigated the effects of CEO overconfidence 
on loan contracting. A very important implication from the findings is that, when 
assessing a borrower, the creditor should not only focus on its characteristics and 
financial health (for example, leverage, profitability, asset size, market-to-book ratio, 
and collateral), as the traits of its CEO also play an important role in the 
determination of potential credit risk. Overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate the 
return on investment and invest excessively, which significantly increase the credit 
risk faced by the creditors. In this section, another important CEO trait that has 
implication on debt contracting, namely, CEO compensation structure, is 
investigated.   
 The Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) proposes two types of agency 
conflict in corporate governance. The first one is the conflict between shareholders 
and managers, which arises due to the interest of shareholders and managers not 
being aligned. The goal of shareholders is to maximize the value of a firm, the 
managers wish to maximize their own payoff. This misalignment can be solved by 
the use of performance-based compensation, especially equity compensation, for the 
managers. Previous studies (e.g., Merhan, 1995) have shown that the use of equity 
compensation can increase firm performance. However, while this could alleviate the 
agency conflict between shareholders and managers, it would intensify the agency 
conflict between the firm and its creditors.  
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As such, this chapter aims to study the impacts of CEO compensation structure 
on the credit risk face by the creditors. The use of equity compensation can be 
classified into stock compensation and option compensation, and the differences in 
their nature can lead to very different incentives for CEOs. In this study, I 
hypothesize that the option compensation induces CEOs to take excessive risk, and 
hence, increases the credit risk faced by creditors. On the other hand, I provide weak 
evidence to show that the use of stock compensation reduces the incentive for CEOs 
to take risk due to the human nature of risk-aversion, especially under an 
undiversified portfolio.  
 Apart from studying the impact of CEO compensation structure, this chapter 
also investigates the interaction between CEO overconfidence and use of option 
compensation. Despite the fact that both provide incentives for CEO to take 
excessive risk, their nature is different. As will be seen from the findings, CEO 
overconfidence and option compensation in fact reinforce each other. If creditors 
only evaluate one without considering the other, it is quite possible that they would 
have underestimated the potential credit risk. 
 As incentives from CEO compensation affect multiple loan contract terms and 
firm characteristics, I employ simultaneous equations to alleviate potential 
endogenity issues. 
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follow: Section 2 reviews the 
current literature on equity compensation and Section 3 describes the hypothesis 
setting and regression model for this analysis. Section 4 introduces the data sources 
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and variable constructions, while Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Finally, 
Section 6 summarizes the findings from this research.  
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Section 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Equity Compensation 
 Frydman and Jenter (2010) documented the changes in CEO compensation 
structure over the past couple of decades. They found that the median income has 
increased by more than 5 times since 1980. Specifically, the median value of CEO 
compensation, which was 1.4 times of other highest-paid executives in 1980, has 
jumped to more than 2.6 times in the early 2000s. Apart from dramatically increased 
pay for CEOs, the structure of the compensation changed significantly in the recent 
decades as well. In the 1980s, average salary plus bonus constituted 74% of the total 
CEO compensation, while options and stock constituted 19% and 7% respectively. 
By the early 2000s, the percentage of options and stock in the compensation rose to 
37% and 23% respectively. Obviously, the use of equity has become more common 
nowadays, and it can be attributed to the Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
According to this theory, the interests of shareholders and managers are not 
properly aligned under static compensation (for example, salary). The use of 
performance-based compensation, for example, equity compensation and bonus, 
aims at inducing managerial efforts, as it links the firm’s performance with the 
manager’s compensation. One of the drawbacks of bonus, though, is that managers 
might focus on completing short-term targets (for example, sales or asset size) in 
hope for a larger bonus payoff at the expense of the firm’s long-run profitability. 
Therefore, in recent decades, equity compensation is more commonly used than 
bonus, as it gives the highest pay-performance sensitivity (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), 
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and share price is regarded as a more objective reflection of a firm’s value, and hence, 
manager’s performance (Kim, Li, & Zhang, 2011). 
 While equity compensation can seemingly improve a firm’s performance, there 
are studies that revealed the negative impacts from its use. For example, Bergstresser 
and Philippon (2006) discovered that the use of equity compensation induces 
managers to manipulate their firm’s earning report in order to boost its stock price in 
the short-run. Similarly, Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) found that the 
managerial option compensation ratio is positively associated with financial 
misstatement. Benmelech, Kandel, and Veronesi (2010) suggested that equity 
compensation induces managers to hide negative news related to their firm. These 
inappropriate actions are harmful to a firm’s value in the long-run, and can account 
for the potential risk and cost in the use of equity compensation.  
 Apart from fraud activities, the use of equity compensation, especially the 
option compensation, could induce managers to take excessive risk. Dittmann and 
Maug (2007) revealed that option compensation attracted managers to invest in 
highly risky projects, even those with zero net present value. Kim, Li, and Zhang 
(2011) also found that option incentive is positively associated with future stock 
price crash. As the loss from option is limited (once it falls below the strike price, the 
option is almost worthless. Therefore, a further drop in stock price would not have a 
significant impact on the manager’s compensation), a higher degree of option 
incentive might invite the moral hazard problem, which induces managers to take 
excessive risk. 
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2.2 Option Compensation and Overconfidence Measure 
 Since both CEO overconfidence and option compensation would induce more 
risk-taking behavior, and the most commonly-used measure of CEO overconfidence 
is based on option-measure (Malmendier & Tate, 2005; Malmandier, Tate, & Yan, 
2011), it might be easy to mix up the effects of the two. This section provides an 
explanation as to why the two effects should be treated separately. In the 
computation of CEO overconfidence, the major variable is average moneyness of the 
option portfolio, which estimates the proportion of the CEO’s vested option portfolio 
that is in-the-money. A higher option compensation does not necessary imply that the 
CEO is overconfident, as option compensation has no direct relationship with not 
exercising the in-the-money option. For example, a CEO may receive a large sum of 
option compensation and exercise them as long as they are vested and in-the-money. 
In this case, the CEO has high option incentive, but it does not imply that he is 
overconfident under the option-based measure. 
 Apart from the difference in definition, the mechanisms that induce CEO to take 
more risk are very different between CEO overconfidence and option compensation. 
In the case of overconfidence, CEOs are willing to take more risk because they 
overestimate their ability and the investment return due to self-attribution bias, and 
perceive the security price to be underestimated. As a result, holding an 
in-the-money option without exercising is an instrumental indicator that one is an 
overconfident CEO. On the other hand, CEOs tend to take more risk with the option 
incentive due to the option compensation itself. As the nature of option compensation 
is limiting loss as long as the strike price is higher than the stock price, it provides an 
incentive for CEOs to take excessive risk, since no further loss would be taken even 
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if the investment failed and the stock price further decreases. Due to the very 
different nature and mechanism between CEO overconfidence and option incentive, 
it is important to treat them as two different variables and investigate their impact on 
loan contract separately.  
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Section 3: Hypothesis 
The major objective of this chapter is to examine the relationship between 
equity compensation, CEO overconfidence, and loan contracting. The study by 
Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) suggested that misstatement cases are 
positively associated with amount of option compensation. Kim, Li, and Zhang 
(2011) calculated the effect of stock compensation and option compensation by using 
the option incentive ratio and stock incentive ratio, and found that future stock crash 
is positively associated with the former but not the latter, which suggests that option 
compensation would induce CEOs to take excessive risk, but stock compensation 
would not.  
Despite the fact that both overconfidence and option compensation can induce 
CEOs to take further risk, the rationale behind are different. Overconfident CEOs 
increase credit risk due to self-attribution and overestimation of profitability, while 
CEOs are induced to perform risk-taking behavior by option compensation partly due 
to moral hazard (as their loss is limited). I hypothesize that banks would take both 
variables into consideration in the loan contract. The use of option compensation 
induces more risk-taking behavior or even fraud activities, and as a result, banks 
would impose more covenants to alleviate the credit risk. On the other hand, the use 
of stock compensation reduces risk-averse CEOs’ incentive to take risk, as more 
stock compensation would make their portfolio less diversified. Banks would hence 
impose less covenants to reflect a reduction in credit risk. The determinant of the 
number of covenant types is expressed as follows: 
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Number of Covenant Types = f (CEO equity compensation, CEO overconfidence, 
Loan Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, 
Industry fixed effects). 
 I have further investigated which type of covenant is more sensitive to changes 
in CEO overconfidence and equity compensation. The determinant of the individual 
type of covenant is expressed as follows: 
Individual Type of Covenant = f (CEO equity compensation, CEO overconfidence, 
Loan Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic Characteristics, 
Industry fixed effects). 
 Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010) discovered that CEO incentives affect both 
debt maturity and firm leverage, while this thesis suggests that CEO option 
compensation has an implication on covenant usage. This shows that there are 
several variables that jointly determine loan contract terms and firm ratio, and 
running a single equation of regression may isolate other factors and result in the 
endogenoity issue. To alleviate such concern when several variables are 
co-determined, the current study uses Brockman, Martin, and Unlu’s (2010) method 
to estimate a system of equations which jointly determine covenant, leverage, and 
loan maturity. The GMM simultaneous equation system is expressed as follows: 
 
Number of Covenant Types = f (CEO equity compensation, CEO overconfidence, 
Leverage, Maturity, Loan Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic 
Characteristics, Industry fixed effects). 
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Leverage = f (CEO equity compensation, CEO overconfidence, Loan Characteristics, 
Maturity, Number of Covenant Types, Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic 
Characteristics, Industry fixed effects). 
Maturity = f (CEO equity compensation, CEO overconfidence, Number of Covenant 
Types, Leverage, Loan Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic 
Characteristics, Industry fixed effects). 
 Loan spread and covenants are both employed by banks as instruments to 
alleviate credit risk. To reduce the endogeneity concern, I have employed another 
system of simultaneous equations as follows:  
Number of Covenant Types = f (CEO equity compensation, CEO overconfidence, 
Loan spread, Loan Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic 
Characteristics, Industry fixed effects). 
Loan Spread = f (CEO equity compensation, , CEO overconfidence, Number of 
Covenant Types, Loan Characteristics,  Firm Characteristics, Macroeconomic 
Characteristics, Industry fixed effects). 
 Firm characteristics and macroeconomic environment can also play an 
important role in affecting how equity compensation incentives and CEO 
overconfidence influence covenant usage. In this study, I have employed four related 
factors and conducted subsample analyses to investigate how these factors affect the 
effects of CEO traits. 
 Market-to-book ratio (as a proxy for growth opportunities): Firms with higher 
growth opportunities for CEOs to take excessive risk. I hypothesize that the 
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effects of CEO traits are more significant in firms with higher market-to-book 
ratio.  
 Firm age (as a proxy for growth opportunities and innovation): Younger firms 
have a higher growth rate conditional on survival rate, which is appealing to 
innovative (overconfident) CEOs. I hypothesize that CEO traits, especially 
the CEO overconfidence effect, is more significant in firms with lower firm 
age.  
 S&P rating (as a proxy for credit risk and financial distress): Firms under 
financial distress are more likely to engage in risk-shifting behavior. I 
hypothesize that the effects of CEO traits on covenants are more significant in 
firms with lower S&P rating. 
 Credit spread (as a proxy for macro environment risk): During high macro risk 
period, banks are likely to impose more covenants to protect their interest. I 
hypothesize that the effects of CEO traits on covenants are more significant in 
periods with high credit spread.  
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Section 4: Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.1 Data Sources 
Firm characteristic data is extracted from CompuStat, and includes asset size, 
profitability, liabilities, S&P rating, etc. The CEO compensation data is extracted 
from the ExecuComp database, and includes annual compensation, option award, 
stock award, option exercise price, option maturity, etc, which can be used to 
construct CEO overconfidence measure using the options-based method. Loan 
characteristics data is extracted from DealScan, and includes information on loan 
size, maturity, loan purpose, loan types, and collateral provisions. Finally, loan 
covenant data is based on that used by Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009), who reported 
that, although DealScan is able to provide information on debt covenants, some 
relevant data are missing. Therefore, in order to obtain a more comprehensive 
covenant dataset, they collected their covenant data using text-searching programs to 
scan through 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filings in the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, 
and Retrieval System (EDGAR), which contains information related to loan 
contracts.  
Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) used the following keywords in the scanning 
program : “credit agreement”, “loan agreement”, “loan and security agreement”, 
“revolving credit”, “financing and security agreement”, “financing and security 
agreement”, “credit and guarantee agreement”, and “credit and guarantee agreement”. 
If any of these 10 keywords are found, the program would extract the first 60 lines of 
the document. For the current study, the search period is extended to 2006. Using the 
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date, borrowers’ CIKA, and firm’s name as the identifiers, each loan contract found 
is matched with other loan information extracted from DealScan. The final sample of 
loan deals contains 1412 private loan agreements in the US made between 1996 and 
2006. 
 
4.2 Loan and Covenants Characteristics 
 The loan characteristics control variables include loan amount (in tranche level), 
loan maturity, performance pricing control, back by collateral, loan purposes, and 
loan types. For measuring covenant, the number of financial covenant types included 
in a loan deal is used as a measure for the degree of restrictiveness in loan contracts. 
As before, following Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) categorization, the financial 
covenants can be classified into six mutually-exclusive groups, namely, debt-to-cash 
flow covenant (including debt-to-cash flow ratio and senior debt-to-senior cash flow 
ratio covenants), coverage covenant (including interest coverage, fixed charge 
coverage and debt service coverage and senior debt service coverage covenants), 
liquidity covenant (including current ratio, quick ratio, and working capital 
covenants), minimum cash flow covenant, net worth covenant, and debt-to-balance 
sheet covenant (including debt-to-total capitalization and debt-to-net worth 
covenants). A variable, FIN_NUM6, is constructed to represent the number of 
financial covenant types imposed on a loan contract. The higher the number of types 
of covenant imposed, the more restrictive the loan contract is. 
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4.3 Measures of Option and Stock Compensations 
I employ the following variables as proxies of equity compensation measures: 
 OPT_RAT: Defined as the percentage of current year total compensation in 
grants of new options. 
 STK_RAT: Defined as the percentage of current year total compensation in 
grants of new stock.  
I also make reference to Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Kim, Li, and Zhang 
(2011) in setting up the following variables to measure the relative strength of 
incentive from stock and options:  
 OPT_ICN: ONEPCT_OPT / (ONEPCT_OPT + Salary + Bonus)  
where ONEPCT_OPT = 0.01*share price*option delta*no. of options held by 
CEO. ONEPCT_OPT can be interpreted as the change in option value from an  
1% change in stock price. 
 STK_ICN: ONEPCT_STK / (ONEPCT_STK + Salary + Bonus)  
where ONEPCT_STK = 0.01*Share Price*no. of shares held by CEO. 
ONEPCT_STK can be interpreted as the change in stock value from 1% 
change in stock price 
 
4.4 CEO Overconfidence  
I employ the option-based measure as a proxy to determine CEO overconfidence. 
Following Malmendier and Tate’s (2005) method, a CEO’s unexercised vested 
options holding is used to determine whether he/she is overconfident. The variable 
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CEO_OVERCON is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO option portfolio 
is at least 67% in-the-money, zero otherwise. Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) and 
Campbell, et al.’s (2009) method is used to calculate the average moneyness of the 
CEO’s option portfolio. By dividing the total realizable value of the options by the 
number of options held by the CEO, the average realizable value per option can be 
estimated. The strike price is calculated by subtracting the average realizable value 
from the fiscal year end stock price. The average moneyness of the options is then 
calculated by dividing the stock price and subtracting one from the result.  
 
4.5 Firm Characteristics and Marco Environment Controls 
I employ a model similar to that of Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2010) and Graham, 
Li, and Qiu (2008), with the following variables to control for firm characteristics. 
 LSIZE (Asset Size): Control for firm’s reputation. 
 LEVERAGE (Firm Leverage Ratio): Control for firm’s financial status. 
 M/B (Market-to-book Ratio): Control for firm’s growth opportunities. 
 PROF (Profitability): Control for firm’s ability to make profit. 
 TANGB (Tangibility): Control for the quality of the firm’s collateral. 
 FIRM_AGE (Firm Age): Control for firm’s growth opportunities and credit 
risk 
 XRD (Research & Development Expenditure): Control for firm’s growth 
opportunities and innovation measure 
 SP_RATING (Standard and Poor's Credit Rating): Control for firm’s credit 
rating 
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 For macro environment control, I employ the variable SPREAD_DIFF, which is 
defined as the difference between AAA corporate bond and BAA corporate bond 
yield. The higher the spread difference, the higher is the required risk premium. 
Appendix A describes in detail how the above-mentioned variables are constructed. 
 
4.6 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows a summary of the loan characteristics, covenant characteristics, 
firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and the macroeconomic control. The 
average asset size of the firm/borrower is US$1,741 million, with a median of 
US$1,574 million. The mean annual total CEO compensation is US$4.81 million, 
with a median of US$2.57 million. Option compensation takes up 32.8% of the 
annual total compensation and stock compensation takes up an average of 8%. The 
mean of option incentive is 0.124 with a median of 0.089. The mean of stock 
incentive is 0.123 with a median of 0.039. Clearly, option compensation dominates 
stock compensation in the sample. 
In addition, the mean loan size is US$298 million, with a median of US$300 
million. The average maturity of the sample is 35.8 months, with a median of 48 
months. 78.2% of the sample has performance pricing - a mechanism in which 
contract terms can be modified based on the firm’s performance. The loan agreement 
of 34.8% of the sample is secured and backed by collateral.  
Table 2 presents a summary of the loan characteristics, firm characteristics, 
covenant characteristics, and CEO’s compensation structures for overconfident and 
non-overconfident CEOs. Out of the 1412 CEOs in the sample, 487 (34.5%) of them 
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are overconfident CEOs. The loan deal for firms with such a CEO on average 
contains more types of covenant. Overconfident CEOs on average also receive 
higher option incentive and option compensation in terms of their total compensation. 
For firm characteristics, the age of firm with overconfident CEOs is lower on 
average. 
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Section 5: Regression analysis 
 
5.1 Effects of Options/Overconfidence on Covenant Number 
Table 3 presents the Poisson regression results of the relationship between CEO 
compensation, CEO overconfidence, and number of covenant types. The dependent 
variable in Equations (1) to (5) is the number of covenants types (FIN_NUM6) 
included in a loan agreement, which, as previously, is categorized into six 
mutually-exclusive types per Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009): Coverage ratio covenants, 
debt-to-cash flow covenants, net worth covenants, debt-to-balance sheet covenants, 
net worth covenants, debt-to-balance sheet covenants, liquidity covenants, and 
minimum cash flow covenants. I count the number of covenants types appeared in 
the loan agreement. A larger number of covenant types included in the loan 
agreement indicates more restrictive contract terms.  
In Equation (1), the types of covenant value is regressed with the option 
incentive measure (OPT_ICN) and stock incentive measure (STK_ICN). The 
coefficient of OPT_ICN is positive and statistically significant, while that of 
STK_ICN is not significant. This result suggests that banks impose more covenant 
types on the loan agreement when a firm’s CEO receives more compensation in form 
of option incentive. The use of option compensation provides incentive for CEOs to 
take more risky investment, as, with option, the loss that one can suffer is limited. So, 
for CEOs, they can enjoy significant gain as the stock price goes above the strike 
price if the investment is successful. However, if the investment fails, their loss is 
limited, especially when the options are not in-the-money (that is, strike price is 
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higher than the stock price). Such compensation structure induces CEO to take 
excessive risk or even engage in asset substitution activities, both of which would 
significantly increase the credit risk faced by banks. As a result, banks impose more 
types of covenants to restrain the CEO’s opportunistic behavior.  
In Equation (2), I employ option compensation ratio (OPT_RAT) and stock 
compensation ratio (STK_RAT) as proxies for equity compensation. The results are 
similar to those in Equation (1). Specifically, the coefficient of OPT_RAT is positive 
and statistically significant, which further affirms the important role of option 
compensation in the determination of covenant types. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of STK_RAT is negative and statistically significant – a reflection of the 
fact that CEOs with more stock compensation are less willing to take risk due to 
concentration of ownership and risk aversion. The decrease in credit risk allows 
banks to reduce the types of loan covenants. These results are also economically 
significant. The coefficient of OPT_ICN, 0.33, implies that an increase of OPT_ICN 
from 0 to 1 would lead to an increase of covenant types by 39.1%. Similarly, the 
coefficient of OPT_RAT is 0.114, implying that the covenant types would increase 
by 12% if the OPT_RAT increases from 0 to 1. 
In Equation (3), I regress the number of covenant types with overconfidence 
measure (CEO_OVERCON). The coefficient of CEO_OVERCON is positive and 
statistically significant, which is consistent with the results in Chapter 1, and 
indicates that banks perceive a higher credit risk from overconfident CEOs. To 
alleviate the risk and protect their interests they impose more types of covenants to 
restrain their opportunistic behavior. 
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In Equation (4), I include both the equity compensation measure (OPT_ICN and 
STK_ICN) and overconfidence measure in the determinants of number of covenant 
types. The results show that the coefficients of OPT_ICN and CEO_OVERCON 
remain positive and statistically significant. Similar results could be found in 
Equation (5), which includes OPT_RAT, STK_RAT, and CEO_OVERCON as the 
independent variables for number of covenant types. The coefficients of OPT_RAT 
and CEO_OVERCON are positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient 
of STK_RAT is negative and statistically significant. These results suggest that the 
effects CEO equity compensation and CEO overconfidence do not affect each other. 
Banks should not just consider one or the other when determining loan contract 
terms. 
 
5.2 Effects of Options/Overconfidence on Individual Types of Covenant 
 In this section, I further investigate which types of covenant are more sensitive 
to the effects of CEO equity compensation and CEO overconfidence. Of the six 
individual types of covenant,  both debt-to-cash flow covenants and coverage ratio 
covenants are more sensitive to an increased CEO option compensation and 
overconfidence.  
 Table 4a presents the Probit regression results, in which the dependent variable 
in Equations (1) to (3) is the dummy variable of coverage ratio covenant, which is 
equal to 1 if the loan agreement contains coverage ratio covenant, zero otherwise. 
The results show that the coefficient of CEO_OVERCON is positive and statistically 
significant in both Equation (2) and Equation (3). The use of coverage covenants 
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restrains the firm by requiring a minimum threshold of interest coverage ratio, fixed 
charge coverage ratio, etc. These ratios are common indicators that reflect the 
profitability and the ability of repaying the debt interest. Since overconfident CEOs 
overestimate their abilities and exaggerate the profit projection, banks impose 
coverage ratio to closely monitor the firm performance to reduce credit risk. This 
finding is consistent with the results in the first part of the thesis.  
Apart from CEO overconfidence measure, option compensation is also an 
important factor that affects the use of coverage covenants. The coefficients of 
OPT_ICN are positive and statistically significant in Equations (1) and (3), 
indicating an increase in the likelihood of banks imposing a coverage type covenant 
if the borrowing firm’s CEO receives more option incentive. This is because the 
higher the option incentive, the more motivation for CEOs to engage in opportunistic 
behavior, as the return from risky investment significantly increases the payoff to 
CEOs holding a high amount of option compensation. They may even have an 
incentive to pursue investments with negative net present value, as the loss is limited. 
Banks acknowledge the potential credit risk and impose coverage type covenants to 
closely monitor the firm’s performance. If the covenant is breached, banks can 
shorten the maturity by requiring the firm to repay the loan earlier to prevent further 
loss on the bank’s side. 
 Table 4b presents the Probit regression result, in which the dependent variable 
in Equations (1) to (3) is the dummy variable of debt-to-cash flow type covenant, 
which is equal to 1 if the loan agreement contains debt-to-cash flow covenant, zero 
otherwise. The results show that the coefficients of CEO_OVERCON is positive and 
statistically significant in Equation (2) and Equation (3), which is consistent with the 
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results in the previous chapter, namely, overconfident CEOs are positively associated 
with the use of debt-to-cash flow type covenants. The coefficient of OPT_ICN is 
positive and statistically significant in Equations (1) and (3), meaning that CEOs 
with high option incentive are likely to adopt a highly-leveraged capital structure to 
increase payoff. Banks impose debt-to-cash flow type covenant to limit the firm's 
capacity to borrow unless it has sufficient cash flow. This can alleviate the CEO’s 
opportunistic behavior. On the other hand, the coefficient of STK_ICN is negative 
and statistically significant in Equations (2) and (3). Due to concentration of 
ownership, risk averse CEOs with a large stock incentive are less likely to take 
excessive risk (for example, increase leverage). Banks acknowledge this and the 
likelihood to impose debt-to-cash flow type covenant is reduced.  
 
5.3 Interaction and Indirect Effects 
 The major purpose of this section is to investigate whether the use of equity 
compensation has a “synergy” effect with CEO overconfidence. The key research 
question is whether the effects of option compensation on the use of covenant would 
be intensified if the CEO is overconfident. First, I investigate the interaction between 
option compensation and CEO overconfidence by using the interaction term, and the 
results are presented in Table 5 (Panel A). The dependent variable in Equations (1) to 
(4) is the number of covenant types (FIN_NUM6) contained in the loan agreement. 
The interaction term “OPT_RAT * CEO_OVERCON” is the product of OPT_RAT 
and CEO_OVERCON. Equations (1) and (2) test the effect of the interaction 
between option compensation and CEO overconfidence. The coefficient of the 
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interaction term is positive and statistically significant in both equations, suggesting 
that CEO overconfidence strengthens the effects of option compensation on the use 
of covenants. High option compensation motivates CEOs to take more risk when 
making investment decision to maximize the payoff they receive due to an increase 
in stock price. Overconfident CEOs perceive they have insider information of the 
firm, making them believe that the stock price of the firm is underestimated. If they 
have more option compensation on hand, they will have more incentive to take on 
risky investment in hope to realize the "true" value of stock price as they have 
perceived. The two effects (overconfidence and option compensation) reinforce each 
other and significantly increase the potential credit risk faced by banks. Again, to 
alleviate the credit risk, banks have to use covenants to protect their interest. If they 
observe that the CEO of a firm has a large option compensation ratio and is 
overconfident at the same time, banks may impose more covenants on the firm than 
one whose CEO has only one of the variables.  
 I have also conducted a subsample analysis by separating the sample by 
overconfident CEOs and non-overconfident CEOs. Table 5 (Panel C) presents the 
Poisson regression results of this subsample analysis. The dependent variable in 
Equation (1) to (4) is the number of covenant types (FIN_NUM6) contained in the 
loan agreement. In Equations (1) and (2), the incentive ratios (OPT_ICN and 
STK_ICN) are employed as the equity compensation measures. The coefficient of 
OPT_ICN is positive and statistically significant only in Equation (1) of the 
overconfident CEO group but not significant in Equation (2) of the 
non-overconfident CEO group. Similar results can be found in the compensation 
ratios (OPT_RAT and STK_RAT) equations, Equations (3) and (4). The coefficient 
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of OPT_RAT is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of 
option incentive on the usage of covenant is reinforced by the effect of CEO 
overconfidence. These results highlight the important role of CEO overconfidence. 
The agency cost of debt arising from option compensation could be understated if 
debt holders do not take such interaction effects into account. 
 
5.4 Growth Opportunities 
 Previous studies (e.g., Eisdorfer, 2008) have shown that firms with more growth 
opportunities are more likely to exhibit risk-shifting behavior due to conflict of 
interest among shareholders, managers, and creditors. In this section, the effect of a 
firm’s growth opportunities on equity compensation and CEO overconfidence is 
studied. I employ the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities and 
hypothesize that the option incentive affects credit risk for firms with higher growth 
opportunities. To test this, a subsample analysis by market-to-book ratio is carried 
out by splitting the sample into two groups: Firms with higher than median 
market-to-book ratio and firms with lower than median market-to-book ratio, and the 
results are shown in Table 6 (Panel A). The dependent variable is number of 
covenant types (FIN_NUM6). Equations (1) and (3) contain the subsample with 
market-to-book ratio larger than median, and the rest of the subsample are contained 
in Equations (2) and (4). The coefficients of OPT_ICN and OPT_STK are positive 
and statistically significant only in Equation (1) and Equation (3), suggesting that 
higher growth opportunities provide CEO with ample chances for investing and 
engaging in risk-taking behavior, which increase the risk exposure to banks, and 
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hence, the banks would set more covenants to reduce the risk. Similar results are 
observed for CEO overconfidence, where the coefficient CEO_OVERCON is 
positive and statistically significant only in the subsample with higher than median 
market-to-book ratio, that is, Equations (1) and (3). This reaffirms the impact of high 
growth opportunities on the CEO traits in the determination of loan contract. 
 
5.5 Firm Age Effect 
 In this section, I investigate the impacts of firm age on the CEO traits. 
Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) pointed out that young firms on average 
have a lower survival rate, but conditional on survival rate, they have a higher 
growth rate. Ouimet and Zarutskie (2014) found that young employees are more 
likely to join young firms, as they seek for more innovative opportunities, and hence, 
giving these firms a higher growth rate. Apart from young people, overconfident 
CEOs also tend to exploit more innovative growth opportunities, as Hirshleifer, Low, 
and Teoh (2012) suggested. These findings indicate that firm age has an implication 
on the effect of CEO overconfidence and equity compensation in the determinant of 
loan contract. As in the previous section, a subsample analysis is conducted by 
splitting the sample into two groups: Firms with firm age lower than the sample 
median and firm with firm age higher than the sample median. Table 6 (Panel B) 
presents the Poisson regression results. Equations (1) and (2) employ the incentive 
ratio as equity compensation measures. The coefficients of OPT_ICN and 
CEO_OVERCON are only positive and statistically significant in the lower firm age 
group. Similar results can be found for Equations (3) and (4), which employ the 
 145 
annual compensation ratio. The coefficients of OPT_RAT and CEO_OVERCON are 
only positive and statistically significant in the lower firm age group. Young firms 
give innovators (for example, overconfident CEOs) ample investment opportunities, 
hence providing more incentive for overconfident CEOs and CEOs with high option 
incentive to invest excessively, and thus, increase the credit risk faced by banks. 
 
5.6 Credit Rating Effect 
Eisdorfer (2008) found that asset substitution is likely to occur in firms that are 
financially distressed, and their investment returns are likely to decrease during high 
uncertainty period. This section investigates whether such distress would strengthen 
the effects of CEO overconfidence and CEOs with high option incentive. I employ 
the S&P rating as a proxy of a firm’s potential credit risk and conduct a subsample 
analysis by splitting the sample into two groups: Firms with investment grade at or 
above investment grade are in the high S&P rating group, and those with lower than 
investment grade are in the low S&P rating group. Table 6 (Panel C) shows the 
subsample analysis on firms’ overall credit rating. The coefficient of OPT_ICN and 
CEO_OVERCON is positive and statistically significant only for the low S&P rating 
group in Equation (1). Similar results can be found by employing the OPT_RAT as 
the option compensation measure in Equation (3). The results show that option 
incentive and option ratio, as well as CEO overconfidence, significantly affect the 
number of covenant types only in the low S&P rating group. This suggests that 
overconfident CEOs tend to take on opportunistic behavior when their firm is in 
distress, as they desperately need to improve firm performance to realize their 
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perceived return. Similarly, CEOs with high option incentive are more likely to 
pursue high-risk investment during times of distress, as their loss is limited as long as 
the stock price is lower than their option strike price. In response, banks impose more 
covenant type to protect their interest against these CEOs’ opportunistic behavior. 
 
5.7 Credit Spread Effect 
Chen (2010) suggested that credit spread, that is, the difference between 
corporate AAA and BAA bond yield, can serve as a proxy to control for 
macroeconomic environment. The larger the credit spread, the more premium is 
required by the creditors to compensate for the risk, which implies a higher risk 
condition. Bradley and Roberts (2015) pointed out that banks impose more covenants 
during high credit spread period. In this section, I examine if the effects of CEO traits 
are reinforced by credit spread by using the subsample analysis. The sample is split 
into high credit spread period and low credit spread period based on sample median, 
and the results are shown in Table 6 (Panel D). The coefficient of OPT_ICN and 
CEON_OVERCON is positive and statistically significant only in the period with 
high credit spread. Similar results can be observed for OPT_RAT in Equation (3), 
indicating that during high credit risk period, banks are more cautious of CEOs who 
are overconfident or who have high option incentive, and will impose more 
covenants to alleviate the potential credit risk.  
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5.8 Addressing Endogeneity Concern with Simultaneous Equations   
Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010) concluded that CEO incentives 
significantly influence debt maturity and leverage, implying that these variables are 
jointly determined. Ignoring this co-determining effect may lead to possible 
endogenous concerns. In this section, I further hypothesize that CEO incentive 
affects covenants, and expand Brockman, Martin, and Unlu’s (2010) model into a 
three-equation model where leverage, maturity, and covenants are co-determined. 
Table 7 (Panel A) presents the results from the GMM simultaneous equations 
(3-equations). The dependent variable in Equations (1), (2), and (3) is, respectively, 
the number of financial covenant types, leverage, and debt maturity. The coefficient 
of OPT_ICN and CEO_OVERCON in the determination of FIN_NUM6 is positive 
and statistically significant, which suggests that the effects of CEO overconfidence 
and option incentive on covenant usage remain significant even if we allow for the 
joint determinant of maturity and leverage. The GMM results reaffirm the validity of 
the earlier single-equation regression result. 
In addition, I have also conducted simultaneous equations analysis on loan 
spread and number of covenant types, as loan spread is also a common instrument 
used by banks to reduce its credit risk. Table 7 (Panel B) presents the GMM 
simultaneous equations (2-equations) results. The dependent variable in Equation (4) 
is FIN_NUM6 and the dependent variable in Equation (5) is loan spread. The 
coefficient of OPT_ICN and CEO_OVERCON remain positive and statistically 
significant in the determination of loan covenant. The results are consistent with 
those in Chapter 1, and confirm the important role of covenant in alleviating the 
credit risk arising from CEO traits. Financial covenants are effective in controlling 
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many types of risky activities, such as R&D investment and cross-border M&A, 
taken on by overconfident CEOs and CEOs with high option incentive. 
On the other hand, none of the coefficients is statistically significant in the 
determination of loan spread, which indicates that interest rate only complements 
covenant usage but cannot replace it. This reaffirms the crucial and unique role of 
covenant in controlling CEO overconfidence and option incentive risks. 
 
5.9 Addressing Self Selection Bias with Propensity Score Matching 
 It is possible that the analyses above are driven by self-selection bias. For 
example, overconfident CEOs tend to choose to work in young firms or high 
market-to-book ratio firms, which give CEO more option compensation in their 
package. To alleviate the possible bias, I make reference to the work of Chava and 
Purnanandam (2011) and employ the propensity score matching (PSM) method, 
using the nearest neighborhood caliper matching approach. I first run a regression 
with firm size, firm age, and market-to-book ratio (growth opportunity), using 
leverage as the determinant of overconfident CEO. The results are presented in Table 
8 (Panel A). From these, I estimate the propensity score for matching. Table 8 (Panel 
B) shows the mean value of firm age, market-to-book ratio, asset size, and leverage 
of the overconfident CEOs (treated group) and non-overconfident CEOs (control 
group) in the matched sample. The mean value is similar for the two groups, which 
suggests that overconfident CEOs and non-overconfident CEOs share similar 
background in the matched sample. Table 8 (Panel C) presents the mean value of 
financial covenant types (FIN_NUM6), proportion of sample having coverage 
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covenant (D_COVER), and proportion of sample having debt-to-cash flow coverage 
covenant (D_DCF). It is observed that the treated group has more number of 
covenant types and a higher proportion of sample with coverage covenant and 
debt-to-cash flow covenant, suggesting that, after disaggregating the firm characters, 
there is evidence that firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to have more 
covenants in their loan agreements. Table 7 (Panel D) shows the result of univariate 
regression on matched model, which provides further evidence to show that 
overconfident CEOs significantly increase the types of covenant imposed by banks. 
The analysis above implies that, after ruling out the firms’ effects on covenants, the 
effect of overconfidence on covenant protection remains important.  
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Section 6: Conclusions and Implications 
 
Supported by empirical evidence, it can be concluded that CEO overconfidence 
is not the only trait that would affect loan contracting. In this chapter, I have 
examined the impact of equity compensation on the use of covenant. On the one 
hand, CEOs with more option compensation would have an incentive to exploit the 
wealth of creditors by taking excessive risk or even engaging in asset substitution 
activities. Banks react accordingly by imposing more types of financial covenant to 
restrain these CEOs’ behavior. On the other hand, there is evidence that the use of 
share compensation can somehow decrease the credit risk faced by creditors. 
Risk-averse CEOs who receive a high stock compensation tend to avoid taking 
excessive risk due to concentration ownership. The results from this thesis show that 
banks would impose fewer covenants on firms if their CEO receives a larger portion 
of stock compensation in a year.  
 This thesis also provides strong evidence that there is an interaction effect 
between CEO overconfidence and option incentive. By using subsample analysis and 
the interaction term as a proxy for the synergy effect between the two CEO traits, I 
find that the effects of option compensation on the use of covenant are significantly 
strengthened if the CEO is overconfident.  This implies that creditors impose more 
covenants on firms managed by overconfident CEO who simultaneously possesses a 
large proportion of option compensation than those with overconfident CEO who 
possesses a relatively smaller proportion of option compensation. This important 
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finding suggests that previous studies may have underestimated the impact of CEO 
traits on the cost of borrowing by focusing on only one of the traits. 
Using different subsample analysis, I find that the impacts of CEO’s trait can be 
reinforced under different circumstances. Firms that are relatively younger or with 
higher growth opportunities would amplify the impacts of CEO traits on the use of 
covenants. Overconfident CEOs and CEOs with high option incentive are willing to 
invest in risky business for different reasons. Overconfident CEOs tend to 
overestimate the return, and hence, would take excessive risk, while CEOs with high 
option incentive face the moral hazard problem, as their loss are limited by the nature 
of option. Both effects would be reinforced if the firms have ample investment 
opportunities (especially in young firms and firms with high growth opportunities). 
The impacts of CEO traits are also subjected to changes in macro environment. 
By using the credit spread as a proxy for credit risk, the subsample analysis shows 
that the impacts of both CEOs traits on the use of covenants increase, which is 
consistent with Eisdorfer’s (2008) observation that distressed firm would take on 
more risk.   
I have also employed several tests, including the GMM simultaneous equations 
and propensity score matching, to deal with potential endogeneity issues. The results 
suggest that the effects of both CEOs traits remain significant. Finally, investigation 
on the relationship between covenant and loan spread suggests that covenants are 
more effective in alleviating the credit risk stemming from the CEO traits due to 
potential adverse selection effect. 
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This thesis contributes to the literature by studying the dual effects of CEO 
character, and establishing important implications on the use of equity compensation. 
The use of equity compensation aims to provide incentive to the managers of firms. 
The results from this thesis suggest that firms may underestimate the cost of equity 
compensation if the effects on the cost of borrowing are ignored.   
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Appendix A  
Definitions of Variables 
Variable Name Variable Definitions 
 
Covenant Characteristics 
 
FIN_NUM6 The total number of financial covenant types in the loan 
contract. There are a total of six different groups of 
covenant: Coverage covenant (including interest 
coverage, fixed charge coverage, debt service coverage, 
and senior debt service coverage covenants); 
debt-to-cash flow ratio covenant (including debt-to-cash 
flow ratio and senior debt-to-cash flow ratio covenants); 
net worth covenant (including minimum net worth and 
minimum tangible net worth covenants), debt-to-balance 
sheet covenant (including debt-to-total capitalization and 
debt-to-net worth covenants), liquidity covenant 
(including current ratio, quick ratio, and working capital 
covenants), and minimum cash flow covenant 
D_COVER Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
coverage ratio covenant 
D_DCF Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
debt-to-cash flow covenant 
D_DBS Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
debt-to-balance sheet covenant 
D_NW Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
minimum net worth covenant 
D_LIQ Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
liquidity covenant 
D_CF Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
minimum cash flow covenant 
  
SLACK_DCF Covenant slack (debt-to-cash flow covenant), defined as: 
maximum allowed debt-to-cash flow ratio under the 
covenant minus firm’s debt-to-cash flow ratio 
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SLACK_IC Covenant slack (interest coverage covenant), defined as 
firm’s interest coverage ratio minus the minimum 
allowed interest coverage ratio 
  
Loan Characteristics  
LN_LOANAMT Natural log of the loan deal amount (in millions)  
LN_MATURITY Natural log of the loan maturity (in months) 
PERF_DUM Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan contains 
performance pricing 
SECURED Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan is 
collateralized 
  
Firm Characteristics  
LSIZE Natural log of the total asset 
XRD Research and development expenditure 
FIRM_AGE The actual age of the firm 
LEVERAGE Firm leverage ratio, defined as: 
(Long term debt + debt in current liabilities)/Total assets 
M/B Market-to-book ratio, defined as: 
(Common Shares Outstanding* Share Price at close + 
Total Asset - Common Equity) / Total asset 
PROF Profitability, defined as EBITDA/Total asset 
EBITDA_SALE (Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization)/Sale  
CFVOL Cash flow volatility, defined as the standard deviation of 
past 4 quarters’ cash flow 
  
TANGB 
 
Tangibility, defined as: 
Property, Plant, and Equipment (Net) / Total Asset 
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SP_RATING Standard & Poor’s credit rating 
  
CEO Characteristics 
 
(a) Compensation 
 
OPT_ICN Option Incentive, which is defined as  
ONEPCT_OPT / (ONEPCT_OPT + Salary + Bonus),  
(where ONEPCT_OPT = 0.01*Share Price*option 
delta*no. of options held by CEO) 
STK_ICN Stock Incentive, which is defined as 
ONEPCT_STK / (ONEPCT_STK + Salary + Bonus)  
(where ONEPCT_STK = 0.01*Share Price*no. of shares 
held by CEO) 
 
OPT_RAT Black-Scholes value of the option grant/Total 
Compensation (see Black and Scholes 1973)  
STK_RAT Value of restricted stock granted/Total Compensation 
OPT_HLD Total value of option held by CEO 
STK_HLD Total value of stock held by CEO 
 
(b) Character 
 
CEO_OVERCON Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO holds 
option that are at least 67% in-the-money, 0 otherwise 
 
Control for Macro Condition 
SPREAD_DIFF The difference between AAA corporate bond and BAA 
corporate bond yield 
 
This table summarizes all the variables used in the paper. Our sample comprises 
1,412 loan deals from 791 firms. The loan characteristic information is obtained from 
DealScan, covenant information from SEC EDGAR filings, firm characteristic 
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information from Compustat, executive compensation information from ExecuComp, 
stock information from CRSP, and overconfidence data are derived from 
ExecuComp. The deal sample covers the period from 1995 to 2006. The financial 
and utility firms are excluded. Total number of financial covenant is the sum total of 
individual groups of financial covenant contained in the loan contract. 
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Appendix B  
Definitions of Additional Control Variables Used in the Systems of Simultaneous 
Equations 
Variable Name Variable Definition and Data Sources 
 
Three-Equation System 
 
 
ABNEARN 
 
Abnormal earning is (Earning in year t+1 – earning in 
year t)/(share price * outstanding shares). From 
Compustat. 
ASSET_MAT Asset maturity is book value-weighted average of 
maturities of property plant and equipment and current 
assets, computed as (gross property, plant & 
equipment)/total assets*(gross property, plant and 
equipment/depreciation expense) + (current assets/total 
assets) * (current assets/cost of goods sold). From 
Compustat.  
FIX_ASSET Fixed asset is ratio of net property, plant and equipment 
to total assets. From Compustat. 
ITC_DUM  Dummy for investment tax credit that is equal to one if 
the firm has an investment tax credit, and zero otherwise. 
From Compustat. 
LSIZE Firm size is market value of equity plus the book value 
of total assets minus the book value of equity, in logs. 
From Compustat. 
LSIZE2 Square of LSIZE 
NOL_DUM Dummy for loss carried forward that is equal to one if 
firm has operating loss carried forward, and zero 
otherwise. From Compustat. 
OWN CEO ownership is number of shares owned by the CEO 
scaled by total shares outstanding. From ExecuComp. 
  
REG_DUM Dummy for industry dummy that is equal to one if the 
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firm’s SIC code is between 4,900 and 4,939 and zero 
otherwise. From Compustat. 
ROA Same as our profitability, which is operating income 
before depreciation divided by total asset. From 
Compustat. 
STD_RET Asset return standard deviation is monthly stock return 
standard deviation during the fiscal year multiplied by 
the ratio of the market value of equity to the market 
value of assets. From CRSP and Compustat. 
TERM Term structure is yield on 10-year government bonds 
subtracted from the yield on 6-month government bonds 
at the fiscal year end. From Compustat. 
ZSCORE_DUM Dummy for Z-score that is equal to one if Altman’s 
Z-score is greater than 1.81, and zero otherwise. From 
Compustat. 
  
Two-Equation System  
ALL_SPR All-in-spread, defined as the natural log of the annual 
spread over LIBOR charged by banks for the drawn 
portion imposed under the loan covenant. From 
DealScan. 
AVG_SPR Average All-in-spread to other loans imposed by the 
same lead bank in the current year. From DealScan 
CASH_HLD Cashing holding ratio, which is defined as: 
Firm’s cash holding/Total assets. From Compustat 
SALES_GRO Sales growth, which is defined as: 
Current year sales/previous year sales. From Compustat 
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics. 
Variable 
 
N Mean Std. Dev.  p25 p50 p75 
 
Covenant 
Characteristics       
FIN_NUM6 1412 2.024 0.986 1 2 3 
D_COVER 1412 0.639 0.481 0 1 1 
D_DCF 1412 0.514 0.5 0 1 1 
D_DBS 1412 0.335 0.472 0 0 1 
D_NW 1412 0.393 0.489 0 0 1 
D_LIQ 1412 0.089 0.285 0 0 0 
D_CF 1412 0.054 0.226 0 0 0 
       
Loan Characteristics       
LN_LOANAMT 1412 19.511 1019.062 18.826 19.519 20.212 
LN_MATURITY 1412 3.578 0.682 3.178 3.871 4.094 
PERF_DUM 1412 0.782 0.413 1 1 1 
SECURED 1412 0.348 0.476 0 0 1 
 
Firm Characteristics       
LSIZE 1412 21.278 1.344 20.303 21.177 22.123 
XRD 1412 51.410 150.504 0 0 25.797 
FIRM_AGE 1412 26.774 16.689 11 25 42 
LEVERAGE 1412 0.261 0.159 0.147 0.263 0.363 
PROF 1412 -0.077 0.662 -0.002 0.078 0.148 
TANGB 1412 0.274 0.269 0.048 0.178 0.436 
M/B 1412 1.836 1.011 1.196 1.499 2.081 
SP_RATING 1412 7.894 6.411 0 10 13 
EBITDA_SALE 1274 0.171 0.292 0.092 0.146 0.227 
CFVOL 1326 5.087 96.463 12.788 34.184 91.255 
 
CEO Characteristics       
 
(a) Compensation       
OPT_ICN 1412 0.124 0.125 0.04 0.089 0.168 
STK_ICN 1412 0.123 0.198 0.013 0.039 0.129 
OPT_RAT 1412 0.328 0.277 0 0.313 0.535 
STK_RAT 1412 0.08 0.157 0 0 0.102 
OPT_HLD 1412 11156.66 23722.41 327.387 2874.557 10575.48 
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STK_HLD 1412 46082.98 165481.6 1378.642 5204.472 18448.64 
 
(b) Overconfidence       
CEO_OVERCON 1412 0.345 0.478 0 0 1 
       
Macro Control  
SPREAD_DIFF 1412 0.869 0.198 0.75 0.83 0.89 
 
Controls for Simultaneous Equations 
 
Three-Equation System 
      
OWN 1003 0.022 0.055 0.001 0.003 0.013 
ABNEARN 1003 0.011 0.105 -0.015 0.006 0.024 
ASSET_MAT 1003 10.792 8.958 4.037 7.808 15.345 
STD_RET 1003 0.070 0.043 0.041 0.061 0.088 
FIX_ASSET 1003 0.358 0.226 0.174 0.307 0.509 
LSIZE2 1003 455.379 57.370 412.052 450.470 489.814 
ROA 1003 0.151 0.079 0.101 0.139 0.189 
NOL_DUM 1003 0.326 0.469 0 0 1 
ITC_DUM 1003 0.095 0.293 0 0 0 
TERM 1003 1.484 1.326 0.360 1.270 2.760 
REG_DUM 1003 0.074 0.262 0 0 0 
ZSCORE_DUM 1003 0.883 0.321 1 1 1 
 
Two-Equation System 
      
ALL_SPR 1321 4.512 0.776 3.912 4.605 5.091 
AVG_SPR 1321 5.052 0.476 4.848 5.144 5.338 
CASH_HLD 1321 0.079 0.104 0.014 0.035 0.103 
SALES_GRO 1321 0.150 0.348 0.006 0.087 0.214 
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Table 2  
Subsample Summary Statistics: Overconfident versus Non-overconfident CEOs 
 Non-overconfident 
CEO (N=925) 
 Overconfident CEO 
(N=487) 
Variable Mean Median  Mean Median 
 
Loan Characteristics   
 
  
LN_LOANAMT 19.453 19.519  19.619*** 19.673*** 
LN_MATURITY 3.535 3.738  3.657*** 4.094*** 
PERF_DUM 0.774 1  0.797 1 
SECURED 0.348 0  0.347 0 
 
Covenant Characteristics   
 
  
FIN_NUM6 1.955 2  2.156*** 2 
D_COVER 0.613 1  0.688*** 1 
D_DCF 0.472 0  0.593*** 1*** 
D_DBS 0.345 0  0.316 0 
D_NW 0.377 0  0.423** 0 
D_LIQ 0.089 0  0.090 0 
D_CF 0.058 0  0.045 0 
 
Firm Characteristics   
 
  
LSIZE 21.3565 21.293  21.130** 20.9457*** 
XRD 56.861 0  71.954 0 
FIRM_AGE 29.661 31.000  21.292*** 17*** 
LEVERAGE 0.275 0.281  0.234*** 0.229*** 
PROF -0.072 0.079  -0.087 0.072 
TANGB 0.270 0.181  0.282 0.168 
M/B 1.567 1.341  2.346*** 1.955*** 
SP_RATING 8.347 11.000  7.033*** 9*** 
 
CEO Characteristics (Incentives)   
 
  
OPT_ICN 0.092 0.068  0.185*** 0.367*** 
STK_ICN 0.110 0.031  0.148*** 0.062*** 
OPT_RAT 0.306 0.276  0.368*** 0.367*** 
STK_RAT 0.085 0  0.071* 0 
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Table 3  
Effects of Compensation Structure and CEO Overconfidence on the Number of 
Covenant 
 
This table presents the coefficients from the unbalanced cross-sectional Poisson 
regressions. It examines the effects of CEO equity compensation and CEO 
overconfidence on the total number of covenants contained in loan agreements. The 
dependent variable in Equations (1) to (5) is FIN_NUM6, which is defined as the 
number of covenant types contained in the loan agreement. The key independent 
variables are the OPT_ICN, STK_ICN, OPT_RAT, STK_RAT and CEO_OVERCON 
which measure the option incentive, stock incentive, option compensation ratio, 
stock compensation ratio and CEO overconfidence respectively. Figures in 
parenthesis are standard errors. *, ** &, *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10%, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level. 
 Dependent Variable = FIN_NUM6 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OPT_ICN 0.330***   0.277***  
 (0.0841)   (0.0990)  
STK_ICN -0.0134   -0.00945  
 (0.138)   (0.138)  
OPT_RAT  0.114***   0.115*** 
  (0.0239)   (0.0232) 
STK_RAT  -0.152**   -0.149** 
  (0.0666)   (0.0689) 
CEO_OVERCON   0.0731*** 0.0585** 0.0724*** 
   (0.0206) (0.0243) (0.0215) 
LSIZE -0.0921*** -0.0855*** -0.0802*** -0.0900*** -0.0853*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
LEVERAGE -0.0824 -0.0751 -0.0830 -0.0809 -0.0725 
 (0.164) (0.159) (0.157) (0.163) (0.159) 
M/B -0.0572*** -0.0481*** -0.0521*** -0.0641*** -0.0599*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0121) (0.0135) (0.0196) (0.0136) 
PROF -0.0394*** -0.0406*** -0.0408*** -0.0396*** -0.0406*** 
 (0.00950) (0.0111) (0.0102) (0.00928) (0.0106) 
TANGB 0.0776** 0.0768** 0.0742* 0.0746* 0.0732* 
 (0.0394) (0.0369) (0.0395) (0.0409) (0.0388) 
FIRM_AGE -0.00102* -0.000944 -0.00113** -0.000854 -0.000667 
 (0.000574) (0.000672) (0.000524) (0.000546) (0.000615) 
XRD -0.000105** -0.000103** -9.36e-05* -0.000102** -0.000102** 
 (4.66e-05) (4.65e-05) (5.12e-05) (4.68e-05) (4.85e-05) 
SP_RATING -0.0111*** -0.0114*** -0.0112*** -0.0110*** -0.0112*** 
 (0.00243) (0.00234) (0.00241) (0.00252) (0.00243) 
SPREAD_DIFF 0.0819 0.0710 0.0923* 0.0875 0.0770 
 (0.0592) (0.0565) (0.0486) (0.0543) (0.0515) 
LN_LOANAMT 0.0140 0.0183* 0.00935 0.00959 0.0126 
 (0.0113) (0.0108) (0.0104) (0.0121) (0.0116) 
LN_MATURITY -0.00960 -0.0113 -0.0119 -0.0107 -0.0126 
 (0.0279) (0.0271) (0.0285) (0.0282) (0.0271) 
PERF_DUM 0.0796*** 0.0788*** 0.0773*** 0.0780*** 0.0768*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0172) (0.0191) (0.0194) (0.0198) 
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SECURED 0.0178 0.0116 0.0157 0.0166 0.0103 
 (0.0264) (0.0273) (0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0273) 
Control for loan 
purpose 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Control for loan type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Control for industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
      
Observations 1,412 1,412 1,412 1,412 1,412 
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Table 4 (Panel A)  
Effects of Compensations and CEO Overconfidence on Coverage Covenant 
This table presents the coefficients from the unbalanced cross-sectional Probit 
regressions. It examines the effects of equity compensation and CEO 
overconfidence to the use of coverage covenant. The dependent variable in 
Equations (1) to (3) is D_COVER, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan 
contract contains coverage type covenant, zero otherwise. Standard errors are 
clustered at the industry level. Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. *, **, & 
*** denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10%, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the industry level. 
 Dependent Variable = D_COVER 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
OPT_ICN 0.951***  0.786** 
 (0.357)  (0.368) 
STK_ICN -0.137  -0.129 
 (0.392)  (0.389) 
CEO_OVERCON  0.237*** 0.194** 
  (0.0920) (0.0983) 
LSIZE -0.307*** -0.275*** -0.303*** 
 (0.0935) (0.0851) (0.0972) 
LEVERAGE 0.556*** 0.560*** 0.571*** 
 (0.150) (0.154) (0.157) 
M/B -0.106* -0.0984*** -0.128** 
 (0.0607) (0.0309) (0.0566) 
PROF -0.0443 -0.0486 -0.0458 
 (0.0643) (0.0615) (0.0660) 
TANGB 0.0241 0.0222 0.0199 
 (0.151) (0.155) (0.155) 
FIRM_AGE 0.00388 0.00374 0.00445 
 (0.00340) (0.00357) (0.00349) 
XRD -0.000150 -0.000129 -0.000143 
 (0.000218) (0.000222) (0.000222) 
SP_RATING -0.0290*** -0.0296*** -0.0289*** 
 (0.00800) (0.00782) (0.00853) 
SPREAD_DIFF 0.435*** 0.468*** 0.462*** 
 (0.109) (0.118) (0.108) 
LN_LOANAMT 0.191*** 0.179*** 0.181** 
 (0.0722) (0.0663) (0.0726) 
LN_MATURITY 0.349** 0.342** 0.345** 
 (0.146) (0.143) (0.145) 
PERF_DUM 0.0760 0.0702 0.0737 
 (0.160) (0.165) (0.165) 
SECURED 0.128 0.125 0.128 
 (0.0804) (0.0818) (0.0794) 
Control for loan purpose Yes Yes Yes 
    
Control for loan type Yes Yes Yes 
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Control for industry Yes Yes Yes 
    
    
Observations 1,412 1,412 1,412 
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Table 4 (Panel B)  
Effects of Compensations and CEO Overconfidence on Debt-to-cash flow Covenant 
This table presents the coefficients from the unbalanced cross-sectional Probit 
regressions. It examines the effects of equity compensation and CEO 
overconfidence to the use of debt-to-cash flow covenant. The dependent variable in 
Equations (1) to (3) is D_DCF, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan 
contract contains debt-to-cash flow type covenant, zero otherwise. Standard errors 
are clustered at the industry level. Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. *, ** &, 
*** denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10%, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the industry level. 
 Dependent Variable = D_DCF 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
OPT_ICN 0.691***  0.533** 
 (0.229)  (0.244) 
STK_ICN -0.330***  -0.323*** 
 (0.121)  (0.118) 
CEO_OVERCON  0.208** 0.176** 
  (0.0835) (0.0888) 
LSIZE -0.209** -0.189** -0.205** 
 (0.0869) (0.0901) (0.0877) 
LEVERAGE 0.00667 0.0167 0.0205 
 (0.305) (0.308) (0.294) 
M/B 0.0176 0.00781 -0.00291 
 (0.0572) (0.0614) (0.0663) 
PROF -0.0576 -0.0589 -0.0600 
 (0.0403) (0.0431) (0.0405) 
TANGB 0.165 0.157 0.160 
 (0.217) (0.227) (0.224) 
FIRM_AGE -0.00244 -0.00193 -0.00198 
 (0.00223) (0.00242) (0.00231) 
XRD -0.00116** -0.00110** -0.00115** 
 (0.000534) (0.000499) (0.000521) 
SP_RATING -0.0452*** -0.0450*** -0.0451*** 
 (0.00765) (0.00855) (0.00792) 
SPREAD_DIFF 0.535*** 0.563*** 0.561*** 
 (0.161) (0.158) (0.157) 
LN_LOANAMT 0.348*** 0.334*** 0.339*** 
 (0.0379) (0.0403) (0.0385) 
LN_MATURITY 0.0537 0.0483 0.0476 
 (0.0579) (0.0610) (0.0589) 
PERF_DUM 0.193* 0.191* 0.190* 
 (0.112) (0.106) (0.108) 
SECURED 0.291*** 0.293*** 0.293*** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) 
Control for loan purpose Yes Yes Yes 
    
Control for loan type Yes Yes Yes 
 171 
    
Control for industry Yes Yes Yes 
    
    
Observations 1,412 1,412 1,412 
 
 
  
 172 
Table 5 (Panel A)  
Interactions between Compensation Ratio and CEO Overconfidence 
 
This table presents the coefficients from the unbalanced cross-sectional Poisson regression. 
It examines the interaction effects of CEO equity compensation and CEO overconfidence on 
the total number of covenants contained in the loan agreements. The dependent variable is 
the number of covenant types. The interaction term is OPT_RAT*CEO_OVERCON (which 
is defined as OPT_RAT times CEO_OVERCON). Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. 
*, **, & *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10%, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the industry level. 
 
 Dependent variable = FIN_NUM6 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
OPT_RAT 0.0663** 0.0570** 
 (0.0274) (0.0258) 
STK_RAT -0.126 -0.150** 
 (0.0793) (0.0677) 
CEO_OVERCON 0.0337 0.0208 
 (0.0259) (0.0273) 
OPT_RAT* 
CEO_OVERCON 
0.162*** 
(0.0452) 
0.154*** 
(0.0526) 
   
LSIZE -0.0967*** -0.0856*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0137) 
LEVERAGE -0.0372 -0.0793 
 (0.140) (0.158) 
M/B -0.0747*** -0.0638*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0137) 
PROF -0.0453*** -0.0408*** 
 (0.0107) (0.00977) 
TANGB 0.0710 0.0751* 
 (0.0449) (0.0387) 
FIRM_AGE -0.00109* -0.000675 
 (0.000648) (0.000631) 
XRD -0.000140*** -0.000105** 
 (5.24e-05) (4.94e-05) 
SP_RATING -0.0131*** -0.0111*** 
 (0.00229) (0.00242) 
SPREAD_DIFF 0.0116 0.0793 
 (0.0346) (0.0535) 
LN_LOANAMT  0.0133 
  (0.0110) 
LN_MATURITY  -0.0125 
  (0.0275) 
PERF_DUM  0.0774*** 
  (0.0188) 
SECURED  0.00948 
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  (0.0291) 
Control for loan purpose  Yes 
   
Control for loan type  Yes 
   
Control for industry Yes Yes 
   
   
Observations 1,412 1,412 
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Table 5 (Panel B)  
Marginal Effect Analysis: Comparing the Coefficient Sizes of Option Ratio, CEO 
Overconfidence, and Interaction 
 Marginal Effects: Column 2 in Table 8 Panel A 
 
VARIABLES 
 
dy/dx 
 
 Std. Err. 
 
Z value 
 
P value 
     
OPT_RAT 0.115466 0.0522145 2.21 0.027 
CEO_OVERCON 0.042059 0.055237 0.76 0.446 
OPT_RAT* 
CEO_OVERCON 
0.311953 0.1063942 2.93 0.003 
     
     
     
This table presents the marginal effect analysis for the unbalanced cross-sectional Poisson 
regression in Table 5 Panel A. The key variables are OPT_RAT (the percentage of current 
year total compensation in grants of new options), CEO_OVERCON (dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 if the CEO holds option that are at least 67% in the money, 0 otherwise) 
and OPT_RAT*CEO_OVERCON. 
 
  
 175 
Table 5 (Panel C)  
Differences in Effects of Compensations on Total Number of Covenants: Overconfident 
CEOs versus Non-overconfident CEOs 
This table presents the coefficients from the unbalanced cross-sectional Poisson 
regression. It examines the differences in the effects of equity compensations on the total 
number of covenants between the overconfident and non-overconfident CEO subgroups. 
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. *, ** &, *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 
10%, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level. 
 Dependent variable = FIN_NUM6 
 Confident  
CEOs 
Non-confident 
CEOs 
Confident  
CEOs 
Non-confident 
CEOs 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OPT_ICN 0.301** 0.178   
 (0.118) (0.168)   
STK_ICN 0.0265 0.0197   
 (0.0844) (0.155)   
OPT_RAT   0.195*** 0.0472 
   (0.0573) (0.0309) 
STK_RAT   -0.228*** -0.126** 
   (0.0801) (0.0581) 
LSIZE -0.0937*** -0.0840*** -0.0840*** -0.0825*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0172) (0.0189) (0.0165) 
LEVERAGE -0.00898 -0.236 -0.00751 -0.232 
 (0.125) (0.226) (0.116) (0.216) 
M/B -0.0618*** -0.0986*** -0.0593*** -0.0950*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0243) (0.0154) (0.0166) 
PROF -0.0462* -0.0266** -0.0475* -0.0278** 
 (0.0241) (0.0126) (0.0242) (0.0124) 
TANGB -0.0277 0.150*** -0.0220 0.149*** 
 (0.0822) (0.0486) (0.0821) (0.0406) 
FIRM_AGE -0.00263** -0.000343 -0.00243* -0.000254 
 (0.00106) (0.000766) (0.00129) (0.000716) 
XRD -0.000125*** -0.000113** -0.000133*** -0.000114** 
 (4.53e-05) (4.74e-05) (4.19e-05) (5.43e-05) 
SP_RATING -0.0118*** -0.00956*** -0.0121*** -0.00970*** 
 (0.00241) (0.00368) (0.00221) (0.00331) 
SPREAD_DIFF 0.0386 0.0786* 0.0228 0.0743 
 (0.0581) (0.0473) (0.0513) (0.0489) 
LN_LOANAMT 0.000890 0.0172 0.00510 0.0212 
 (0.0215) (0.0171) (0.0222) (0.0181) 
LN_MATURITY -0.107** -0.0558 -0.121*** -0.0547 
 (0.0524) (0.0447) (0.0400) (0.0435) 
PERF_DUM 0.133*** 0.0397* 0.128*** 0.0420** 
 (0.0396) (0.0212) (0.0403) (0.0206) 
SECURED 0.0779*** -0.0128 0.0708*** -0.0191 
 (0.0175) (0.0377) (0.0204) (0.0378) 
Control for loan Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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purpose 
     
Control for loan type Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Control for industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
Observations 487 925 487 925 
 
 
 
 
  
 177 
Table 6 (Panel A)  
Analysis of the Effects of Overconfidence and Compensation on Covenant Size: 
Market-to-book Ratio 
This table presents the coefficients from the unbalanced cross-sectional Poisson 
regression. It examines the impacts of equity compensation and CEO overconfidence 
on the total number of covenants using subsample data (high and low market-to-book 
ratio). The high market-to-book subsample includes observations of market-to-book 
ratio above the median and the low subsample includes observations of 
market-to-book ratio below the median. Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. 
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. *, **, & *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
& 10%, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level. 
 Dependent variable = FIN_NUM6 
 High  
Market-to-Boo
k 
Low  
Market-to-Boo
k 
High  
Market-to-Boo
k 
Low  
Market-to-Boo
k 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
OPT_ICN 0.408*** 0.129   
 (0.0901) (0.225)   
STK_ICN -0.0233 0.0701   
 (0.172) (0.0902)   
OPT_RAT   0.210*** -0.0156 
   (0.0283) (0.0389) 
STK_RAT   -0.0800 -0.211*** 
   (0.0848) (0.0742) 
CEO_OVERCO
N 
0.0734*** 0.0322 0.0960*** 0.0405 
 (0.0278) (0.0590) (0.0267) (0.0583) 
LSIZE -0.107*** -0.0891*** -0.0922*** -0.0863*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0243) (0.0152) (0.0236) 
LEVERAGE -0.230 -0.0842 -0.223 -0.0903 
 (0.159) (0.0739) (0.156) (0.0644) 
M/B -0.0685*** -0.0592 -0.0611*** -0.0416 
 (0.0156) (0.121) (0.0111) (0.114) 
PROF -0.0329* -0.0393*** -0.0345 -0.0394*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0144) (0.0211) (0.0136) 
TANGB 0.0714 0.0894 0.0769 0.0880 
 (0.0608) (0.0632) (0.0664) (0.0585) 
FIRM_AGE -0.00390*** 0.00130* -0.00348*** 0.00116 
 (0.000455) (0.000772) (0.000501) (0.000769) 
XRD -7.19e-05 -0.000146 -8.38e-05 -0.000155 
 (7.76e-05) (0.000116) (7.76e-05) (0.000119) 
SP_RATING -0.0113*** -0.00651** -0.0115*** -0.00684*** 
 (0.00333) (0.00255) (0.00311) (0.00260) 
SPREAD_DIFF -0.00547 0.120 -0.00971 0.127 
 (0.0385) (0.106) (0.0522) (0.106) 
LN_LOANAMT 0.0102 -0.00104 0.0114 0.00500 
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 (0.0232) (0.0198) (0.0252) (0.0199) 
LN_MATURITY -0.0548* 0.0411 -0.0608** 0.0447 
 (0.0333) (0.0455) (0.0276) (0.0450) 
PERF_DUM 0.106*** 0.0689** 0.102*** 0.0690* 
 (0.0139) (0.0345) (0.0127) (0.0367) 
SECURED -0.0151 0.0316 -0.0117 0.0267 
 (0.0302) (0.0450) (0.0297) (0.0447) 
Control for loan 
purpose 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Control for loan 
type 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Control for 
industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
Observations 706 706 706 706 
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Table 6 (Panel B)  
Subsample Analysis of the Effects of Overconfidence and Compensation on Covenant 
Size: Firm Age   
This table presents the coefficients from the unbalanced cross-sectional Poisson 
regression. It examines the impacts of equity compensation and CEO overconfidence on 
the total number of covenants using subsample data (high versus low firm age). The 
high firm-age subgroup includes observations of firm age above the median and the low 
firm-age subgroup includes observations of firm age below the median. Figures in 
parenthesis are standard errors. *, **, & *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10%, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level. 
 
 Dependent variable = FIN_NUM6 
 Low 
Firm-Age 
High 
Firm-Age  
Low 
Firm-Age 
High 
Firm-Age 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
OPT_ICN 0.231*** 0.283  O 
 (0.0512) (0.197)   
STK_ICN 0.176* -0.420   
 (0.105) (0.264)   
OPT_RAT   0.142*** 0.0519 
   (0.0367) (0.0728) 
STK_RAT   -0.160 -0.182** 
   (0.136) (0.0856) 
CEO_OVERCON 0.0813** 0.0258 0.0879** 0.0399 
 (0.0383) (0.0337) (0.0362) (0.0383) 
LSIZE -0.0941*** -0.0962*** -0.0851*** -0.0949*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0213) (0.0144) (0.0223) 
LEVERAGE -0.236* -0.0271 -0.222* -0.0110 
 (0.136) (0.231) (0.122) (0.243) 
M/B -0.0460*** -0.149*** -0.0378*** -0.158*** 
 (0.00479) (0.0448) (0.00606) (0.0416) 
PROF -0.0111 -0.0780*** -0.0165 -0.0790*** 
 (0.0263) (0.00836) (0.0238) (0.00559) 
TANGB 0.0716* 0.0887 0.0762* 0.104 
 (0.0426) (0.0989) (0.0459) (0.0922) 
FIRM_AGE -0.000433 -0.00474* 0.000129 -0.00328 
 (0.00253) (0.00275) (0.00249) (0.00340) 
XRD -0.000146*** -5.65e-05 -0.000148** -4.25e-05 
 (4.83e-05) (4.60e-05) (6.13e-05) (4.52e-05) 
SP_RATING -0.00591 -0.0125*** -0.00731** -0.0126*** 
 (0.00439) (0.00262) (0.00342) (0.00344) 
SPREAD_DIFF -0.0265 0.183* -0.0373 0.184* 
 (0.0461) (0.106) (0.0459) (0.101) 
LN_LOANAMT 0.0230 0.00610 0.0301 0.00471 
 (0.0253) (0.0172) (0.0229) (0.0179) 
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LN_MATURITY -0.0302 2.12e-05 -0.0398 0.00565 
 (0.0360) (0.0518) (0.0346) (0.0504) 
PERF_DUM 0.113*** 0.0584 0.108*** 0.0529 
 (0.0302) (0.0507) (0.0276) (0.0560) 
SECURED -0.00702 0.0372 -0.0131 0.0369 
 (0.0298) (0.0539) (0.0290) (0.0462) 
Control for loan 
purpose 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Control for loan type Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Control for industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
Observations 697 715 697 715 
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Table 6 (Panel C) Analysis of the Effects of Overconfidence and Compensations on 
Covenant Size: S&P Rating 
 
This table presents the coefficients from the unbalanced cross-sectional Poisson 
regression. It examines the impacts of equity compensation and CEO 
overconfidence on the total number of covenants using the subsample data (high 
and low S&P rating). The high S&P Rating subsample includes observations of 
SP_RATING firms above the investment grade while the low S&P Rating includes 
SP_RATING firms below the investment grade. Figures in parenthesis are standard 
errors. *, **, & *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10%, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the industry level. 
 Dependent variable = FIN_NUM6 
 Low S&P 
Rating 
High S&P 
Rating 
Low S&P 
Rating 
High S&P 
Rating 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
OPT_ICN 0.198** 0.192   
 (0.0932) (0.167)   
STK_ICN 0.184* -0.379*   
 (0.0990) (0.207)   
OPT_RAT   0.0892*** 0.0813 
   (0.0337) (0.0843) 
STK_RAT   -0.271*** -0.123 
   (0.102) (0.113) 
CEO_OVERCON 0.0594** 0.0806* 0.0634** 0.0832* 
 (0.0242) (0.0444) (0.0247) (0.0426) 
LSIZE -0.0999*** -0.112*** -0.0945*** -0.110*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0315) (0.0183) (0.0301) 
LEVERAGE -0.339*** 0.138 -0.326*** 0.190 
 (0.0842) (0.141) (0.0680) (0.184) 
M/B -0.0584*** -0.0214 -0.0511*** -0.0260 
 (0.00932) (0.0340) (0.00294) (0.0275) 
PROF -0.0280 -0.0537*** -0.0307 -0.0534*** 
 (0.0194) (0.00721) (0.0196) (0.00669) 
TANGB 0.0529 0.114** 0.0496 0.127** 
 (0.0370) (0.0499) (0.0417) (0.0569) 
FIRM_AGE 0.000347 0.000805 3.72e-05 0.00125 
 (0.000821) (0.00183) (0.000814) (0.00204) 
XRD -0.000238** -2.80e-07 -0.000265* 1.43e-05 
 (0.000121) (4.04e-05) (0.000137) (3.57e-05) 
SP_RATING 0.00671* -0.131*** 0.00627* -0.134*** 
 (0.00364) (0.0180) (0.00360) (0.0223) 
SPREAD_DIFF 0.0759 0.0818 0.0651 0.0581 
 (0.0545) (0.0873) (0.0525) (0.0748) 
LN_LOANAMT 0.0199 0.0289 0.0271 0.0221 
 (0.0300) (0.0298) (0.0317) (0.0352) 
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LN_MATURITY -0.0455 0.0440 -0.0508 0.0420* 
 (0.0360) (0.0288) (0.0382) (0.0230) 
PERF_DUM 0.117*** 0.0122 0.119*** 0.00471 
 (0.0298) (0.0221) (0.0269) (0.0227) 
SECURED -0.0342** 0.0707 -0.0431*** 0.0626 
 (0.0144) (0.0841) (0.0142) (0.0911) 
Control for loan 
purpose 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Control for loan type Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Control for industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
Observations 828 584 828 584 
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Table 6 (Panel D) 
Effects of Overconfidence and Compensations on Covenant Size: Credit Spread 
This table presents the coefficients from the unbalanced cross-sectional Poisson regression. 
It examines the impacts of equity compensation and CEO overconfidence on total number 
of covenants using split sample data (high and low SPREAD_DIFF). The high credit spread 
subsample includes observations of credit spread above the median whereas the low credit 
spread subsample includes those below the median. Figures in parenthesis are standard 
errors. *, **, & *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 10%, respectively. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the industry level. 
 Dependent variable = FIN_NUM6 
 High  
Credit Spread 
Low  
Credit Spread 
High  
Credit Spread 
Low  
Credit Spread 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
OPT_ICN 0.343** 0.183   
 (0.165) (0.130)   
STK_ICN -0.151 0.156   
 (0.105) (0.203)   
OPT_RAT   0.0989*** 0.103* 
   (0.0259) (0.0540) 
STK_RAT   -0.0895* -0.199 
   (0.0483) (0.182) 
CEO_OVERCON 0.0633** 0.0616* 0.0833*** 0.0615* 
 (0.0257) (0.0333) (0.0218) (0.0332) 
LSIZE -0.101*** -0.0653** -0.0995*** -0.0564** 
 (0.0119) (0.0281) (0.0140) (0.0260) 
LEVERAGE -0.123 -0.153** -0.116 -0.125* 
 (0.220) (0.0710) (0.223) (0.0689) 
M/B -0.0726*** -0.0506* -0.0695*** -0.0413** 
 (0.0203) (0.0294) (0.0145) (0.0188) 
PROF -0.0411*** -0.0573*** -0.0369*** -0.0569*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0198) (0.0143) (0.0176) 
TANGB 0.0984 0.0702* 0.0944 0.0708** 
 (0.0719) (0.0388) (0.0748) (0.0345) 
FIRM_AGE -0.000832 -8.89e-05 -0.000421 -0.000490 
 (0.000687) (0.00165) (0.00100) (0.00160) 
XRD -0.000234*** 3.88e-06 -0.000217*** -1.62e-05 
 (2.87e-05) (3.95e-05) (2.58e-05) (3.34e-05) 
SP_RATING -0.0111*** -0.0117*** -0.0111*** -0.0123*** 
 (0.00290) (0.00438) (0.00318) (0.00375) 
SPREAD_DIFF 0.279** -0.285 0.264** -0.229 
 (0.111) (0.443) (0.113) (0.442) 
LN_LOANAMT 0.0527*** -0.0400 0.0550*** -0.0370 
 (0.0162) (0.0282) (0.0162) (0.0257) 
LN_MATURITY -0.114* -0.0213 -0.117* -0.0207 
 (0.0638) (0.0227) (0.0606) (0.0223) 
PERF_DUM 0.0354 0.111** 0.0369 0.108** 
 (0.0278) (0.0502) (0.0282) (0.0477) 
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SECURED 0.0216 0.0401 0.0155 0.0331 
 (0.0306) (0.0397) (0.0328) (0.0417) 
Control loan purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Control loan type Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Control for industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 857 555 857 555 
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Table 7 (Panel A)  
GMM – Joint determinants of Covenant, Leverage, and Maturity 
The table contains the regression with generalize method of moment (GMM) for the 
number of covenant types, firm's leverage and loan maturity. The endogenous 
variables for the three equation system are covenant size, leverage, and debt maturity. 
The system of equations is expressed as follow: 
FIN_NUM6 = f(OPT_ICN, STK_ICN, CEO_OVERCON, LEVERAGE, MATURITY, 
M/B, LSIZE, PROF, TANGB, FIRM_AGE, XRD, SP_RATING, 
SPREAD_DIFF, LN_LOANAMT, PERF_DUM, SECURED)  
                
LEVERAGE = f(OPT_ICN, STK_ICN, CEO_OVERCON, FIN_NUM6, MATURITY, 
LSIZE, OWN, M/B, REG_DUM, ABNEARN, STD_RET, FIX_ASSET, 
ROA, NOL_DUM, ITC_DUM)             
                
LN_MATURITY = f(OPT_ICN, STK_ICN, CEO_OVERCON, LEVERAGE, 
FIN_NUM6, LSIZE, LSIZE2, ASSET_MAT, OWN, M/B, TERM, 
REG_DUM, ABNEARN, STD_RET, SP_RATING, ZSCORE_DUM)
                    
The key exogenous variables are OPT_ICN, STK_ICN and CEO_OVERCON. The 
definitions of these and other variables can be found in Appendixes A and B. Figures 
in parenthesis are standard errors. *, **, & *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, & 
10%, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FIN_NUM6 LEVERAGE LN_MATURITY 
    
LEVERAGE -2.357*  2.399** 
 (1.249)  (1.014) 
LN_MATURITY -0.695*** 0.0113  
 (0.229) (0.0460)  
FIN_NUM6  0.375*** 0.914*** 
  (0.0982) (0.329) 
OPT_ICN 0.675** -0.226* -0.775** 
 (0.288) (0.115) (0.381) 
STK_ICN 0.0814 0.00150 0.233 
 (0.183) (0.0839) (0.236) 
CEO_OVERCON 0.175** -0.0912*** 0.00299 
 (0.0780) (0.0317) (0.0960) 
LSIZE -0.322*** 0.110*** -0.189 
 (0.0561) (0.0302) (0.760) 
M/B -0.268*** 0.0950*** 0.205*** 
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 (0.0561) (0.0299) (0.0732) 
PROF -0.132***   
 (0.0483)   
TANGB 0.339***   
 (0.129)   
FIRM_AGE -3.99e-05   
 (0.00252)   
XRD -0.000623**   
 (0.000307)   
SP_RATING -0.0184*  -0.000392 
 (0.0105)  (0.0136) 
SPREAD_DIFF -0.119   
 (0.197)   
LN_LOANAMT 0.183***   
 (0.0634)   
PERF_DUM 0.272***   
 (0.102)   
SECURED 0.377***   
 (0.134)   
OWN  -0.170 -1.090 
  (0.316) (0.794) 
REG_DUM  0.0875** -0.0922 
  (0.0419) (0.158) 
ABNEARN  0.174 0.801** 
  (0.137) (0.353) 
STD_RET  -2.473*** -1.789 
  (0.493) (1.776) 
FIX_ASSET  0.222***  
  (0.0614)  
ROA  -0.594***  
  (0.225)  
NOL_DUM  0.0448*  
  (0.0248)  
ITC_DUM  0.00710  
  (0.0388)  
LSIZE2   0.00661 
   (0.0181) 
ASSET_MAT   0.00923 
   (0.00566) 
TERM   0.212*** 
   (0.0291) 
ZSCORE_DUM   0.487** 
   (0.198) 
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Observations 1,003 1,003 1,003 
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Table 7 (Panel B) GMM – Joint Determinants of Loan Spread and Number of 
Covenants 
This table presents the coefficients derived from GMM. The dependent variables for 
the two equation system are number of covenant types and loan spread. The system 
of equations is expressed as follow: 
FIN_NUM6 = f(OPT_ICN, STK_ICN, CEO_OVERCON, ALL_SPR, LEVERAGE, 
LN_MATURITY, M/B, LSIZE, PROF, TANGB, FIRM_AGE, XRD, 
SP_RATING, SPREAD_DIFF, LN_LOANAMT, PERF_DUM, 
SECURED)            
ALL_SPR = f(OPT_ICN, STK_ICN, CEO_OVERCON, FIN_NUM6, LEVERAGE, 
LN_MATURITY, M/B, LSIZE, PROF, TANGB, SALES_GRO, 
CASH_HLD, AVG_SPR, SP_RATING, SPREAD_DIFF, 
LN_LOANAMT, PERF_DUM, SECURED)       
 
The key pre-determined variables are OPT_ICN and CEO_OVERCON. The 
definitions of these and other variables used in GMM can be found in Appendixes A 
and B. Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. *, **, & *** denote significance at 
1%, 5%, & 10%, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry 
level. 
 (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FIN_NUM6 ALL_SPR 
   
FIN_NUM6  1.030 
  (1.044) 
ALL_SPR 0.475**  
 (0.201)  
CEO_OVERCON 0.138** -0.102 
 (0.0568) (0.165) 
OPT_ICN 0.470** -0.435 
 (0.205) (0.611) 
STK_ICN 0.0900 -0.128 
 (0.128) (0.133) 
LSIZE -0.192*** 0.159 
 (0.0371) (0.246) 
LEVERAGE -0.679** 1.315*** 
 (0.268) (0.317) 
M/B -0.0776* -0.0143 
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 (0.0408) (0.162) 
PROF -0.0884*** 0.0998 
 (0.0335) (0.0922) 
TANGB 0.0395 0.0145 
 (0.0901) (0.141) 
CASH_HLD  0.788** 
  (0.317) 
SALES_GRO  -0.0573 
  (0.128) 
AVG_SPR  0.117 
  (0.146) 
SP_RATING -0.0143** 0.00120 
 (0.00723) (0.0276) 
SPREAD_DIFF -0.241 0.597*** 
 (0.199) (0.178) 
LN_LOANAMT 0.0602 -0.0621 
 (0.0378) (0.0605) 
LN_MATURITY 0.0469 -0.0459 
 (0.0371) (0.0778) 
PERF_DUM 0.225*** -0.325** 
 (0.0739) (0.157) 
SECURED -0.232 0.556*** 
 (0.146) (0.0970) 
FIRM_AGE 0.000358  
 (0.00185)  
XRD -0.000125  
 (0.000142)  
   
Observations 1,321 1,321 
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Table 8 (Panel A)  
Propensity Score Matching: Impacts of Firm Characteristics 
on CEO Overconfidence 
 
VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable = 
CEO_OVERCON 
  
FIRM_AGE -0.0163*** 
 (0.00265) 
M/B 0.499*** 
 (0.0444) 
LEVERAGE 0.0206 
 (0.256) 
LSIZE 0.0753** 
 (0.0327) 
Control for industry Yes 
  
Observations 1,412 
  
The Propensity Score, estimated using Probit regression, is used to 
perform a nearest neighbor match with replacement to other firms. I pair 
up a firm’s overconfident CEO with another firm’s non-overconfident 
CEO such that these two groups have similar firm age, market-to-book 
ratio, leverage, and firm size.   
 
Table 8 (Panel B)  
Propensity Score Matching: Covariate Imbalance Testing on 
Matched Sample 
 
              Mean 
 
 
Variable Treated Control t-value 
    
FIRM_AGE 21.292 20.345 1.01 
M/B 2.346 2.2913 0.67 
LEVERAGE 0.234 0.225 0.83 
LSIZE 21.130 21.163 -0.39 
T-test is performed for the treatment group (with overconfident CEOs) 
and the control group (with non-overconfident CEO) in the matched 
sample. The mean values between the treatment and control groups are 
not significantly different from each other at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 8 (Panel C)  
Propensity Score Matching: Differences in the Number of Financial 
Covenants between the Treatment and Control Groups 
 
Variable 
 
Treated 
 
Control 
 
Differences 
 
t-value 
     
FIN_NUM6 
 
2.156 
 
1.977 
 
0.179 
 
2.82 
 
D_COVER 
 
0.688 
 
0.620 
 
0.067 
 
2.23 
 
D_DCF 0.593 0.491 0.103 3.23 
     
 
T-tests are performed at 5% level of significance.  
 
Table 8 (Panel D)  
Univariate Regression on Matched Sample: Effects of Overconfidence on Total 
Number of Covenants, Coverage Covenants and Debt-to-Cash Flow Covenants 
 Dependent Variables 
____________________________________________________
______  
 FIN_NUM6 D_COVER D_DCF 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
CEO_OVERCON 0.106** 0.212** 0.322*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0952) (0.0932) 
Constant 0.662*** 0.278*** -0.0859 
 (0.0420) (0.0744) (0.0734) 
    
Observations 779 779 779 
 
I examine here the relations between CEO overconfidence and number of financial 
covenants, coverage covenants and debt-to-cash flow covenants based on the 
matched sample. Column (1) corresponds to univariate Poisson regression, column 
(2) to univariate Probit regression, and column (3) to univariate Probit regression. 
